Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Roderick Firth, Lawrence Kohlberg and Peter Klein

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

---

6 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence

8833	Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P]
	Full Idea: A key question for a coherentist is, why should he or she adopt a coherent set of beliefs rather than an incoherent set?
	From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], 'Step 1')
	A reaction: The point of the question is that the coherentist may have to revert to other criteria in answering it. One could equally ask, why should I believe in tables just because I vividly experience them? Or, why believe 2+2=4, just because it is obvious?

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems

6493	We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth]
	Full Idea: We are not conscious of liquidity, coldness, and solidity, but of the liquidity of water, the coldness of ice, and the solidity of rocks.
	From: Roderick Firth (Sense Data and the Percept Theory [1949]), quoted by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.7
	A reaction: A nice point, but it might not be entirely true in a blindfold test, where one might only report properties like 'sticky' or 'warm', without having any clear concept of the substance being experienced. Firth is proposing the 'percept theory'.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma

8834	Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P]
	Full Idea: Infinitism can solve the regress problem, because it endorses a warrant-emergent form of reasoning in which warrant increases as the series of reasons lengthens. The theory can avoid both circularity and arbitrariness.
	From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], 'Step 2')
	A reaction: It nicely avoids arbitrariness by offering a reason for absolutely every belief. I think the way to go may to combine individual Infinitism with a social account of where to set the bar of acceptable justification.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations

8838	If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P]
	Full Idea: An endless chain of inferential justifications can never ultimately explain why any link in the chain is justified.
	From: comment on Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005]) by Carl Ginet - Infinitism not solution to regress problem p.148
	A reaction: This strikes me as a mere yearning for foundations. I don't see sense-experience or the natural light of human reason (or the word of God, for that matter) as in any way 'ultimate'. It's all evidence to be evaluated.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

8839	Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P]
	Full Idea: The infinitist holds that finding a reason, and then another reason for that reason, places it at the beginning of a series where each gains warrant as part of the series. ..Rational credibility increases as the series lengthens.
	From: Peter Klein (Infinitism solution to regress problem [2005], p.137)
	A reaction: A striking problem here for Klein is the status of the first reason, prior to it being supported by a series. Surprisingly, it seems that it would not yet be a justification. Coherence accounts have the same problem, if coherence is the only criterion.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics

5319	Avoid punishment, then get rewards, avoid rejection, avoid guilt, accept contracts, follow conscience [Kohlberg, by Wilson,EO]
	Full Idea: Kohlberg's six stages of ethical development are: 1) avoid punishment, 2) obtain rewards, 3) avoid rejection, 4) avoid censure and guilt, 5) recognise contracts, 6) individual conscience.
	From: report of Lawrence Kohlberg (works [1969]) by Edmund O. Wilson - On Human Nature p.166
	A reaction: This doesn't throw much light on philosophical problems, but the order of the six stages is interesting. Beware of oversimplification, because a situation can put pressure on any one of these six aspects of morality.