Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Roderick Firth, Theophrastus and Richard Bentley

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4 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems

6493	We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth]
	Full Idea: We are not conscious of liquidity, coldness, and solidity, but of the liquidity of water, the coldness of ice, and the solidity of rocks.
	From: Roderick Firth (Sense Data and the Percept Theory [1949]), quoted by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.7
	A reaction: A nice point, but it might not be entirely true in a blindfold test, where one might only report properties like 'sticky' or 'warm', without having any clear concept of the substance being experienced. Firth is proposing the 'percept theory'.

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique

20921	How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus]
	Full Idea: How could what is bitter for us be sweet and sour for others, if there is not some determinate nature for them?
	From: Theophrastus (On the Senses [c.321 BCE], 70)
	A reaction: The remark is aimed at Democritus. This is part of the general question of how you can even talk about relativism, without attaching stable meanings to the concepts employed.

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism

23224	That all matter thinks is absurd, and would make each part of our bodies a distinct self-consciousness [Bentley]
	Full Idea: [Belief in thinking matter] leads to monstrous absurdities. …Every stock and stone would be a percipient and rational creature. …every single Atom of our bodies would be a distinct Animal, endued with self-consciousness and personal sensation of its own.
	From: Richard Bentley (Matter and Motion Cannot Think [1692], p.14-15), quoted by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 2
	A reaction: Sounds correct, though presumably panpsychists don't think the flickers of consciousness in my toenails and hair constitute full-blown persons. I can't imagine what awareness is being claimed for my toenails.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied

5990	Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk]
	Full Idea: Theophrastus questioned Aristotle's teaching on the extent to which teleological explanations could be applied to the natural world.
	From: report of Theophrastus (On Metaphysics (frags) [c.320 BCE]) by H.B. Gottschalk - Aristotelianism
	A reaction: It is interesting to see that Aristotle's own immediate successor had doubts about teleology. We usually assume that the ancients were teleological, and this was rejected in the seventeenth century (e.g. Idea 4826).