Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Roger Penrose, Johanna Seibt and Verity Harte

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11 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V]
     Full Idea: Judicious use of an opponent's assumptions is quite capable of producing a perfectly reasonable ad hominem refutation of the opponent's thesis.
     From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.6)
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V]
     Full Idea: Historically, the evolution of mereology was associated with the desire to find alternatives to set theory for those with nomimalist qualms about the commitment to abstract objects like sets.
     From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.2)
     A reaction: Goodman, for example. It is interesting to note that the hardline nominalist Quine, pal of Goodman, eventually accepted set theory. It is difficult to account for things by merely naming their parts.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V]
     Full Idea: Earth, air, fire and water, viewed as elements, are, by tradition, the leading candidates for being the things that persist through change.
     From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 4.4)
     A reaction: Physics still offers us things that persist through change, as conservation laws.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Process philosophy places the dynamic nature of being at the centre of our theories [Seibt]
     Full Idea: Process philosophy is based on the premise that being is dynamic and that the dynamic nature of being should be the primary focus of any comprehensive philosophical account of reality and our place within it.
     From: Johanna Seibt (Process Philosophy [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: Put like that, the chief ancestor of this approach would be Leibniz, even though his central idea concerns substances. Heraclitus is the most famous ancestor of Process Philosophy. Powers are dynamic, but powers of what?
Reductionists identify processes by their 'owner', but tornadoes etc. are processes without owners [Seibt]
     Full Idea: On the reductionist view of processes, they are all 'owned' and we identify them by their owner (such as the murder of Caesar), ...but many processes (e.g. tornadoes, lightning bolts, the NY rush hour) lack a proper 'subject' altogether.
     From: Johanna Seibt (Process Philosophy [2012], 2)
     A reaction: This seems to be a fairly conclusive refutation of the view that processes are just objects changing their properties.
Traditionally small things add up to processes, but quantum mechanics reverses this [Seibt]
     Full Idea: Instead of very small things (atoms) combining to produce standard processes (snowstorms), modern physics envisions very small processes (quantum phenomena) combining to produce standard things.
     From: Johanna Seibt (Process Philosophy [2012], 4 (i))
     A reaction: Though electrons seem to be distinct things with a fixed set of properties, so this is not a clear point. Where do fields come into it? Beware of citing quantum mechanics in metaphysics!
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
     Full Idea: Mereologists do suppose that constitution is a criterion of identity. This view is enshrined in the Mereological axiom of extensionality; that objects with the same parts are identical.
     From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 3.1)
     A reaction: A helpful explanation of why classical mereology is a very confused view of the world. It is at least obvious that a long wall and a house are different things, even if built of identical bricks.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V]
     Full Idea: The difficulty with the claim that a whole is (just) the sum of its parts is what are we to understand by 'the sum'? ...If we say wholes are 'composites' of parts, how are we to understand the relation of composition?
     From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1)
If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V]
     Full Idea: Holism inherits all the difficulties associated with the term 'sum' and adds one of its own, when it says a whole is 'more than' the sum of its parts. This seems to say it has something extra? Is this something extra a part?
     From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1)
     A reaction: [compressed] Most people take the claim that a thing is more than the sum of its parts as metaphorical, I would think (except perhaps emergentists about the mind, and they are wrong).
The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V]
     Full Idea: For my money, the real problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular.
     From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1)
     A reaction: Her point is that the surface grammar makes you accept a unity here, with no account of what unifies it, or even whether there is a unity. Does classical mereology have a concept (as the rest of us do) of 'disunity'?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Quantum states in microtubules could bind brain activity to produce consciousness [Penrose]
     Full Idea: I propose that microtubules in nerve cells could give rise to a stable quantum state that would bind the activity of brain cells throughout the cerebrum and in doing so give rise to consciousness.
     From: Roger Penrose (Could a computer ever understand? [1998], p.329)
     A reaction: This seems to offer a physical theory to account for the 'unity' of the mind (which so impressed Descartes), but I don't quite see why being aware of things would ensue from some 'quantum binding'. I daresay 'quantum binding' occurs in the Sun.