Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Roger Penrose, Jonathan Swift and David H. Sanford

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4 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
You can't reason someone out of an irrational opinion [Swift]
     Full Idea: Reasoning will never make a man correct an ill opinion, which by reasoning he never acquired.
     From: Jonathan Swift (Letters to a Young Clergyman [1720])
     A reaction: It would be hard to prove this, and someone full of irrational beliefs may have their rationality awakened by a sound argument. Nice remark, but too pessimistic.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford]
     Full Idea: Although not all explanations are causal, anything which can be explained in any way can be explained causally.
     From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.79)
     A reaction: A nice bold claim with which I am in sympathy, but he would have a struggle proving it. Does this imply that causal explanations are basic, or in some way superior? Note that functional explanations would thus have underlying causal explanations.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Quantum states in microtubules could bind brain activity to produce consciousness [Penrose]
     Full Idea: I propose that microtubules in nerve cells could give rise to a stable quantum state that would bind the activity of brain cells throughout the cerebrum and in doing so give rise to consciousness.
     From: Roger Penrose (Could a computer ever understand? [1998], p.329)
     A reaction: This seems to offer a physical theory to account for the 'unity' of the mind (which so impressed Descartes), but I don't quite see why being aware of things would ensue from some 'quantum binding'. I daresay 'quantum binding' occurs in the Sun.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford]
     Full Idea: A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is jointly sufficient for it. This is a widely held but controversial view, and it is not a logical truth.
     From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.82)
     A reaction: This wouldn't work for an impossible occurrence. What are the necessary conditions to produce a large planet made of uranium? One of them would have to be a naturally impossible necessity.