10 ideas
| 3534 | To be is to have causal powers [Alexander,S] |
| Full Idea: To be is to have causal powers. | |
| From: Samuel Alexander (works [1927], §4), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation | |
| A reaction: This is sometimes called Alexander's Principle. It is first found in Plato, and is popular with physicalists, but there are problem cases... A thing needs to exist in order to have causal powers. To exist is more than to be perceived. |
| 16065 | Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman] |
| Full Idea: Some insist that constitution is identity, on the grounds that distinct material objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time. Others argue that constitution is not identity, since the statue and its material differ in important respects. | |
| From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], Intro) | |
| A reaction: The 'important respects' seem to concern possibilities rather than actualities, which is suspicious. It is misleading to think we are dealing with two things and their relation here. Objects must have constitutions; constitutions make objects. |
| 16067 | Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman] |
| Full Idea: For those for whom 'constitution is not identity' (the 'constitution view'), constitution is said to be an asymmetric relation, and also a dependence relation (unlike identity). | |
| From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], 2) | |
| A reaction: It seems obvious that constitution is not identity, because there is more to a thing's identity than its mere constitution. But this idea makes it sound as if constitution has nothing to do with identity (chalk and cheese), and that can't be right. |
| 16069 | There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman] |
| Full Idea: The three most common objections to the constitution view are the Impenetrability Objection (two things in one place?), the Extensionality Objection (mereology says wholes are just their parts), and the Grounding Objection (their ground is the same). | |
| From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], 2) | |
| A reaction: [summary] He adds a fourth, that if two things can be in one place, why stop at two? [Among defenders of the Constitution View he lists Baker, Fine, Forbes, Koslicki, Kripke, Lowe, Oderberg, N.Salmon, Shoemaker, Simons and Yablo.] |
| 16068 | The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman] |
| Full Idea: We do not calculate the weight of something by summing the weights of all its parts - weigh bricks and the molecules of a wall and you will get the wrong result, since you have weighed some parts more than once. | |
| From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], 2) | |
| A reaction: In fact the complete inventory of the parts of a thing is irrelevant to almost anything we would like to know about the thing. The parts must be counted at some 'level' of division into parts. An element can belong to many different sets. |
| 16074 | Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman] |
| Full Idea: If the relative identity theorist denies transitivity (to deal with the Ship of Theseus, for example), this would make us suspect that relativised identity relations are not identity relations, since transitivity seems central to identity. | |
| From: Ryan Wasserman (Material Constitution [2009], 6) | |
| A reaction: The problem here, I think, focuses on the meaning of the word 'same'. One change of plank leaves you with the same ship, but that is not transitive. If 'identical' is too pure to give the meaning of 'the same' it's not much use in discussing the world. |
| 20945 | Belief is no more rational than is tasting and smelling [Hamann] |
| Full Idea: Belief happens as little in terms of reasons as tasting and smelling. | |
| From: J.G. Hamann (works [1770], v2:74), quoted by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy | |
| A reaction: That is one idea definitively expressed! I take it as only a partial truth. Beliefs happen as a result of observation and experience. But someone can draw our attention to something (and we can hunt it out ourselves), which is giving a reason for belief. |
| 14494 | Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S] |
| Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do, no purpose to serve, a species of noblesse which depends on the work of its inferiors, but is kept for show and might as well, and undoubtedly would in time be abolished. | |
| From: Samuel Alexander (Space, Time and Deity (2 vols) [1927], 2:8), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation IV | |
| A reaction: Wonderful! Kim quotes this, and labels the implicit slogan (to be real is to have causal powers) 'Alexander's Dictum'. All the examples given of epiphenomena are only causally inert within a defined system, but they act causally outside the system. |
| 3398 | Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S] |
| Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do and no purpose to serve. | |
| From: Samuel Alexander (works [1927]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.129 | |
| A reaction: An objection, but not, I think, a strong one. The fact, for example, that sweat is shiny is the result of good evolutionary reasons, but I cannot think of any purpose which it serves. All events which are purposeful are likely to have side-effects. |
| 7666 | God is not a mathematician, but a poet [Hamann, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: Hamann's fundamental doctrine was that God was not a geometer, not a mathematician, but a poet. | |
| From: report of J.G. Hamann (works [1770]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: [This idea is wonderfully expressed by D.H.Lawrence in his poem 'Red Geranium and Godly Mignonette]. The idea becomes attractive when you ask whether God would need to do mathematics. |