Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Samuel Alexander, Dmitri Mendeleev and G.F. Stout

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8 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
To be is to have causal powers [Alexander,S]
     Full Idea: To be is to have causal powers.
     From: Samuel Alexander (works [1927], §4), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation
     A reaction: This is sometimes called Alexander's Principle. It is first found in Plato, and is popular with physicalists, but there are problem cases... A thing needs to exist in order to have causal powers. To exist is more than to be perceived.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Stout first explicitly proposed that properties and relations are particulars [Stout,GF, by Campbell,K]
     Full Idea: In modern times, it was G.F. Stout who first explicitly made the proposal that properties and relations are as particular as the substances that they qualify.
     From: report of G.F. Stout (The Nature of Universals and Propositions [1923]) by Keith Campbell - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars §1
     A reaction: Note that relations will have to be tropes, as well as properties. Williams wants tropes to be parts of objects, but that will be tricky with relations. If you place two objects on a table, how does the 'to the left of' trope come into existence?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S]
     Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do and no purpose to serve.
     From: Samuel Alexander (works [1927]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.129
     A reaction: An objection, but not, I think, a strong one. The fact, for example, that sweat is shiny is the result of good evolutionary reasons, but I cannot think of any purpose which it serves. All events which are purposeful are likely to have side-effects.
Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S]
     Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do, no purpose to serve, a species of noblesse which depends on the work of its inferiors, but is kept for show and might as well, and undoubtedly would in time be abolished.
     From: Samuel Alexander (Space, Time and Deity (2 vols) [1927], 2:8), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation IV
     A reaction: Wonderful! Kim quotes this, and labels the implicit slogan (to be real is to have causal powers) 'Alexander's Dictum'. All the examples given of epiphenomena are only causally inert within a defined system, but they act causally outside the system.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Mendeleev saw three principles in nature: matter, force and spirit (where the latter seems to be essence) [Mendeleev, by Scerri]
     Full Idea: Mendeleev rejected one unifying principles in favour of three basic components of nature: matter (substance), force (energy), and spirit (soul). 'Spirit' is said to be what we now mean by essentialism - what is irreducibly peculiar to the object.
     From: report of Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870]) by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Making'
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
Elements don't survive in compounds, but the 'substance' of the element does [Mendeleev]
     Full Idea: Neither mercury as a metal nor oxygen as a gas is contained in mercury oxide; it only contains the substance of the elements, just as steam only contains the substance of ice.
     From: Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870], I:23), quoted by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Nature'
     A reaction: [1889 edn] Scerri glosses the word 'substance' as meaning essence.
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Mendeleev focused on abstract elements, not simple substances, so he got to their essence [Mendeleev, by Scerri]
     Full Idea: Because he was attempting to classify abstract elements, not simple substances, Mendeleev was not misled by nonessential chemical properties.
     From: report of Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870]) by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Making'
     A reaction: I'm not fully clear about this, but I take it that Mendeleev stood back from the messy observations, and tried to see the underlying simpler principles. 'Simple substances' were ones that had not so far been decomposed.
Mendeleev had a view of elements which allowed him to overlook some conflicting observations [Mendeleev]
     Full Idea: His view of elements allowed Mendeleev to maintain the validity of the periodic table even in instances where observational evidence seemed to point against it.
     From: Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870]), quoted by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Making'
     A reaction: Mendeleev seems to have focused on abstract essences of elements, rather than on the simplest substances they had so far managed to isolate.