Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Saunders MacLane, Justus Lipsius and John Wycliff

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
A neo-Stoic movement began in the late sixteenth century [Lipsius, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: A neo-Stoic movement began at the end of the sixteenth century, under the inspiration of the Dutch scholar Justus Lipsius.
     From: report of Justus Lipsius (works [1584]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.5
     A reaction: I would take this to be just as much a movement against Christianity as the interest in the less theistic Epicurus. They wanted the virtues of Christianity without the theological trappings.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
ZFC could contain a contradiction, and it can never prove its own consistency [MacLane]
     Full Idea: We have at hand no proof that the axioms of ZFC for set theory will never yield a contradiction, while Gödel's second theorem tells us that such a consistency proof cannot be conducted within ZFC.
     From: Saunders MacLane (Mathematics: Form and Function [1986], p.406), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics
     A reaction: Maddy quotes this, while defending set theory as the foundation of mathematics, but it clearly isn't the most secure foundation that could be devised. She says the benefits of set theory do not need guaranteed consistency (p.30).
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
In order to speak about time and successive entities, the 'present' must be enlarged [Wycliff]
     Full Idea: It is clear from the way in which one must speak about time and other successive entities that talk about 'the present' must be enlarged. Otherwise it would have to be denied that any successive entity could exist, which is impossible.
     From: John Wycliff (De ente praedicamentali [1375], 20 p.189), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
     A reaction: This is a lovely idea, even if it is not quite clear what it means. The mind seems to stretch out the now anyway (as the 'specious present'), so why not embrace that in language and conscious thought?
To be successive a thing needs parts, which must therefore be lodged outside that instant [Wycliff]
     Full Idea: If something is successive, it is successive with respect to its individual parts, which cannot exist at the same instant. Therefore it follows that many of its parts are lodged outside that instant.
     From: John Wycliff (De ente praedicamentali [1375], 20 p.189), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.3
     A reaction: An obvious would be to say that there are therefore no successive entities, but Wycliff is appealing to our universal acceptance of them, and offering a transcendental argument. Nice move.