23 ideas
8220 | Philosophy is in a perpetual state of digression [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Philosophy can be seen as being in a perpetual state of digression. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Anyone who has ever tried to teach philosophy will vouch for this. Philosophy is the 'Arabian Nights', conjuring up wonderful stories, to avoid having to face something nasty. Philosophy is perpetual postponement of problems. |
8217 | Philosophy is a concept-creating discipline [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is the discipline that involves creating concepts. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], Intro) | |
A reaction: One might very reasonably reply that Geography is a discipline which creates concepts. However, this emphasis is an interesting corrective to the school of analysis, which appears confined to existing, and even 'folk', concepts. |
8242 | Philosophy aims at what is interesting, remarkable or important - not at knowledge or truth [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Philosophy does not consist in knowing, and is not inspired by truth. Rather, it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.3) | |
A reaction: Speak for yourself. I wonder what the criteria are for 'Interesting' or 'Important'. They can't seriously count 'remarkable' as a criterion of philosophical success, can they? There can be remarkable stupidity. |
8223 | The plague of philosophy is those who criticise without creating, and defend dead concepts [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Those who criticise without creating, those who are content to defend the vanished concept without being able to give it the forces it needs to return to life, are the plague of philosophy. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the continental view of analytical philosophy, that it is pathetically conservative. I would offer MacIntyre as a response, who gives a beautiful analysis of why the super-modern view is dead. The French are hopelessly romantic. |
8247 | Phenomenology needs art as logic needs science [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Phenomenology needs art as logic needs science. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 2.6) | |
A reaction: I would have thought that it was science that needs logic. Art is more elitist than science, and less universal. I presume artists and phenomenologists share a target of deconstructing lived human experience. |
8224 | 'Eris' is the divinity of conflict, the opposite of Philia, the god of friendship [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: 'Eris' is the Greek divinity of discord, conflict, and strife, the complementary opposite of Philia, the divinity of union and friendship. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.2 n) | |
A reaction: Are these actual gods? This interestingly implies that the wonders of dialectic and Socrates' elenchus are simply aspects of friendship, which was elevated by Epicurus to the highest good. The Greeks just wanted wonderful friends and fine speeches. |
9355 | One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt] |
Full Idea: An argument is 'premise-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that is assumed as a premise of that very argument. An argument is 'rule-circular' if it aims to establish a conclusion that asserts the goodness of the rule used in that argument. | |
From: report of R.B. Braithwaite (Scientific Explanation [1953], p.274-8) by Michael Devitt - There is no a Priori §2 | |
A reaction: Rule circularity is the sort of thing Quine is always objecting to, but such circularities may be unavoidable, and even totally benign. All the good things in life form a mutually supporting team. |
8219 | Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Logic has an infantile idea of philosophy. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This offers some explanation of why Anglo-American philosophers are steeped in logic, and the continentals just ignore it. I have some sympathy with the French view. Logic seems to study language with all the interesting part drained off. |
8246 | Logic hates philosophy, and wishes to supplant it [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: A real hatred inspires logic's rivalry with, or its will to supplant, philosophy. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 2.6) | |
A reaction: A delightful corrective to the neurotic inferiority that most English-speaking philosophers feel about their failure to master logic. What was Aristotle playing at when he invented logic? Philosophical talent is utterly different from a talent for logic. |
8221 | We cannot judge the Cogito. Must we begin? Must we start from certainty? Can 'I' relate to thought? [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: There is no point in wondering whether Descartes' Cogito is right or wrong. Is it necessary "to begin", and, if so, is it necessary to start from the point of view of a subjective certainty? Can thought be the verb of an I? There is no direct answer. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: A nice first sentence for a work of philosophy would be "It is necessary to begin". Is the Cogito the only idea that is beyond judgement? I fear a slippery slope here, which would paralyse all of our judgements - and would therefore be ridiculous. |
8222 | Concepts are superior because they make us more aware, and change our thinking [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: If one concept is 'better' than an earlier one, it is because it makes us aware of new variations and unknown resonances, it carries out unforeseen cuttings-out, it brings forth an Event that surveys (survole) us. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I don't get much of that, but it is certainly in tune with the Kuhn/Feyerabend idea that what science can generate is fresh visions, rather than precisely expanded truths. Personally I consider it dangerous nonsense, but I thought I ought to pass it on. |
2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
Full Idea: When bodies are conceived without mind, Zombies are the topic; when mind is conceived without bodies, Ghosts are the topic. | |
From: Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: Personally I am not too impressed by either possibility. I doubt whether either of them are even logically possible. Can you have a magnet without its magnetism? Can you have magnetism with no magnet? |
2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
Full Idea: The question is whether mental and physical types (which are properties) are distinct, and whether mental and physical tokens (which are events) are distinct. | |
From: Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: Helpful. While the first one gives us the rather dodgy notion of 'property dualism', the second one seems to imply Cartesian dualism, if the events really are distinct. It seems to me that thought is an aspect of brain events, not a distinct event. |
8218 | Other people completely revise our perceptions, because they are possible worlds [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: The concept of the Other Person as expression of a possible world in a perceptual field leads us to consider the components of this field in a new way. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I like the idea that other people are possible worlds. You can give reductionist accounts of the human animal till the cows come home, but when one walk into your visual field, the mind takes off. See Crusoe and Friday. |
2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
Full Idea: The link between Aboutness and consciousness, plus the latter's theoretical recalcitrance, have prevented reduction of the former. | |
From: Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: I remain unconvinced that Aboutness (intentionality) has to be wholly (or even partly conscious). We are more interested in our conscious mental states, because those are the ones we can report to other people, and discuss. |
2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
Full Idea: If you can't squeeze an 'ought' from an 'is', then the feature of normativity will prevent the reduction of Aboutness. | |
From: Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: A dubious argument. Hume's point is that no rational inference will get you from is to ought, but you can get there on a whim. I don't see normativity as being so intrinsically magical that it is irreducible. |
2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
Full Idea: The dominant empirical argument for physicalism is the Overdetermination Argument: physics is closed and complete, mind is causally efficacious, the world isn't choc-full of overdetermination, so the mind is physical as well. | |
From: Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: I find this argument utterly convincing. The idea that there is only one thing which is outside the interconnected causal nexus which seems to constitute the rest of reality, and that is a piece of meat inside our heads, strikes me as totally ridiculous. |
8248 | Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: According to phenomenology, thought depends on man's relations with the world - with which the brain is necessarily in agreement because it is drawn from these relations. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], Conclusion) | |
A reaction: The development of externalist views of mind, arising from the Twin Earth idea, seems to provide a link to continental philosophy, where similar ideas are found in Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. So study science, psychology, or sociology? |
2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |
Full Idea: Does a thought relate to its truth conditions like a tree to its age, a bee dance to its target, or smoke to its cause? | |
From: Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: Nice question. Is truth the purpose of thoughts, or the cause of thoughts, or the constitution(?) of thoughts? I vote for the bee….but we mustn't confuse truth with truth-conditions. |
8245 | The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Logic is reductionist not accidentally, but essentially and necessarily: following the route marked out by Frege and Russell, it wants to turn the concept into a function (...when actually a concept is a form, or a force). | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 2.6) | |
A reaction: [Last part on p.144] I'm not sure that I understand 'form or force', but the idea that concepts are mere functions is like describing something as 'transport', without saying whether it is bus/bike/train.. Is a concept a vision, or a tool? |
21906 | Political theory should not focus on the state or economy, but on the small scale of power [Deleuze/Guattari, by May] |
Full Idea: Liberals who focus on the state and Marxists who focus on the economy are macropolitical theorists. They overlook the small elements that comprise our political lives. To understand how we are constructed and power works we must turn to the smaller scale. | |
From: report of G Deleuze / F Guattari (A Thousand Plateaus [1980]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 4.04 | |
A reaction: This seems to be precisely in tune with the ideas of Foucault. I'm not sure that a study of power within the family or the office throws much light on macropolitics. How the micro intrudes into the micro seems more interesting. |
8243 | Atheism is the philosopher's serenity, and philosophy's achievement [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: It is amazing that so many philosophers take the death of God as tragic. Atheism is not a drama, but the philosopher's serenity and philosophy's achievement. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 1.4) | |
A reaction: It seems to me that it is the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that feels the death of God as a tragedy. Modern Anglo-American philosophers are mostly pretty serene on the subject, unless, like Dennett, they go on the offensive. |
1468 | If meaning is use, then religious sentences have meaning because they are used to assert an intention about how to live [Braithwaite, by PG] |
Full Idea: If the meaning of statements is their use (as Wittgenstein claims), then religious people use religious claims to assert an intention to follow a religious life and morality, and this intention gives their sentences meaning. | |
From: report of R.B. Braithwaite (Empiricist View of Religion [1955]) by PG - Db (ideas) |