53 ideas
| 21463 | Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were key opponents of the Enlightenment [Gardner] |
| Full Idea: Hamann, Herder and Jacobi are central figues in the reaction against Enlightenment. | |
| From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 10 'immediate') | |
| A reaction: From a British perspective I would see Hume as the leading such figure. Hamann emphasised the neglect of the role of language. Jacobi was a Christian. |
| 21459 | Kant halted rationalism, and forced empiricists to worry about foundations [Gardner] |
| Full Idea: Kant's Critique swiftly brought rationalism to a halt, and after Kant empiricism has displayed a nervousness regarding its foundations, and been forced to assume more sophisticated forms. | |
| From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 10 Intro) | |
| A reaction: See the ideas of Laurence Bonjour for a modern revival of rationalism. After Kant philosophers either went existential, or stared gloomily into the obscure depths. Formal logic was seen as a possible rope ladder down. |
| 21460 | Only Kant and Hegel have united nature, morals, politics, aesthetics and religion [Gardner] |
| Full Idea: Apart from Hegel, no later philosophical system equals in stature Kant's attempt to weld together the diverse fields of natural science, morality, politics, aesthetics and religion into a systematic overarching epistemological and metaphysical unity. | |
| From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 10) | |
| A reaction: Earlier candidate are Plato and Aristotle. Earlier Enlightenment figures say little about morality or aesthetics. Hobbes ranges widely. Aquinas covered most things. |
| 7807 | The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra] |
| Full Idea: Bolzano said the 'laws of thought' (identity, contradiction, excluded middle) are true, but nothing of interest follows from them. Logic obeys them, but they are not logic's first principles or axioms. | |
| From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837], §3) by George / Van Evra - The Rise of Modern Logic | |
| A reaction: An interesting and crucial distinction. For samples of proposed axioms of logic, see Ideas 6408, 7798 and 7797. |
| 10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: The Geach-Kaplan sentence 'Some critics admire only one another' provably has no singular first-order paraphrase using only its predicates. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 1) | |
| A reaction: There seems to be a choice of either going second-order (picking out a property), or going plural (collectively quantifying), or maybe both. |
| 21443 | Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner] |
| Full Idea: A transcendental proof converts a possibility into a necessity: by saying under what conditions experience of objects is possible, transcendental proofs show those conditions to be necessary for us to the extent that we have any experience of objects. | |
| From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 02 'Transc') | |
| A reaction: They appear to be hypothetical necessities, rather than true metaphysical necessities. Gardner is discussing Kant, but seems to be generalising. Hypothetical necessities are easy: if it is flying, it is necessarily above the ground. |
| 9987 | An aggregate in which order does not matter I call a 'set' [Bolzano] |
| Full Idea: An aggregate whose basic conception renders the arrangement of its members a matter of indifference, and whose permutation therefore produces no essential difference, I call a 'set'. | |
| From: Bernard Bolzano (Paradoxes of the Infinite [1846], §4), quoted by William W. Tait - Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind IX | |
| A reaction: The idea of 'sets' was emerging before Cantor formalised it, and clarified it by thinking about infinite sets. Nowadays we also have 'ordered' sets, which rather contradicts Bolzano, and we also expect the cardinality to be determinate. |
| 10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: If φ contains no bound second-order variables, the corresponding comprehension axiom is said to be 'predicative'; otherwise it is 'impredicative'. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1) | |
| A reaction: ['Predicative' roughly means that a new predicate is created, and 'impredicative' means that it just uses existing predicates] |
| 23445 | Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Naïve set theory is based on the principles that any formula defines a set, and that coextensive sets are identical. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 4.2) | |
| A reaction: The second principle is a standard axiom of ZFC. The first principle causes the trouble. |
| 10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: I offer these three claims as a partial analysis of 'pure logic': ontological innocence (no new entities are introduced), universal applicability (to any realm of discourse), and cognitive primacy (no extra-logical ideas are presupposed). | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1) |
| 10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: The defining features of a pure logic are its absolute generality (the objects of discourse are irrelevant), and its formality (logical truths depend on form, not matter), and its cognitive primacy (no extra-logical understanding is needed to grasp it). | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 3) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This strikes me as very important. The above description seems to contain no ontological commitment at all, either to the existence of something, or to two things, or to numbers, or to a property. Pure logic seems to be 'if-thenism'. |
| 10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: According to its supporters, second-order logic allow us to pay the ontological price of a mere first-order theory and get the corresponding monadic second-order theory for free. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §0) |
| 10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: If my arguments are correct, the theory of plural quantification has no right to the title 'logic'. ...The impredicative plural comprehension axioms depend too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §4) |
| 10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Second-order quantification and plural quantification are generally regarded as different forms of quantification. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2) |
| 10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Plural quantification can be used to eliminate the commitment of science and common sense to complex objects. We can use plural quantification over mereological atoms arranged tablewise or chairwise. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 4.5) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Hossack and van Ingwagen] |
| 10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: The traditional view in analytic philosophy has been that all plural locutions should be paraphrased away by quantifying over sets, though Boolos and other objected that this is unnatural and unnecessary. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5) |
| 10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Higher-order plural quantification (plural plurals) is often rejected because plural quantification is supposedly ontological innocent, with no plural things to be plural, and because it is not found in ordinary English. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: [Summary; he cites Boolos as a notable rejector] Linnebo observes that Icelandic contains a word 'tvennir' which means 'two pairs of'. |
| 10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Plural quantification seems to offer ontological economy. We can pay the price of a mere first-order theory and then use plural quantification to get for free the corresponding monadic second-order theory, which would be an ontological bargain. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 4.4) | |
| A reaction: [He mentions Hellman's modal structuralism in mathematics] |
| 23447 | In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: In classical semantics the function of singular terms is to refer, and that of quantifiers, to range over appropriate domains of entities. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 7.1) |
| 23443 | The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Considered in isolation, the axioms of group theory are not assertions but comprise an implicit definition of some abstract structure, | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 3.5) | |
| A reaction: The traditional Euclidean approach is that axioms are plausible assertions with which to start. The present idea sums up the modern approach. In the modern version you can work backwards from a structure to a set of axioms. |
| 23444 | To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Mathematics investigates the deductive consequences of axiomatic theories, but it also needs its own foundational axioms in order to provide models for its various axiomatic theories. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: This is a problem which faces the deductivist (if-then) approach. The deductive process needs its own grounds. |
| 9618 | Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR] |
| Full Idea: Bolzano if the father of 'arithmetization', which sought to found all of analysis on the concepts of arithmetic and to eliminate geometrical notions entirely (with logicism taking it a step further, by reducing arithmetic to logic). | |
| From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 3 | |
| A reaction: Brown's book is a defence of geometrical diagrams against Bolzano's approach. Bolzano sounds like the modern heir of Pythagoras, if he thinks that space is essentially numerical. |
| 21444 | Modern geoemtry is either 'pure' (and formal), or 'applied' (and a posteriori) [Gardner] |
| Full Idea: There is now 'pure' geometry, consisting of formal systems based on axioms for which truth is not claimed, and which are consequently not synthetic; and 'applied', a branch of physics, the truth of which is empirical, and therefore not a priori. | |
| From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 03 'Maths') | |
| A reaction: His point is that there is no longer any room for a priori geometry. Might the same division be asserted of arithmetic, or analysis, or set theory? |
| 10856 | A truly infinite quantity does not need to be a variable [Bolzano] |
| Full Idea: A truly infinite quantity (for example, the length of a straight line, unbounded in either direction) does not by any means need to be a variable. | |
| From: Bernard Bolzano (Paradoxes of the Infinite [1846]), quoted by Brian Clegg - Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable §10 | |
| A reaction: This is an important idea, followed up by Cantor, which relegated to the sidelines the view of infinity as simply something that could increase without limit. Personally I like the old view, but there is something mathematically stable about infinity. |
| 23446 | You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: If the 2nd Incompleteness Theorem undermines Hilbert's attempt to use a weak theory to prove the consistency of a strong one, it is still possible to prove the consistency of one theory, assuming the consistency of another theory. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 4.6) | |
| A reaction: Note that this concerns consistency, not completeness. |
| 23448 | Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Philosophical structuralism holds that mathematics is the study of abstract structures, or 'patterns'. If mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, then it is inevitable that the world is described by mathematics. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 11.1) | |
| A reaction: [He cites the physicist John Barrow (2010) for this] For me this is a major idea, because the concept of a pattern gives a link between the natural physical world and the abstract world of mathematics. No platonism is needed. |
| 14085 | 'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: The 'deductivist' version of eliminativist structuralism avoids ontological commitments to mathematical objects, and to modal vocabulary. Mathematics is formulations of various (mostly categorical) theories to describe kinds of concrete structures. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], 1) | |
| A reaction: 'Concrete' is ambiguous here, as mathematicians use it for the actual working maths, as opposed to the metamathematics. Presumably the structures are postulated rather than described. He cites Russell 1903 and Putnam. It is nominalist. |
| 14084 | Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: The 'non-eliminative' version of mathematical structuralism takes it to be a fundamental insight that mathematical objects are really just positions in abstract mathematical structures. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], I) | |
| A reaction: The point here is that it is non-eliminativist because it is committed to the existence of mathematical structures. I oppose this view, since once you are committed to the structures, you may as well admit a vast implausible menagerie of abstracta. |
| 14086 | 'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: The 'modal' version of eliminativist structuralism lifts the deductivist ban on modal notions. It studies what necessarily holds in all concrete models which are possible for various theories. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], I) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Putnam 1967, and Hellman 1989] If mathematical truths are held to be necessary (which seems to be right), then it seems reasonable to include modal notions, about what is possible, in its study. |
| 14087 | 'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: 'Set-theoretic' structuralism rejects deductive nominalism in favour of a background theory of sets, and mathematics as the various structures realized among the sets. This is often what mathematicians have in mind when they talk about structuralism. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], I) | |
| A reaction: This is the big shift from 'mathematics can largely be described in set theory' to 'mathematics just is set theory'. If it just is set theory, then which version of set theory? Which axioms? The safe iterative conception, or something bolder? |
| 14089 | Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Structuralism can be distinguished from traditional Platonism in that it denies that mathematical objects from the same structure are ontologically independent of one another | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], III) | |
| A reaction: My instincts strongly cry out against all versions of this. If you are going to be a platonist (rather as if you are going to be religious) you might as well go for it big time and have independent objects, which will then dictate a structure. |
| 14083 | Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Against extreme views that all mathematical objects depend on the structures to which they belong, or that none do, I defend a compromise view, that structuralists are right about algebraic objects (roughly), but anti-structuralists are right about sets. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], Intro) |
| 14090 | In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: If objects depend on the other objects, this would mean an 'upward' dependence, in that they depend on the structure to which they belong, where the physical realm has a 'downward' dependence, with structures depending on their constituents. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], III) | |
| A reaction: This nicely captures an intuition I have that there is something wrong with a commitment primarily to 'structures'. Our only conception of such things is as built up out of components. Not that I am committing to mathematical 'components'! |
| 9830 | Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
| Full Idea: Bolzano began the process of eliminating intuition from analysis, by proving something apparently obvious (that as continuous function must be zero at some point). Proof reveals on what a theorem rests, and that it is not intuition. | |
| From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Kant was the target of Bolzano's attack. Two responses might be to say that many other basic ideas are intuited but impossible to prove, or to say that proof itself depends on intuition, if you dig deep enough. |
| 23441 | Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Modern logic requires that logical truths be true in all models, including ones devoid of any mathematical objects. It follows immediately that the existence of mathematical objects can never be a matter of logic alone. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 2) | |
| A reaction: Hm. Could there not be a complete set of models for a theory which all included mathematical objects? (I can't answer that). |
| 23442 | Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Game Formalism seeks to banish all semantics from mathematics, and Term Formalism seeks to reduce any such notions to purely syntactic ones. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: This approach was stimulated by the need to justify the existence of the imaginary number i. Just say it is a letter! |
| 17265 | Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
| Full Idea: Mathematical proofs are philosophical in method if they do not only demonstrate that a certain mathematical truth holds but if they also disclose why it holds, that is, if they uncover its grounds. | |
| From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Correia,F/Schnieder,B - Grounding: an opinionated introduction 2.3 | |
| A reaction: I aim to defend the role of explanation in mathematics, but this says that this is only if the proofs are 'philosophical', which may be of no interest to mathematicians. Oh well, that's their loss. |
| 14091 | There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: We can give an exhaustive account of the identity of the empty set and its singleton without mentioning infinite sets, and it might be possible to defend the view that one natural number depends on its predecessor but not vice versa. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], V) | |
| A reaction: Linnebo uses this as one argument against mathematical structuralism, where the small seems to depend on the large. The view of sets rests on the iterative conception, where each level is derived from a lower level. He dismisses structuralism of sets. |
| 21453 | Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner] |
| Full Idea: Leibnizian monads clearly satisfy Kant's definition of noumena. | |
| From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 06 'Noumena') | |
| A reaction: This needs qualifying, because Leibniz clearly specifies the main attributes of monads, where Kant is adamant that we can saying virtually nothing about noumena. |
| 10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Some philosophers speak about a theory's 'ideological commitments' and not just about its 'ontological commitments'. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5.4) | |
| A reaction: This is a third strategy for possibly evading one's ontological duty, along with fiddling with the words 'exist' or 'object'. An ideological commitment to something to which one is not actually ontologically committed conjures up stupidity and dogma. |
| 10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Maybe ordinary speakers aren't very concerned about their ontological commitments, and sometimes find it convenient to posit objects. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: I think this is the whole truth about the ontological commitment of ordinary language. We bring abstraction under control by pretending it is a world of physical objects. The 'left wing' in politics, 'dark deeds', a 'huge difference'. |
| 14088 | An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: There are two main ways of spelling out an 'intrinsic' property: if and only if it is shared by every duplicate of an object, ...and if and only if the object would have this property even if the rest of the universe were removed or disregarded. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], II) | |
| A reaction: [He cites B.Weatherson's Stanford Encyclopaedia article] How about an intrinsic property being one which explains its identity, or behaviour, or persistence conditions? |
| 10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Our modern general concept of an object is given content only in connection with modern quantificational logic. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §2) | |
| A reaction: [He mentions Frege, Carnap, Quine and Dummett] This is the first thing to tell beginners in modern analytical metaphysics. The word 'object' is very confusing. I think I prefer 'entity'. |
| 9185 | Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
| Full Idea: Bolzano was determined to expel Kantian intuition from analysis, and to prove from first principles anything that could be proved, no matter how obvious it might seem when thought of in geometrical terms. | |
| From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Michael Dummett - The Philosophy of Mathematics 2.3 | |
| A reaction: This is characteristic of the Enlightenment Project, well after the Enlightenment. It is a step towards Frege's attack on 'psychologism' in mathematics. The problem is that it led us into a spurious platonism. We live in troubled times. |
| 10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: The predicate 'is on the table' is 'distributive', since some things are on the table if each one is, whereas the predicate 'form a circle' is 'non-distributive', since it is not analytic that when some things form a circle, each one forms a circle. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: The first predicate can have singular or plural subjects, but the second requires a plural subject? Hm. 'The rope forms a circle'. The second is example is not true, as well as not analytic. |
| 22276 | Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter] |
| Full Idea: Bolzano took the entities of which truth is predicated to be not propositions in the subjective sense but 'propositions-in-themselves' - objective entities existing independent of our apprehension. | |
| From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Emp' | |
| A reaction: A serious mistake. Presumably the objective propositions are all true (or there would be endless infinities of them). So what is assessed in the case of error? Something other than the objective propositions! We assess these other things! |
| 17264 | Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
| Full Idea: Bolzano conceived of propositions as abstract objects which are structured compounds of concepts and potential contents of judgements and assertions. | |
| From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Correia,F/Schnieder,B - Grounding: an opinionated introduction 2.3 | |
| A reaction: Personally I think of propositions as brain events, the constituents of thought about the world, but that needn't contradict the view of them as 'abstract'. |
| 12232 | A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano] |
| Full Idea: What I mean by 'propositions' is not what the grammarians call a proposition, namely the linguistic expression, but the mere sense of this expression, is what is meant by proposition in itself or object proposition. This sense can be true or false. | |
| From: Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837], Pref?) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the origin of what we understand by 'proposition'. The disputes are over whether such things exists, and whether they are features of minds or features of the world (resembling facts). |
| 12233 | The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano] |
| Full Idea: We can find the ground of a pure conceptual truth only in other conceptual truths. | |
| From: Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837], Pref) | |
| A reaction: Elsewhere he insists that these grounds must be in 'truths', and not just in the attributes of the concepts of involved. This conflicts with Kit Fine's view, that the concepts themselves are the source of conceptual truth and necessity. |
| 8108 | Aesthetics presupposes a distinctive sort of experience, and a unified essence for art [Gardner] |
| Full Idea: Aesthetics traditionally has two presuppositions: the first is that there is a distinctive form of experience which is common to the appreciation of art and natural beauty; the second is that art has an essence or some sort of underlying unity. | |
| From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Both must come up for discussion. I think the biggest problem for the first one is the place of sexual attraction, or even fancying a prawn sandwich. The second has been weakened by Marcel Duchamp's urinal, and modern fringe arts. |
| 8112 | Art works originate in the artist's mind, and appreciation is re-creating this mental object [Gardner] |
| Full Idea: A strong tradition in aesthetics (the 'idealist' view) regards works of art as existing originally in the artist's mind, and the appreciation of art as a matter of re-creating the artist's mental object. | |
| From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: He mentions Collingwood and Croce. Against this is the view (Idea 7268) that what goes on in the artist's mind is just irrelevant. Freud is important here, suggesting that the artist doesn't quite know what he or she is doing. |
| 8111 | Aesthetic objectivists must explain pleasure being essential, but not in the object [Gardner] |
| Full Idea: The aesthetic objectivist faces the difficulty of accounting for the fact that pleasure is not in the object, and is necessary for, and not just a contingent accompaniment to, aesthetic response. | |
| From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 1.2.3) | |
| A reaction: The objectivist has to claim, not utterly implausibly, that if you don't get pleasure from certain works, then you 'ought' to. You can ignore a good work, but to deny that it gives pleasure is a failing in you. |
| 8109 | Aesthetic judgements necessarily require first-hand experience, unlike moral judgements [Gardner] |
| Full Idea: I am not within my rights to declare an object beautiful until I have seen it myself, ..unlike moral judgement, which (arguably) does not presuppose either a felt response or personal acquaintance. | |
| From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: Particularists might argue that moral judgements also require exposure to the actual situation, if they are to be authentic and authoritative. We can also discuss principles of aesthetics in the absence of examples. |