Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Sphaerus, Proclus and David H. Sanford

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

---

5 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure

20769	Sphaerus he was not assenting to the presence of pomegranates, but that it was 'reasonable' [Sphaerus, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: When Sphaerus accepted pomegranates from the king, he was accused of assenting to a false presentation, to which Sphaerus replied that what he had assented to was not that they were pomegranates, but that it was reasonable that they were pomegranates.
	From: report of Sphaerus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.177
	A reaction: He then cited the stoic distinction between a 'graspable' presentation and a 'reasonable' one. This seems a rather helpful response to Dretske's zebra problem. I like the word 'sensible' in epistemology, because animals can be sensible.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations

13165	Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus]
	Full Idea: Geometry does not ask 'why?' ..When from the exterior angle equalling two opposite interior angles it is shown that the interior angles make two right angles, this is not a causal demonstration. With no exterior angle they still equal two right angles.
	From: Proclus (Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements' [c.452], p.161-2), quoted by Paolo Mancosu - Explanation in Mathematics §5
	A reaction: A very nice example. It is hard to imagine how one might demonstrate the cause of the angles making two right angles. If you walk, turn left x°, then turn left y°, then turn left z°, and x+y+z=180°, you end up going in the original direction.

8406	Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford]
	Full Idea: Although not all explanations are causal, anything which can be explained in any way can be explained causally.
	From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.79)
	A reaction: A nice bold claim with which I am in sympathy, but he would have a struggle proving it. Does this imply that causal explanations are basic, or in some way superior? Note that functional explanations would thus have underlying causal explanations.

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought

9569	The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus]
	Full Idea: It is unsurprising that geometry was discovered in the necessity of Nile land measurement, since everything in the world of generation goes from imperfection to perfection. They would naturally pass from sense-perception to calculation, and so to reason.
	From: Proclus (Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements' [c.452]), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 9.12 n55
	A reaction: The last sentence is the core of my view on abstraction, that it proceeds by moving through levels of abstraction, approaching more and more general truths.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation

8407	A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford]
	Full Idea: A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is jointly sufficient for it. This is a widely held but controversial view, and it is not a logical truth.
	From: David H. Sanford (Causation [1995], p.82)
	A reaction: This wouldn't work for an impossible occurrence. What are the necessary conditions to produce a large planet made of uranium? One of them would have to be a naturally impossible necessity.