Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Stephen Hetherington, L. Jonathan Cohen and Michael Esfeld

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

---

3 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem

19699	A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
	Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified.
	From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5)
	A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities

4800	Natural laws result from eliminative induction, where enumerative induction gives generalisations [Cohen,LJ, by Psillos]
	Full Idea: Cohen contends that statements that express laws of nature are the products of eliminative induction, where accidentally true generalisations are the products of enumerative induction.
	From: report of L. Jonathan Cohen (The Problem of Natural Laws [1980], p.222) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §7.1
	A reaction: The idea is that enumerative induction only offers the support of positive instances, where eliminative induction involves attempts to falsify a range of hypotheses. This still bases laws on observed regularities, rather than essences or mechanisms.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow

13440	Causation is the power of one property to produce another, and this gives time its direction [Esfeld]
	Full Idea: The metaphysics of causation in terms of powers is linked with an intrinsic direction of time. There is a causal connection if an F-property produces a G. One can argue that causation thus is the basis for the direction of time.
	From: Michael Esfeld (Humean metaphysics vs metaphysics of Powers [2010], 7.2)
	A reaction: I think this is my preferred metaphysic - that both time and causation are primitive, but the direction of time is the result of the causal process. Viewing some new world, we would just say that time went in whichever direction the causation went.