Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Stephen Hetherington, L. Jonathan Cohen and Tuomas E. Tahko

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6 ideas

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16978 If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko]
     Full Idea: Maybe conceivability could be understood as a priori coherence, which implies possibility.
     From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 3.2)
     A reaction: I'm not quite sure why 'a priori' has to be there. Assessing conceivability just is assessing coherence. That couches it as a rational activity, rather than as a purely imaginary one. Trying to conceive a square circle isn't just daydreaming.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19699 A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington]
     Full Idea: A Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified without being knowledge. Its justificatory support is also fallible, ...and there is considerable luck in how the belief combnes being true with being justified.
     From: Stephen Hetherington (The Gettier Problem [2011], 5)
     A reaction: This makes luck the key factor. 'Luck' is a rather vague concept, and so the sort of luck involved must first be spelled out. Or the varieties of luck that can produce this outcome.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
16975 Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko]
     Full Idea: Essences are supposed to do a lot of explanatory work: natural kinds can be identified in terms of their essences, metaphysical modality can be reduced to essence, the causal power of objects can be explained with the help of essence.
     From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 1)
     A reaction: Natural kinds and modality are OK with me, but I'm dubious about the third one. If an essence explains something's causal powers, I have no idea what an essence might be. Essence are largely characterised in terms of causal powers.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
4800 Natural laws result from eliminative induction, where enumerative induction gives generalisations [Cohen,LJ, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: Cohen contends that statements that express laws of nature are the products of eliminative induction, where accidentally true generalisations are the products of enumerative induction.
     From: report of L. Jonathan Cohen (The Problem of Natural Laws [1980], p.222) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §7.1
     A reaction: The idea is that enumerative induction only offers the support of positive instances, where eliminative induction involves attempts to falsify a range of hypotheses. This still bases laws on observed regularities, rather than essences or mechanisms.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
16976 Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko]
     Full Idea: The conception of essence taken for granted in much of the 'scientific essentialist' literature is that essence can be explained in terms of modality (rather than the other way round).
     From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 2.1)
     A reaction: [He cites Ellis and Bird] That is, presumably, that they are inclined to say that the essence of gold is a set of necessary properties. Maybe conceptual necessities dictate the properties of gold, and they in turn dictate metaphysical necessities?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
16977 If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko]
     Full Idea: If essence is conceived in terms of modality and the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, it seems that the laws of nature constitute essentialist knowledge, so the discovery of essences is mostly due to scientists.
     From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 2.1)
     A reaction: This seems muddled to me. The idea that the laws themselves are essences is way off target. No one thinks all knowledge of necessities is essentialist. Mumford, for example, doesn't even believe in laws.