3 ideas
6457 | Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent [Vesey] |
Full Idea: Whereas a sensation is by definition mental, a sense-datum might be mind-independent. | |
From: Godfrey Vesey (Collins Dictionary of Philosophy [1990], p.266) | |
A reaction: This seems to be what Russell is getting at in 1912, as he clearly separates sense-data from sensations. Discussions of sense-data always assume they are mental, which may make them redundant - but so might making them physical. |
5210 | We could know what a lion thinks by mapping both its brain patterns and its experiences [Douglas,A] |
Full Idea: In principle, it seems possible to monitor both the brain activity and the external experiences of a lion cub from birth, and by extensive mapping of one against the other to work out fairly accurately what a lion is thinking. | |
From: Andy Douglas (talk [2003]) | |
A reaction: This has limitations (e.g. we could monitor the external events, but not the way the lion experiences them), but it seems to me to offer a real theoretical possibility of breaching the mental privacy of an inarticulate creature. |
21788 | The moral will is self-determining, but the ethical will is met in society [Houlgate] |
Full Idea: Whereas the moral will understands the good to be something which it can recognise or determine by itself, the ethical will acknowledges the good to be something actual which it encounters in the world about it. | |
From: Stephen Houlgate (An Introduction to Hegel [1991], 08 'Freedom') | |
A reaction: I think these two terms have become blurred - or at least I have thoroughly lost track of them. I'm not sure whether it is good to have distinct terms for (Kantian) personal choice and for social expectations. Ethics is what Nietzsche attacks. |