Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Stephen Houlgate, Harry Gildersleve and C.J. Thomae

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3 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve]
     Full Idea: A common modern reductive view of the mind is that a hierarchy of intentional systems eventually produce qualia, but it might be the other way around. The mind is 'qualia-upon-qualia', with units of minimal qualia building up into intentional thought.
     From: Harry Gildersleve (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: If qualia are seen as existing at the most basic level of the brain, this may well imply panpsychism. It certainly says that basic brain cells are capable of minimal experiences. The idea that thought is essentially qualitative is very intriguing.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Thomae's idea of abstract from peculiarities gives a general concept, and leaves the peculiarities [Frege on Thomae]
     Full Idea: When Thomae says "abstract from the peculiarities of the individual members of a set of items", or "disregard those characteristics which serve to distinguish them", we get a general concept under which they fall. The things keep their characteristics.
     From: comment on C.J. Thomae (works [1869], §34) by Gottlob Frege - Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) §34
     A reaction: Interesting. You don't have to leave out their distinctive fur in order to count cats. But you have to focus on some aspect of them, because they aren't 'three meats'.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
The moral will is self-determining, but the ethical will is met in society [Houlgate]
     Full Idea: Whereas the moral will understands the good to be something which it can recognise or determine by itself, the ethical will acknowledges the good to be something actual which it encounters in the world about it.
     From: Stephen Houlgate (An Introduction to Hegel [1991], 08 'Freedom')
     A reaction: I think these two terms have become blurred - or at least I have thoroughly lost track of them. I'm not sure whether it is good to have distinct terms for (Kantian) personal choice and for social expectations. Ethics is what Nietzsche attacks.