18470
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Maybe truth-making is an unanalysable primitive, but we can specify principles for it [Smith,B]
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Full Idea:
The signs are that truth-making is not analysable in terms of anything more primitive, but we need to be able to say more than just that. So we ought to consider it as specified by principles of truth-making.
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From:
Barry Smith (Truth-maker Realism: response to Gregory [2000], p.20), quoted by Fraser MacBride - Truthmakers 1.5
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A reaction:
This is the axiomatic approach to such problems - treat the target concept as an undefinable, unanalysable primitive, and then give rules for its connections. Maybe all metaphysics should work like that, with a small bunch of primitives.
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15312
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We get the idea of power by abstracting from ropes, magnets and electric shocks [Priestley]
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Full Idea:
A rope sustains weight, a magnet attracts iron, a charged electrical jar gives a shock, and from these and other similar observations, we get the idea of power, universally and abstractly considered.
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From:
Joseph Priestley (Theological and other works [1790], p.191), quoted by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 9.II.B
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A reaction:
I agree with this, in that we appear to be observing powers directly, and are not observing something which can then be reduced to non-powers. Nature just can't be a set of inert structures, with forces 'imposed' on them.
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15311
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Attraction or repulsion are not imparted to matter, but actually constitute it [Priestley]
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Full Idea:
Attraction or repulsion appear to me not to be properly what is imparted to matter, but what really makes it what it is, in so much that, without it, it would be nothing at all.
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From:
Joseph Priestley (Theological and other works [1790], p.237), quoted by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 9.II.B
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A reaction:
This is music to the ears of anyone who thinks that powers are the fundamentals of nature (like me).
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