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14235
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Saying 'they can become a set' is a tautology, because reference to 'they' implies a collection [Cargile]
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Full Idea:
If the rule is asserted 'Given any well-determined objects, they can be collected into a set by an application of the 'set of' operation', then on the usual account of 'they' this is a tautology. Collection comes automatically with this form of reference.
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From:
James Cargile (Paradoxes: Form and Predication [1979], p.115), quoted by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For? Intro
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A reaction:
Is this a problem? Given they are well-determined (presumably implying countable) there just is a set of them. That's what set theory is, I thought. Of course, the iterative view talks of 'constructing' the sets, but the construction looks unstoppable.
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10198
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If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
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Full Idea:
If nothing existed except two electrons, which are indiscernible, it remains possible that differences will emerge later. Even if this universe has eternal symmetry, such differences are still logically, metaphysically, physically and causally possible.
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From:
Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306)
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A reaction:
The question then is whether the two electrons have hidden properties that make differences possible. Zimmerman assumes that 'laws' of an indeterministic kind will do the job. I doubt that. Can differences be discerned after the event?
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10199
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Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
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Full Idea:
Possible differences which may later become discernible could be treated as differences in a counterpart, which is similar to, but not identical with, the original object.
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From:
Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.307)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This is a reply to Idea 10198, which implies that two things could never be indiscernible over time, because of their different possibilities. One must then decide issues about rigid designation and counterparts.
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14608
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A-theorists, unlike B-theorists, believe some sort of objective distinction between past, present and future [Zimmerman,DW]
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Full Idea:
To be an A-theorist is to believe in some sort of objective distinction between what is present and past and future. ..To be a B-theorist is to deny the objectivity of our talk about past, present and future.
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From:
Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 2)
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A reaction:
The A/B distinction originates with McTaggart. All my intuitions side with the A-theory, certainly to the extent that the present seems to be objectively privileged in some way (despite special relativity).
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