17 ideas
9254 | In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard] |
Full Idea: In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
A reaction: A lovely remark! In a flash you suddenly see why philosophers expend such vast energy on such unpromising views of reality (e.g. idealism, panpsychism). This might be the best definition of philosophy I have yet discovered. |
17499 | Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides] |
Full Idea: The semantic approach contends that theoretical models ...are candidates for representing physical systems by virtue of the fact that they stand in mapping relations to corresponding data-models. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
A reaction: Sounds like a neat and satisfying picture. |
17498 | In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG] |
Full Idea: The 'received view' of models is that they are Tarskian formal axiomatic calculi interpreted by meta-mathematical models. The 'semantic' view of models gives equal importance to their representational capacity. | |
From: report of Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'background') by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The Tarskian view is the one covered in my section on Model Theory. Portides favours the semantic account, and I am with him all the way. Should models primarily integrate with formal systems, or with the world? Your choice... |
17501 | Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides] |
Full Idea: Models are representational, independently of the strength of their relation to theory, depending on how well they achieve the purpose of providing explanations for what occurs in physical systems. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound quite right. It seems possible to have a perfect representation of a system which remains quite baffling (because too complex, or with obscure ingredients). Does the stylised London tube map explain well but represent badly? |
17502 | The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides] |
Full Idea: The unified model can be considered a better representation of the atomic nucleus in comparison to the liquid-drop and shell models, because it explains most of the known results about the nucleus. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
A reaction: The point here is that models are evaluated not just by their accuracy, but by their explanatory power. Presumably a great model is satisfying and illuminating. Do the best models capture the essence of a thing? |
17496 | 'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides] |
Full Idea: A better understanding of 'model', as used in science, could be achieved if we examine it as a member of the triad of concepts of representation, idealisation and abstraction. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Abstraction seems to have a bad name in philosophy, and yet when you come to discuss things like models, you can't express it any other way. |
17497 | Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides] |
Full Idea: 'Theory-driven' models are constructed in a systematic theory-regulated way by supplementing the theoretical calculus with locally operative hypotheses. 'Phenomenological' models deploy semi-empirical results, with ad hoc hypotheses, and extra concepts. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: [compressed] I am not at all clear about this distinction, even after reading his whole article. The first type of model seems more general, while the second seems tuned to particular circumstances. He claims the second type is more explanatory. |
17500 | General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides] |
Full Idea: If theoretical models are highly abstract and idealised descriptions of phenomena, they may only represent general features, and fail to explain the specific mechanisms at work in physical systems. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
A reaction: [compressed] While there may be an ideal theory that explains everything, it sounds right capturing the actual mechanism (such as the stirrup bone in the ear) is not at all theoretical. |
9261 | The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard] |
Full Idea: Reading the 'Ethics' is so disappointing, because Aristotle does not try to convince us that we really ought to do what our non-reflective consciousness has hitherto believed we ought to do. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912]) | |
A reaction: Aristotle didn't speak the language of 'duty' (see Idea 2172), but he could work it into his account if Prichard asked nicely. I take the truly virtuous person to be, above all, a wonderful citizen. Duties are contractual; good deeds flow from virtue. |
9262 | The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard] |
Full Idea: Moral Philosophy rests on the mistake of supposing the possibility of proving what can only be apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912]) | |
A reaction: This is a beginning of the rebellion against the Enlightenment Project in ethics, which is why Prichard has become popular. At bottom he is offering intuition ('direct moral thinking'), which is a frustratingly thin concept. |
9256 | I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard] |
Full Idea: How can I be brought to see the truth of the principle of paying a debt except in connection with a particular instance? For this purpose any instance will do. If I cannot see that I ought to pay this debt, I shall not see that I ought to a debt. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
A reaction: This isn't quite particularism, which would (I think) say that the degree of obligation will never be quite the same in any two situations, and so one instance will not suffice to understand the duty. |
9257 | The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard] |
Full Idea: Owing to the complication of human relations, the problem of what one ought to do from the point of view of life as a whole is one of intense difficulty. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
A reaction: I suspect that the difficulty is not the problems engendered by complexity, but that there is no answer available from the most objective point of view. Morality simply is a matter of how daily life is conducted, with medium-term goals only. |
9260 | Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard] |
Full Idea: It is untrue to urge that, since courage is a virtue, we ought to act courageously. We feel an obligation to act, but not from a certain desire. The action is done from obligation, so isn't an act of courage. ..In fact, virtue is no basis for morality. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912]) | |
A reaction: One of the few interesting and direct attacks on virtue theory, before its modern revival. Prichard urges a perception of what is valuable (or good) as the basis for obligation and right action. He is right that values come first, in virtue and elsewhere. |
9259 | We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard] |
Full Idea: The relation involved in an obligation need not be a relation to another at all. Thus we should admit that there is an obligation to overcome our natural timidity or greediness, and this involves no relations to others. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912]) | |
A reaction: An interesting un-Aristotelian and individualistic view of virtue. Why would we want to rid ourselves of timidity or greediness? Either it is self-interested, or we wish to be better citizens. See Richard Taylor on duty. |
9255 | Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard] |
Full Idea: The appreciation of the goodness of the effect is different from desire for the effect, and will originate not the desire but the sense of obligation to produce it. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925]) | |
A reaction: A wonderful rebuttal of Hume, and a much better account of duty than Kant's idea that it arises from reason. Perception of value is what generates duty. And (with Frankfurt) we may say that love is what generates value. |
9258 | If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard] |
Full Idea: If the badness of pain were the reason why we ought not to inflict pain on another, it would equally be a reason why we ought not to inflict pain on ourselves; yet, though we would call such behaviour foolish, we wouldn't think it wrong. | |
From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912], n4) | |
A reaction: A very nice point. Note that it will equally well apply to 'benefit' or 'preferences', or any other ideal which utilitarians set out to maximise. It may not be bad to hurt yourself, but it might still be bad to harm yourself. |
3029 | Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stilpo asked a man whether Athena is the daughter of Zeus, and when he said yes, said,"But this statue of Athena by Phidias is the child of Phidias, so it is not a god." | |
From: report of Stilpo (fragments/reports [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.10.5 |