49 ideas
8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
Full Idea: If I have a headache, I could have a set of beliefs that I do not have a headache, that I am not in pain, that no one is in pain, and so on. The resulting system of beliefs would cohere as fully as does my actual system of beliefs. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §9) | |
A reaction: I think this is a misunderstanding of coherentism. Beliefs are not to be formulated through a process of coherence, but are evaluated that way. A belief that I have headache just arrives; I then see that its denial is incoherent, so I accept it. |
8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Coherence involves the logical, explanatory and probabilistic relations among one's beliefs, but it could not do to attain a tightly iterrelated system by lopping off whatever beliefs refuse to fit. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This is clearly right, so the coherentist has to distinguish between lopping off a belief because it is inconvenient (fundamentalists rejecting textual contradictions), and lopping it off because it is wrong (chemists rejecting phlogiston). |
8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
Full Idea: You could detect the absence of an eleven-dot pattern without having counted the dots, so your phenomenal concept of that array is not an arithmetical concept, and its content will not yield that its dots do indeed number eleven. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.3) | |
A reaction: Sosa is discussing foundational epistemology, but this draws attention to the gulf that has to be leaped by structuralists. If eleven is not derived from the pattern, where does it come from? Presumably two eleven-dotters are needed, to map them. |
8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Mereological essentialism says that nothing else could have been the unique entity composed of certain parts except the very thing that is composed of those parts. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 2) | |
A reaction: This sounds initially implausible. It means the ship of Theseus ceases to be that ship if you change a single nail of it. Whether we say that seems optional, but if we do, it leads to the collaps of all our normal understanding of identity. |
8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
Full Idea: I am quite flexible on epistemic terminology, and am even willing to grant that a supermarket door can 'know' that someone is approaching. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.6) | |
A reaction: I take this amazing admission to be a hallmark of externalism. Sosa must extend this to thermostats. So flowers know the sun has come out. This is knowledge without belief. Could the door ever be 'wrong'? |
8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
Full Idea: In trying to reduce arithmetic to self-evident logical axioms, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.7) | |
A reaction: I have heard Frege called "the greatest of all rationalist philosophers". However, the apparent reduction of arithmetic to analytic truths played into the hands of logical positivists, who could then marginalise arithmetic. |
8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Almost nothing that one knows of history or geography or science has adequate sensory support, present or even recalled. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.7) | |
A reaction: This seems a bit glib, and may be false. The main issue to which this refers is, of course, induction, which (almost by definition) is a supposedly empirical process which goes beyond the empirical evidence. |
8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Radical foundationalism suffers from two weaknesses: there are not so many perfectly obvious truths as Descartes thought; and if we restrict ourselves to what it truly obvious, very little supposed common sense knowledge can be proved. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §3) | |
A reaction: It is striking how few examples can ever be found of self-evident a priori truths. However, if there are self-evident truths about direct experience (pace Descartes), that would give us more than enough. |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
Full Idea: There is a difference between having just an indexical concept which one can apply to a perceptual characteristic (just saying 'this is thus'), and having a thicker perceptual concept of that characteristic. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.2) | |
A reaction: Both of these, of course, would precede any categorial concepts that enabled one to identify the characteristic or the object. This is a ladder foundationalists must climb if they are to reach the cellar of basic beliefs. |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Are foundationally justified beliefs perhaps those that result from attending to our experience and to features of it or in it? | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.3) | |
A reaction: A promising suggestion. I do think our ideas acquire a different epistmological status once we have given them our full attention, though is that merely full consciousness, or full thoughtful evaluation? The latter I take to be what matters. Cf Idea 2414. |
8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Some intrinsic features of our thoughts are attributable to them directly, or foundationally, while others are attributable only based on counting or inference. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.5) | |
A reaction: In practice the brain combines the two at a speed which makes the distinction impossible. I'll show you ten dot-patterns: you pick out the sixer. The foundationalist problem is that only those drained of meaning could be foundational. |
8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Much of our propositional knowledge is not easily formulable, as when a witness looking at a police lineup may know what the culprit's face looks like. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.1) | |
A reaction: This is actually a very helpful defence of foundationalism, because it shows that we will accept perceptual experiences as knowledge when they are not expressed as explicit propositions. Davidson (Idea 8801), for example, must deal with this difficulty. |
8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
Full Idea: A single belief can trail at once regresses of both sorts: one terminating and one not. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §6) | |
A reaction: This makes foundationalism possible, while admitting the existence of regresses. It is a good point, and triumphalist anti-foundationalists can't just point out a regress and then smugly troop off to the pub. |
8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
Full Idea: If a mental state is not propositional, then how can it possibly serve as a foundation for belief? How can one infer or justify anything on the basis of a state that, having no propositional content, must be logically dumb? | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §11) | |
A reaction: This may be the best objection to foundationalism. McDowell tries to argue that conceptual content is inherent in perception, thus giving the beginnings of inbuilt propositional content. But an organism awash with bare experiences knows nothing. |
8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
Full Idea: If a mental state provides no guarantee against error, then it cannot serve as a foundation for knowledge. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §4) | |
A reaction: That assumes that knowledge entails certainty, which I am sure it should not. On a fallibilist account, a foundation could be incredibly secure, despite a barely imaginable scenario in which it turned out to be false. |
8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
Full Idea: One's beliefs can be comprehensively coherent without amounting to knowledge. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.6) | |
A reaction: Beliefs that are fully foundational or reliably sourced may also fail to be knowledge. I take it that any epistemological theory must be fallibilist (Idea 6898). Rational coherentism will clearly be sensitive to error. |
8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
Full Idea: Visual experience is recognized as both the cause and the justification of our visual beliefs. But these are not wholly independent. Presumably the justification that something is red derives partly from the fact that it originates in visual experience. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §10) | |
A reaction: Yes, but the fact that certain visual experiences originate in dreams is taken as grounds for denying their truth, not affirming it. So why do we distinguish them? I am thinking that only in the 'space of reasons' can a cause become a justification. |
17405 | If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri] |
Full Idea: A theorist may have designed his theory to fit the facts, but is it not equally possible for observers to be influenced by a theory in their report of experimental facts? | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 05 'Power') | |
A reaction: This is in reply to Lipton's claim that prediction is better than accommodation because of the 'fudging' problem. The reply is that you might fudge to achieve a prediction. If it was correct, that wouldn't avoid the charge of fudging. |
17397 | The periodic system is the big counterexample to Kuhn's theory of revolutionary science [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The history of the periodic system appears to be the supreme counterexample to Kuhn's thesis, whereby scientific developments proceed in a sudden, revolutionary fashion. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 03 'Rapid') | |
A reaction: What is lovely about the periodic table is that it seems so wonderfully right, and hence no revolution has ever been needed. The big theories of physics and cosmology are much more precarious. |
17393 | Scientists eventually seek underlying explanations for every pattern [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Whenever scientists are presented with a useful pattern or system of classification, it is only a matter of time before the begin to ask whether there may be some underlying explanation for the pattern. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], Intro 'Evol') | |
A reaction: Music to my ears, against the idea that the sole aim of science is accurately describe the patterns. |
17403 | The periodic table suggests accommodation to facts rates above prediction [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Rather than proving the value of prediction, the development and acceptance of the periodic table may give us a powerful illustration of the importance of accommodation, that is, the ability of a new scientific theory to explain already known facts. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 05 'Intro') | |
A reaction: The original table made famous predictions, but also just as many wrong ones (Scerri:143), and Scerri thinks this aspect has been overrated. |
17394 | Natural kinds are what are differentiated by nature, and not just by us [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Natural kinds are realistic scientific entities that are differentiated by nature itself rather than by our human attempts at classification. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], Intro 'Evol') |
17421 | If elements are natural kinds, might the groups of the periodic table also be natural kinds? [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Elements defined by their atomic numbers are frequently assumed to represent 'natural kinds' in chemistry. ...The question arises as to whether groups of elements appearing in the periodic table might also represent natural kinds. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 10 'Elements') | |
A reaction: Scerri says the distinction is not as sharp as that between the elements. As a realist, he believes there is 'one ideal periodic classification', which would then make the periods into kinds. |
8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
Full Idea: If I fasten a board onto a tree stump, causing a table to come into existence, ...what law of nature or, even, what quasi-law or law-like principle could possibly play in such a case of generation the role required by nomological accounts? | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 1) | |
A reaction: A very nice question. The nomological account is at its strongest when rocks fall off walls or magnets attract, but all sorts of other caused events seem too messy or complex or original to fit the story. |
8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
Full Idea: The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator. If p-and-q is a fact, then this necessitates that p, but the fact that p need not be a result or consequence of the fact that p-and-q. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], p.242) | |
A reaction: This is obviously correct, and needs to be borne in mind when considering necessary causation. It is not enough to produce a piece of logic; something in the link from cause to effect must be demonstrated to be necessary. |
8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |
Full Idea: It is not clear how to analyse the form of necessary causation found in the only three people in the room being tall causing everybody in the room to be tall. | |
From: Ernest Sosa (Varieties of Causation [1980], 5) | |
A reaction: I would want to challenge this as a case of causation. There are no events or processes involved. It seems that a situation described in one way can also be described in another. |
17396 | The colour of gold is best explained by relativistic effects due to fast-moving inner-shell electrons [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Many seemingly mundane properties of elements such as the characteristic color of gold ....can best be explained by relativistic effects due to fast-moving inner-shell electrons. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 01 'Under') | |
A reaction: John Locke - I wish you were reading this! That we could work out the hidden facts of gold, and thereby explain and predict the surface properties we experience, is exactly what Locke thought to be forever impossible. |
17420 | The stability of nuclei can be estimated through their binding energy [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The stability of nuclei can be estimated through their binding energy, a quantity given by the difference between their masses and the masses of their constituent particles. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 10 'Stabil') |
17411 | If all elements are multiples of one (of hydrogen), that suggests once again that matter is unified [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The work of Moseley and others rehabilitated Prout's hypothesis that all elements were composites of hydrogen, being exact multiples of 1. ..This revitalized some philososophical notions of the unity of all matter, criticised by Mendeleev and others. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 06 'Philos') |
17407 | The electron is the main source of chemical properties [Scerri] |
Full Idea: It is the electron that is mainly responsible for the chemical properties of the elements. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 06 'Intro') |
17415 | A big chemistry idea is that covalent bonds are shared electrons, not transfer of electrons [Scerri] |
Full Idea: One of the most influential ideas in modern chemistry is of a covalent bond as a shared pair of electrons (not as transfer of electrons and the formation of ionic bonds). | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 08 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Gilbert Newton Lewis was responsible for this. |
17392 | How can poisonous elements survive in the nutritious compound they compose? [Scerri] |
Full Idea: A central mystery of chemistry is how the elements survive in the compounds they form. For example, how can poisonous grey metal sodium combine with green poisonous gas chlorine, to make salt, which is non-poisonous and essential for life? | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], Intro 'Elem') | |
A reaction: A very nice question which had never occurred to me. If our digestive system pulled the sodium apart from the chlorine, we would die. |
17391 | Periodicity and bonding are the two big ideas in chemistry [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The two big ideas in chemistry are chemical periodicity and chemical bonding, and they are deeply interconnected. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], Intro 'Per') |
17404 | Chemistry does not work from general principles, but by careful induction from large amounts of data [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Unlike in physics, chemical reasoning does not generally proceed unambiguously from general principles. It is a more inductive science in which large amounts of observational data must be carefully weighed. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 05 'Mendel') | |
A reaction: This is why essentialist thinking was important for Mendeleev, because it kept his focus on the core facts beneath the messy and incomplete data. |
17409 | Does radioactivity show that only physics can explain chemistry? [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Some authors believe that the interpretation of the properties of the elements passed from chemistry to physics as a result of the discovery of radioactivity. ...I believe this view to be overly reductionist. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 06 'Radio') | |
A reaction: It is all a matter of the explanations, and how far down they have to go. If most non-radiocative chemistry doesn't need to mention the physics, then chemistry is largely autonomous. |
17418 | It is now thought that all the elements have literally evolved from hydrogen [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The elements are now believed to have literally evolved from hydrogen by various mechanisms. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 10 'Evol) |
17398 | 19th C views said elements survived abstractly in compounds, but also as 'material ingredients' [Scerri] |
Full Idea: In the 19th century abstract elements were believed to be permanent and responsible for observed properties in compounds, but (departing from Aristotle) they were also 'material ingredients', thus linking the metaphysical and material realm. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 04 'Nature') | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I can make sense of this gulf between the metaphysical and the material realm, so this was an account heading for disaster. |
17406 | Moseley, using X-rays, showed that atomic number ordered better than atomic weight [Scerri] |
Full Idea: By using X-rays, Henry Moseley later discovered that a better ordering principle for the periodic system is atomic numbers rather than atomic weight, by subjecting many different elements to bombardment. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 06 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Moseley was killed in the First World War at the age of 26. It is interesting that they more or less worked out the whole table, before they discovered the best principle on which to found it. |
17408 | Some suggested basing the new periodic table on isotopes, not elements [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Some chemists even suggested that the periodic table would have to be abandoned in favor of a classification system that included a separate place for every single isotope. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 06 'Intro') | |
A reaction: The extreme case is tin, which has 21 isotopes, so is tin a fundamental, or is each of the isotopes a fundamental? Does there have to be a right answer to that? All tin isotopes basically react in the same way, so we stick with the elements table. |
17412 | Elements are placed in the table by the number of positive charges - the atomic number [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The serial number of an element in the periodic table, its atomic number, corresponds to the number of positive charges in the atom. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 07 'Models') | |
A reaction: Note that this is a feature of the nucleus, despite that fact that the electrons decide the chemical properties. A nice model for Locke's views on essentialism. |
17413 | Elements in the table are grouped by having the same number of outer-shell electrons [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The modern notion is that atoms fall into the same group of the periodic table if they possess the same numbers of outer-shell electrons. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 07 'Quantum') | |
A reaction: Scerri goes on to raise questions about this, on p.242. By this principle helium should be an alkaline earth element, but it isn't. |
17416 | Orthodoxy says the periodic table is explained by quantum mechanics [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The prevailing reductionist climate implies that quantum mechanics inevitably provides a more fundamental explanation for the periodic system. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 08 'Concl') | |
A reaction: Scerri has argued that chemists did much better than physicists in working out how the outer electron shells of atoms worked, by induction from data, rather than inference from basic principles. |
17414 | Pauli explained the electron shells, but not the lengths of the periods in the table [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Pauli explained the maximum number of electrons successive shells can accommodate, ...but it does not explain the lengths of the periods, which is the really crucial property of the periodic table. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 07 'Pauli') | |
A reaction: Paulis' Exclusion Principle says no two electrons in an atom can have the same set of four quantum numbers. He added 'spin' as a fourth number. It means 'electrons cannot be distinguished' (243). Scerri says the big problem is still not fully explained. |
17410 | Moseley showed the elements progress in units, and thereby clearly identified the gaps [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Moseley's work showed that the successive elements in the periodic table have an atomic number greater by one unit. The gaps could then be identified definitively, as 43, 61, 72, 75, 85, 87, and 91. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 06 'Henry') | |
A reaction: [compressed] |
17395 | Elements were ordered by equivalent weight; later by atomic weight; finally by atomic number [Scerri] |
Full Idea: Historically, the ordering of elements across periods was determined by equivalent weight, then later by atomic weight, and eventually by atomic number. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 01 'React') | |
A reaction: So they used to be ordered by quantities (measured by real numbers), but eventually were ordered by unit items (counted by natural numbers). There need to be distinct protons (unified) to be counted. |
17422 | The best classification needs the deepest and most general principles of the atoms [Scerri] |
Full Idea: An optimal classification can be obtained by identifying the deepest and most general principles that govern the atoms of the elements. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 10 'Continuum') | |
A reaction: He adds (p.286) that the best system will add the 'greatest degree of regularity' to these best principles. |
17417 | To explain the table, quantum mechanics still needs to explain order of shell filling [Scerri] |
Full Idea: The order of shell filling has not yet been deduced from first principles, and this issue cannot be avoided if one is to really ask whether quantum mechanics explains the periodic system in a fundamental manner. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 09 'From') |
17419 | Since 99.96% of the universe is hydrogen and helium, the periodic table hardly matters [Scerri] |
Full Idea: All the elements other than hydrogen and helium make up just 0.04% of the universe. Seen from this perspective, the periodic table appears to rather insignificant. | |
From: Eric R. Scerri (The Periodic Table [2007], 10 'Astro') |
3029 | Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stilpo asked a man whether Athena is the daughter of Zeus, and when he said yes, said,"But this statue of Athena by Phidias is the child of Phidias, so it is not a god." | |
From: report of Stilpo (fragments/reports [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.10.5 |