61 ideas
21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
Full Idea: We should focus on other philosophers, and not on science. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is entirely linguistic, and is a display. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
Full Idea: Derrida points out that the project of philosophy consists largely in attempting to build foundations for thought. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Todd May - Gilles Deleuze 1.04 | |
A reaction: You would first need to be convinced that there could be such a thing as foundations for thinking. Derrida thinks the project is hopeless. I think of it more as building an ideal framework for thought. |
21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
Full Idea: All of philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and hence aesthetic. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Because interpretations of texts can be interpreted, they can therefore have no 'original meaning'. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
Full Idea: Derrida worried that hermeneutics blunts the disruptive power of truth by forcing it conform to the interpreter's mental horizon. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction 3 'The heart' | |
A reaction: Good heavens - I agree with Derrida. Very French, though, to see the value of truth in its disruptiveness. I tend to find the truth reassuring, but then I'm English. |
20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
Full Idea: Derrida described the hermeneutic impulse to understand another as a form of violence that seeks to overcome the other's particularity and unique difference. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction App 'Derrida' | |
A reaction: I'm not sure about 'violence', but Derrida was on to somethng here. The 'hermeneutic circle' sounds like a creepy process of absorption, where the original writer disappears in a whirlpool of interpretation. |
21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
8210 | Deconstructing philosophy gives the history of concepts, and the repressions behind them [Derrida] |
Full Idea: To 'deconstruct' philosophy would be to think the structured genealogy of philosophy's concepts, but at the same time determine what this history has been able to dissimulate or forbid, making itself into history by this motivated repression. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (Implications [1967], p.5) | |
A reaction: All of this type of philosophy is motivated by what I think of as (I'm afraid!) a rather adolescent belief that we are all being 'repressed', and that somehow, if we think hard enough, we can all become 'free', and then everything will be fine. |
8211 | The movement of 'différance' is the root of all the oppositional concepts in our language [Derrida] |
Full Idea: The movement of 'différance', as that which produces different things, that which differentiates, is the common root of all the oppositional concepts that mark our language, such as sensible/intelligible, intuition/signification, nature/culture etc. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (Implications [1967], p.7) | |
A reaction: 'Différance' is a word coined by Derrida, and his most famous concept. At first glance, the concept of a thing which is the source of all differentiation sounds like a fiction. |
6840 | Derrida came to believe in the undeconstructability of justice, which cannot be relativised [Derrida, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: In Derrida's later work we find him moving explicitly towards a belief in the undeconstructability of justice, as he puts it, which is an overarching value that cannot be relativised. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (later work [1980]) by Simon Critchley - Interview with Baggini and Stangroom p.191 | |
A reaction: A nice corrective to the standard Anglo-Saxon assumption that Derrida is an extreme (and stupid) relativist. The notion of 'undeconstructability' is nice, just as Descartes found an idea that resisted the blasts of scepticism. |
21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
Full Idea: The tradition of conceiving being in terms of persisting presence, and meaning in terms of pure intelligibility or logos potentially present to the mind, finds itself dismantled by resources internal to its own construction. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 6 | |
A reaction: [compressed] Glendinning says this is the basic meaning of de-construction. My personal reading of this is that Aristotle is right, and grand talk of Being is hopeless, so we should just aim to understand objects. I also believe in propositions. |
21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Sincerity can never be verified, so fiction infuses all speech, which means that reality is also fictional. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Sentences are implicitly contradictory, because they can be used differently in different contexts (most obviously in 'I am ill'). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
8216 | Deconstruction is not neutral; it intervenes [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Deconstruction, I have insisted, is not neutral. It intervenes. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (Positions [1971], p.76) | |
A reaction: This, I think, is because there is in Derrida, as in most French philosophers, a strong streak of Marxism, and a desire to change the world, rather than merely understanding it. Idea 8213 shows the sort of thing he wants to change. |
21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
Full Idea: The aim is to explore the limits of expression (which is what makes the poetry of Mallarmé so important). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
8213 | I try to analyse certain verbal concepts which block and confuse the dialectical process [Derrida] |
Full Idea: I have tried to analyse certain marks in writing which are undecidables, false verbal properties, which inhabit philosophical opposition, resisting and disorganising it, without ever constituting a third term, withour ever leaving room for a solution. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (Positions [1971], p.40) | |
A reaction: [I have simplified his sentence!] Much of Derrida seems to be a commentary on the Hegelian dialectic, and the project is presumably to figure out why philosophy is not advancing in the way we would like. Interesting... |
12249 | 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: The standard classification holds that 'animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.5) | |
A reaction: My understanding of 'difference' would take it down to the level of the individual, so the question is - which did Aristotle believe in. Not all commentators agree with Oderberg, and Wedin thinks the individual substance is paramount. |
12242 | Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: To define something just means to set forth its limits in such a way that one can distinguish it from all other things of a different kind. To distinguish it from all other things of the same kind belongs to the theory of 'individuation'. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.4) | |
A reaction: I take Aristotle to have included individuation as part of his understanding of definition. Are tigers a kind, or are fierce tigers a kind, and is my tiger one-of-a-kind? |
4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
Full Idea: Derrida's view is that every discourse is metaphorical, and there is no difference between truth-talk and metaphor. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Pascal Engel - Truth §2.5 | |
A reaction: Right. Note that this is a Frenchman's summary. How would one define metaphor, without mentioning that it is parasitic on truth? Certainly some language tries to be metaphor, and other language tries not to be. |
21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
Full Idea: 'True' thoughts are inaccessible, buried in the subconscious, long before they get to speech or writing. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction | |
A reaction: [My reading of some Derrida produced no quotations. I've read two commentaries, which were obscure. The Derrida ideas in this db are my simplistic tertiary summaries. Experts can chuckle over my failure] |
21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
Full Idea: 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
Full Idea: We can give a subjective account of names, by considering our own name. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Even Kripke can't explain names, because the word is the thing, and also the thing is the word. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
12238 | The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: The Aristotelian account of numbers is that their existence depends on the existence of things that are not numbers, ..since numbers are abstractions from the existence of things. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.2) | |
A reaction: This is the deeply unfashionable view to which I am attached. The problem is the status of transfinite, complex etc numbers. They look like fictions to me. |
12254 | Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Being is heterogeneous: there is substantial being, accidental being, complete being, incomplete being, necessary being, contingent being, possible being, absolute being, relative being, intrinsic being, extrinsic being, and so on. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 5.3) | |
A reaction: Dependent being? Oderberg is giving the modern scholastic view. Personally I take 'being' to be univocal, even if it can be qualified in all sorts of ways. I don't believe we actually have any grasp at all of different ways to exist. |
12253 | If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 4.5) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a conclusive objection to claims for any such thing to be abstract. See, for example, Dummett's claim that the Equator is an abstract object. |
12256 | We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: We need a theory of essence to help us distinguish between the powers that do and do not belong to the essence of a thing. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 6.3) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a very good reason for searching for the essence of things, though the need to distinguish does not guarantee that there really is something to distinguish. Maybe powers just come and go. A power is essential in you but not in me? |
12252 | Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: The demise of 'substance' was wholly due to mistaken notions, mainly from the empiricists, by which it was conceived either as an unknowable featureless substratum, or as dispensable in favour of some or other bundle theory. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 4.4) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a view that the notion of substance is essential to explaining how we understand the world. I am inclined to think that if we accept the notion of essence we can totally dispense with the notion of substance. |
12241 | Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG] |
Full Idea: Real essences are objectively real, they concern being, they are knowable, they are definable, and they are classifiable. | |
From: report of David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This is a lovely summary (spread over two pages) of what essentialism is all about. It might be added that they are about unity and identity. The fact that they are intrinsically classifiable seems to mislead some people into a confused view. |
12244 | Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Nominalism is consistent with belief in individual essences, but real essentialism postulates essences as universals (quiddities). Nominalists are nearly always empiricists, though the converse may not be the case. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 2.1) | |
A reaction: This is where I part company with Oderberg. I want to argue that the nominalist/individualist view is more in tune with what Aristotle believed (though he spotted a dilemma here). Only individual essences explain individual behaviour. |
12240 | Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Real essentialism, more than any other ontological theory, stresses and seeks to explain the unity of objects. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.3) | |
A reaction: A key piece in the jigsaw I am beginning to assemble. If explanation is the aim, and essence the key to explanation, then explaining unity is the part of it that connects with other metaphysics, about identity and so on. 'Units' breed numbers. |
12247 | Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Essence is not reducible to explanatory relations, ...and fundamentally the role of essence is not explanatory but constitutive. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Effectively, this asserts essence as part of 'pure' metaphysics, but I like impure metaphysics, as the best explanation of the things we can know. Hence we can speculate about constitution only by means of explanation. Constitution is active. |
12258 | Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: A substance is constituted by its essence, and properties are a species of accident. No property of a thing is part of a thing's essence, though properties flow from the essence. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 7.2) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this. How can you know of something which has no properties? I'm wondering if the whole notion of a 'property' should be eliminated from good metaphysics. |
12257 | Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Why not do away with talk of essences and replace it with talk of powers pure and simple, or reduce essences to collections of powers? But then what unites the powers, and could a power be lost, and is there entailment between the powers? | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 6.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Bennett and Hacker 2003 for this view] The point would seem to be that in addition to the powers, there are also identity and unity and kind-membership to be explained. Oderberg says the powers flow from the essence. |
12236 | Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1) | |
A reaction: That is, if two things must have identical properties because they are the same thing, this is because those properties are essential to the thing. Otherwise two things could be the same, even though one of them lacked a non-identifying property. |
12250 | Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: The fundamental thesis of real essentialism is that every finite material body has a twofold composition, being a compound of act and potency. ...Reality can take on new kinds of existence because there is a principle of potentiality inherent in reality. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 4.1) | |
A reaction: I take from this remark that the 'powers' discussed by Molnar and other scientific essentialists is roughly the same as 'potentiality' identified by Aristotle. |
12234 | Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Any realist theory of possible worlds will be circular in its attempt to illuminate modality, for there has to be some criterion of what counts as a possible world. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Seems right. At the very least, if we are going to rule out contradictory worlds as impossible (and is there a more obvious criterion?), we already need to understand 'impossible' in order to state that rule. |
12235 | Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: The necessity of identity carries the appearance of triviality, because it is the eviscerated contemporary essentialist form of a foundational real essentialist truth to the effect that every object has its own nature. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1) | |
A reaction: I like this. Writers like Mackie and Forbes have to put the 'trivial' aspects of essence to one side, without ever seeing why there is such a problem. Real substantial essences have necessity of identity as a side-effect. |
12237 | Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: The rigid designator approach to essentialism has essentialist assumptions. ..The necessity of identity is built into the very conception of a rigid designator,..and Leibniz's Law is presupposed...and necessity of origin presupposes sufficiency of origin. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed. He cites Salmon 1981:196 for the last point] This sounds right. You feel happy to 'rigidly designate' something precisely because you think there is something definite and stable which can be designated. |
21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Heidegger showed us the importance of transient time for consciousness. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
Full Idea: All thought is controlled by tacit theory (which is why Freud is so important). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction | |
A reaction: This idea is said to be the essential thought of Derrida's Deconstruction. The aim is liberation of thought, by identifying and bypassing these tacit metaphysical schemas. |
21932 | 'Différance' is the interwoven history of each sign [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
Full Idea: What Derrida calls 'différance' can be understood as the movement through which every sign is 'constituted historically as a weave of differences'....This replacement for 'speech' in the 'origin' of the system is to avoid the circularity in structuralism. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (Différance [1982]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 5 | |
A reaction: [compressed] Struggling to grasp this. Some English words entirely change their meaning over time (e.g. buxom). Does the lost meaning remain part of the new meaning? If so, how? He also calls différance 'sameness which is not identical'. |
21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Meaning depends on 'differences' (contrasts). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
Full Idea: A noun [for Aristotle] is proper when it has but a single sense. Better, it is only in this case that it is properly a noun. Univocity is the essence, or better, the telos of language. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 5 | |
A reaction: [no ref given] His target seem to be Aristotelian definition, and also formal logic, which usually needs unambiguous meanings. {I'm puzzled that he thinks 'telos' is simply better than 'essence', since it is quite different]. |
21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
Full Idea: The capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
Full Idea: The sign is conceivable only on the basis of the presence that it defers, and moving toward the deferred presence that it aims to reappropriate. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 6 | |
A reaction: [Glendinning gives no source for this] I take the fundamental idea to be that meanings are dynamic, when they are traditionally understood as static (and specifiable in dictionaries). |
21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
Full Idea: Writing can and must be able to do without the presence of the sender. ...Also writing can and must he able to do without the presence of the receiver. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 6 | |
A reaction: In simple terms, one of them could die during the transmission. This is the grounds for the assertion of the primacy of writing. It opposes orthodox views which define language in terms of sender and receiver. |
21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks behind all language. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
8212 | Everything that is experienced in consciousness is meaning [Derrida] |
Full Idea: All experience is the experience of meaning (Sinn). Everything that appears to consciousness, everything that is for consciousness in general, is meaning. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (Semiology and Grammatology [1968], p.26) | |
A reaction: This an assertion, from a quite different philosophical tradition, of the centrality of linguistic meaning in philosophy. It links with the centrality of intentionality in our understanding of the mind. |
21929 | Derrida focuses on ambiguity, but talks of 'dissemination', not traditional multiple meanings [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Derrida affirms something like an 'ambiguity of meaning'. But he explicitly contrasts the word he uses to characterize the phenomenon at issue, what he calls 'dissemination', with the traditional concept of 'polysemia' - multiple meanings. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (Of Grammatology [1967]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 2 'After' | |
A reaction: The point, I presume, is that there is vagueness and elision to the meanings, rather than a list of options, such as bank/bank. Context (sense-making paths) is crucial for Derrida. Can the analytic apparatus for the logic of vagueness be brought to bear? |
21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
Full Idea: The intention to oppose polysemia with dissemination does not aim to affirm that everything we say is ambiguous, but that polysemia is irreducible in the sense that each and every 'meaning' is itself subject to more than one understanding. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 5 | |
A reaction: The key point, I think, is that ambiguity and polysemia are not failures of language (which is the way most logicians see it), but part of the essential and irreducible nature of language. Nietzsche started this line of thought. |
21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Words only exist is 'spacings' (of time and space), so there are no synchronic meanings (except perhaps in writing). | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
Full Idea: Even the good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there can be no 'pure' good. | |
From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction |
21936 | A community must consist of singular persons, with nothing in common [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
Full Idea: In Derrida's modal reversal (where the only possible forgiveness is forgiving the unforgivable), the only possible community is the impossible community, which is a 'community of singularities' without anything in common. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (later work [1980]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 7 | |
A reaction: Since this seems to go beyond multiculturalism, I can only see it as hyper-liberalism - that isolated individuals have an absolute status. Sounds like Nozick, but Derrida saw himself as a non-Marxist left-winger. |
21937 | Can there be democratic friendship without us all becoming identical? [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
Full Idea: The question is whether it is possible to think of a politics of democratic friendship that could free itself from the terrifying threat of homogenization. | |
From: report of Jacques Derrida (later work [1980]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 7 | |
A reaction: Being terrified of people becoming all the same links Derrida to existentialist individualism. Is he just a linguistic existentialist, trying to free us from the tyranny of linguistic uniformity? |
12245 | Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: In the traditional terminology, function follows essence. Essence just is the principle from which flows the characteristic behaviour of a thing. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 2.1) | |
A reaction: Hence essence must be identified if the behaviour is to be explained, and a successful identification of essence is the terminus of our explanations. But the essences must go down to the micro-level. Explain non-characteristic behaviour? |
12246 | What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: Even if there were no multiplicity in unity - only a Parmenidean 'block' - still the question would arise as to what gave the amorphous lump its unity; by virtue of what would it be one rather than many? | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.1) | |
A reaction: Which is prior, division or unification? If it was divided, he would ask what divided it. One of them must be primitive, so why not unity? If one big Unity is primitive, why could not lots of unities be primitive? Etc. |
12239 | The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: It is incorrect to hold that the job of the real essentialist just is the job of the scientist. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.3) | |
A reaction: Presumably scientific essentialism, while being firmly a branch of metaphysics, is meant to clarify the activities of science, and thereby be of some practical use. You can't beat knowing what it is you are trying to do. |
12243 | The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg] |
Full Idea: The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken. | |
From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.4) | |
A reaction: Oderberg's point is that essence doesn't just occur at the bottom of the hierarchy of kinds, but can exist on a macro-level, and need not be a concealed structure, as we see in the essence of a pile of stones. |
3029 | Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stilpo asked a man whether Athena is the daughter of Zeus, and when he said yes, said,"But this statue of Athena by Phidias is the child of Phidias, so it is not a god." | |
From: report of Stilpo (fragments/reports [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.10.5 |