Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Stilpo, Michael J. Loux and Martin Luther

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
Aristotle is a buffoon who has misled the Church [Luther, by MacIntyre]
     Full Idea: Aristotle is a buffoon who has misled the Church.
     From: report of Martin Luther (talk [1525]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.10
     A reaction: Before he became famous, Luther was a university lecturer on Aristotle. This remark was a hundred years before philosophers began serious criticism of Aristotle. Presumably Protestants just stopped reading him.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux]
     Full Idea: If trope theorists say abstract singular terms name sets of tropes, what is the referent of 'is a unicorn'? The only candidate is the null set (with no members), but there is just one null set, so 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' will be identical.
     From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.86)
     A reaction: Not crucial, I would think, given that a unicorn is just a horse with a horn. Hume explains how we do that, combining ideas which arose from actual tropes.
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux]
     Full Idea: Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability.
     From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.60)
     A reaction: Plato's view seems to be that we don't identify universals independently. We ascend The Line, or think about the shadows in The Cave, and infer the universals from an array of particulars (by dialectic).
Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux]
     Full Idea: Universals come in hierarchies of generality.
     From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.24)
     A reaction: If it is possible to state facts about universals, this obviously encourages a rather Platonic approach to them, as existent things with properties. But maybe the hierarchies are conventional, not natural.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux]
     Full Idea: In return for a one-category ontology (with particulars but no universals), the austere nominalist is forced to take a whole host of things (like being red, or triangular, or human) as unanalysable or primitive.
     From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.68)
     A reaction: I see that 'red' might have to be primitive, but being human can just be a collection of particulars. It is no ontologically worse to call them 'primitive' than to say they exist.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux]
     Full Idea: Nominalists have been very concerned to provide an account of the role of abstract singular terms (such as 'circularity').
     From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.34)
     A reaction: Whether this is a big problem depends on our view of abstraction. If it only consists of selecting one property of an object and reifying it, then we can give a nominalist account of properties, and the problem is solved.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux]
     Full Idea: Any account of the identity of material objects which turns on the identity of places and times must face the objection that the identity of places and times depends, in turn, on the identities of the objects located at them.
     From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.56)
     A reaction: This may be a benign circle, in which we concede that there are two basic interdependent concepts of objects and space-time. If you want to define identity - in terms of what?
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Stilpo asked a man whether Athena is the daughter of Zeus, and when he said yes, said,"But this statue of Athena by Phidias is the child of Phidias, so it is not a god."
     From: report of Stilpo (fragments/reports [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.10.5
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
With respect to religion, reason is a blind whore [Luther]
     Full Idea: With respect to the mysteries of the Christian religion, reason is a blind whore.
     From: Martin Luther (talk [1525]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
     A reaction: Reason is presumably a blind whore with respect to all impenetrable mysteries. Since the reason of Aquinas endorsed the mysteries of Christianity, the remark seems a bit strong, but it is appropriate if you think that only faith (in Christianity) matters.