6 ideas
12354 | A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin] |
Full Idea: A 'categorial' property is a property something has by virtue of being or having an item from one of the categories. | |
From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], V.5) | |
A reaction: I deny that these are 'properties'. A thing is categorised according to its properties. To denote the category as a further property is the route to madness (well, to a regress). |
16643 | Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura] |
Full Idea: An accident's aptitudinal relationship to a subject is essential, and this is never taken away from accidents….for it is true to say that they are suited to a subject. | |
From: Bonaventura (Commentary on Sentences [1252], IV.12.1.1.1c) | |
A reaction: This is the compromise view that allows accidents to be separated, for Transubstantiation, while acknowledging that we identify them with their subjects. |
12358 | Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin] |
Full Idea: Substance [ousia] is a principle [arché] and a kind of cause [aitia]. | |
From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], 1041a09) | |
A reaction: The fact that substance is a cause is also the reason why substance is the ultimate explanation. It is here that I take the word 'power' to capture best what Aristotle has in mind. |
12346 | Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin] |
Full Idea: The form of a thing (of a given kind) explains why certain matter constitutes a thing of that kind, and with this, Aristotle holds, we have reached explanatory bedrock. | |
From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: We must explain an individual tiger which is unusually docile. It must have an individual form which makes it a tiger, but also an individual form which makes it docile. |
16696 | Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura] |
Full Idea: Everything successive reduces to something permanent. | |
From: Bonaventura (Commentary on Sentences [1252], II.2.1.1.3 ad 5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.2 | |
A reaction: Avicenna first took successive entities seriously, but Bonaventure and Aquinas seem to have rejected them, or given reductive accounts of them. It resembles modern actualists versus modal realists. |
3029 | Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Stilpo asked a man whether Athena is the daughter of Zeus, and when he said yes, said,"But this statue of Athena by Phidias is the child of Phidias, so it is not a god." | |
From: report of Stilpo (fragments/reports [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.10.5 |