Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Stilpo, Mirabeau and committee and J.J.C. Smart

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics should avoid talk of past, present or future [Smart]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics should not be cosmically parochial. It should eschew tensed languages.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (The Tenseless Theory of Time [2008], 1)
     A reaction: This is quite an engaging reason to be an eternalist (or B-theorist) about time. Presumably we can still believe in tensed time, as long as we recognise that metaphysics itself is a timeless subject.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence is consilience, simplicity, analogy, and fitting into a web of belief [Smart]
     Full Idea: I shall make use of the admittedly imprecise notions of consilience, simplicity, analogy and fitting into a web of belief, or in short of 'coherence'.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.06)
     A reaction: Coherence sounds like a family of tests, rather than a single unified concept. I still like coherence, though.
We need comprehensiveness, as well as self-coherence [Smart]
     Full Idea: Not mere self-coherence, but comprehensiveness belongs to the notion of coherence.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.07)
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
I simply reject evidence, if it is totally contrary to my web of belief [Smart]
     Full Idea: The simplest way of fitting the putative observed phenomena of telepathy or clairvoyance into my web of belief is to refuse to take them at face value.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.07-8)
     A reaction: Love it. It is very disconcerting for the sceptical naturalist to be faced with adamant claims that the paranormal has occurred, but my response is exactly the same as Smart's. I reject the reports, no matter how passionately they are asserted.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
The height of a flagpole could be fixed by its angle of shadow, but that would be very unusual [Smart]
     Full Idea: You could imagine a person using the angle from a theodolite to decide a suitable spot to cut the height of the flagpole, …but since such circumstances would be very unusual we naturally say the flagpole subtends the angle because of its height.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.14)
     A reaction: [compressed; he mentions Van Fraassen 1980:132-3 for a similar point] As a response this seems a bit lame, if the direction is fixed by what is 'usual'. I think the key point is that the direction of explanation is one way or the other, not both.
Universe expansion explains the red shift, but not vice versa [Smart]
     Full Idea: The theory of the expansion of the universe renders the red shift no longer puzzling, whereas he expansion of the universe is hardly rendered less puzzling by facts about the red shift.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.15)
     A reaction: The direction of explanation is, I take it, made obvious by the direction of causation, with questions about what is 'puzzling' as mere side-effects.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
Explanation of a fact is fitting it into a system of beliefs [Smart]
     Full Idea: I want to characterise explanation of some fact as a matter of fitting belief in this fact into a system of beliefs.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.02)
     A reaction: Sounds good to me. Simple facts slot straight into daily beliefs, and deep obscure facts are explained when we hook them up to things we have already grasped. Quark theory fits into prior physics of forces, properties etc.
Explanations are bad by fitting badly with a web of beliefs, or fitting well into a bad web [Smart]
     Full Idea: An explanation may be bad if it fits only into a bad web of belief. It can also be bad if it fits into a (possibly good) web of belief in a bad sort of way.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.09)
     A reaction: Nice. If you think someone has an absurd web of beliefs, then it counts against some belief (for you) if it fits beautifully into the other person's belief system. Judgement of coherence comes in at different levels.
Deducing from laws is one possible way to achieve a coherent explanation [Smart]
     Full Idea: The Hempelian deductive-nomological model of explanation clearly fits in well with the notion of explanation in terms of coherence. One way of fitting a belief into a system is to show that it is deducible from other beliefs.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.13)
     A reaction: Smart goes on to reject the law-based deductive approach, for familiar reasons, but at least it has something in common with the Smart view of explanation, which is the one I like.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
An explanation is better if it also explains phenomena from a different field [Smart]
     Full Idea: One explanation will be a better explanation that another if it also explains a set of phenomena from a different field ('consilience').
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.07)
     A reaction: This would count as 'unexpected accommodation', rather than prediction. It is a nice addition to Lipton's comparison of mere accommodation versus prediction as criteria. It sounds like a strong criterion for a persuasive explanation.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
If scientific explanation is causal, that rules out mathematical explanation [Smart]
     Full Idea: I class mathematical explanation with scientific explanation. This would be resisted by those who, unlike me, regard the notion of causation as essential to scientific explanation.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.02-3)
     A reaction: I aim to champion mathematical explanation, in terms of axioms etc., so I am realising that my instinctive attraction to exclusively causal explanation won't do. What explanation needs is a direction of dependence.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Scientific explanation tends to reduce things to the unfamiliar (not the familiar) [Smart]
     Full Idea: The history of science suggests that most often explanation is reduction to the unfamiliar.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.11)
     A reaction: Boyle was keen to reduce things to the familiar, but that was early days for science, and some nasty shocks were coming our way. What would Boyle make of quantum non-locality?
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Negative utilitarianism implies that the world should be destroyed, to avoid future misery [Smart]
     Full Idea: The doctrine of negative utilitarianism (that we should concern ourselves with the minimisation of suffering, rather than the maximisation of happiness) ...means we should support a tyrant who explodes the world, to prevent infinite future misery.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Outline of a System of Utilitarianism [1973], 5)
     A reaction: That only seems to imply that the negative utilitarian rule needs supplementary rules. We are too fond of looking for one single moral rule that guides everything.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Any group interested in ethics must surely have a sentiment of generalised benevolence [Smart]
     Full Idea: A utilitarian can appeal to the sentiment of generalised benevolence, which is surely present in any group with whom it is profitable to discuss ethical questions.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Outline of a System of Utilitarianism [1973], I)
     A reaction: But ethics is not intended only for those who are interested in ethics. If this is the basics of ethics, then we must leave the mafia to pursue its sordid activities without criticism. Their lack of sympathy seems to be their good fortune.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The purpose of society is to protect the rights of liberty, property, security and resistance [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: The aim of all political associations is the conservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 02)
     A reaction: Radical thinkers will obviously be doubtful about property being on the list, because that entrenches huge inequalities, between peasants and their landlords. Resistance to oppression will bother the likes of Edmund Burke.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The law expresses the general will, and all citizens can participate [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: The law is the expression of the general will. All citizens have the right to take part in person or through their representatives in its formulation. It must be the same for all, whether it protects or whether it punishes.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 06)
     A reaction: Now you are wondering who qualifies as a 'citizen'. Rousseau would have been excited until he found that the citizens could send 'representatives', instead of voting themselves. Rousseau aimed at foundational laws, not all of the laws.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
There is only a constitution if rights are assured, and separation of powers defined [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: Any society in which the guarantee of Rights is not assured, nor the separation of Power determined, has no Constitution.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 16)
     A reaction: I wonder if they had Britain in mind with this one? The British latched onto Magna Carta in the early 19th century, because it offered some semblance of a constitution.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
No one should be molested for their opinions, if they do not disturb the established order [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: No man is to be molested on account of his opinions, even his religious opinions, provided that their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 10)
     A reaction: Virtually any opinion will 'disturb' the established order a little bit, so this gives the option of suppressing quite mild beliefs, on the grounds of their small disturbance. It is still a wonderful proposal, though.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Free speech is very precious, and everyone may speak and write freely (but take responsibility for it) [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of man's most precious rights. Every citizen may therefore speak, write, and publish freely; except that he shall be responsible for the abuse of that freedom in cases determined by law.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 11)
     A reaction: Wonderful, and very nicely expressed. Tom Paine will have been a huge influence on this clause.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
All citizens are eligible for roles in the state, purely on the basis of merit [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: All citizens being equal in the eyes of the law are equally eligible to all honours, offices, and public employments, according to their abilities and without other distinction than that of their virtues and talents.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 06)
     A reaction: This proclamation of meritocracy must have rung bells around the cities of Europe, and was a reason why many people enjoyed being invaded by Napoleon.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property is a sacred right, breached only when essential, and with fair compensation [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no man may be deprived of it except when public necessity, lawfully constituted, evidently requires it; and on condition that a just indemnity be paid in advance.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 17)
     A reaction: This covers compulsory purchase orders. Is the ownership of slaves inviolable? Will aristocrats be compensated for the confiscation of their vast estates?
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
Everyone must contribute to the state's power and administration, in just proportion [Mirabeau/committee]
     Full Idea: For the maintenance of public force and the expenses of administration, a common contribution is indispensable. It must be equally apportioned among all citizens according to their abilities.
     From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 13)
     A reaction: Presumably this enshrines graduated income tax, an eighteenth century invention. Could you contribute just by your labour, or by fighting for the army? Those may be greater contributions than mere money.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
Special relativity won't determine a preferred frame, but we can pick one externally [Smart]
     Full Idea: Though special relativity does not determine a preferred frame of reference, it does not rule out the possibility of a frame being determined from outside the theory. Perhaps we should prefer a frame where background radiation is equal in all directions.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (The Tenseless Theory of Time [2008], 3)
     A reaction: Of course this is a mere philosopher offering the escape clause, and not some Nobel-winning physicist, but I start from the assumption that this idea is plausible, and I am unmoved by the contempt for presentism among relativity geeks.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
Unlike Newton, Einstein's general theory explains the perihelion of Mercury [Smart]
     Full Idea: Newtonian celestial mechanics does not explain the advance of the perihelion of Mercury, while Einstein's general theory of relativity does.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.03)
     A reaction: A perfect example of why explanation is the central concept in science, and probably in all epistemological activity. The desire to know is the desire for an explanation. Once the explanation is obvious, we know.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
If time flows, then 'how fast does it flow?' is a tricky question [Smart]
     Full Idea: If it is said that time flows, then it seems that the question 'how fast does it flow?' is a devastating one for the A-theorist.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (The Tenseless Theory of Time [2008], 5)
     A reaction: This is one of the basic landmarks in any debate on time. Time can't be understood by analogy with anything else (such as a river) it seems.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
The past, present, future and tenses of A-theory are too weird, and should be analysed indexically [Smart]
     Full Idea: The main objections to the A-theory are due to the metaphysical mysteriousness of the A-theory ideas of past, present and future, and also tenses, and to the greater plausibility of analyzing them as indexicals.
     From: J.J.C. Smart (The Tenseless Theory of Time [2008], 3)
     A reaction: When it comes to time, every theory that has ever been though of is deeply weird, so the basic objection doesn't bother me. Analysing as indexicals just seems to be a technical way of denying reality to the present.
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Stilpo asked a man whether Athena is the daughter of Zeus, and when he said yes, said,"But this statue of Athena by Phidias is the child of Phidias, so it is not a god."
     From: report of Stilpo (fragments/reports [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.10.5