21 ideas
| 5901 | Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham] |
| Full Idea: Bentham has not made up his mind whether he thinks that 'right' means 'productive of the general happiness', or that being productive of the general happiness is what makes acts right (and he would have thought the difference unimportant). | |
| From: comment on Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §I | |
| A reaction: The issue is whether rightness exists as a concept separate from happiness. I take it Bentham would vote for the first reading, as he has no interest in what is right, apart from increasing happiness. |
| 5934 | Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham] |
| Full Idea: Most of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure refer to further pleasures, or are irrelevant to the pleasure; we are left with intensity and duration as the characteristics on which depend the value of a pleasure qua pleasure, and there is nothing to add. | |
| From: comment on Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §VI | |
| A reaction: I agree. When Bentham produces his list he seems to be trying to add a bogus enrichment to what is really a rather crude and basic notion of the aim of life. Your simple hedonist appears to only desire high intensity and long duration. |
| 5271 | Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham] |
| Full Idea: Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and science of music and poetry. | |
| From: Jeremy Bentham (Constitutional Code I [1827], p.139), quoted by J.R. Dinwiddy - Bentham p.114 | |
| A reaction: Mill quoted this with implied outrage, but Bentham was attacking public subsidies to the arts when he said it. It is a basic idea in the debate on pleasure - that pleasures are only distinguished by their intensity, not some other value. |
| 3777 | Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham] |
| Full Idea: Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. | |
| From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], I.1) | |
| A reaction: Ridiculous. Both halves are false. We pursue things for other reasons, and to deny this makes his idea a tautology. Deep ecology has nothing to do with human pleasure or pain. |
| 3554 | Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham] |
| Full Idea: It is easy to fall into Bentham's mindless assumption that happiness must be a specific state of feeling good about something, but it is mysterious why anyone would think morality a good strategy for achieving this. | |
| From: comment on Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.7 |
| 3781 | The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham] |
| Full Idea: It behoves the legislator to understand the force of pleasures and pains, which is their value. | |
| From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], IV.1) |
| 20977 | Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham] |
| Full Idea: Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense — nonsense upon stilts. | |
| From: Jeremy Bentham (Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights [1796]) | |
| A reaction: If you want your opinion to be remembered, express it memorably! I take natural rights to be the basic principles and values which are obvious to almost everyone when they come for formulate legal rights (which are the only true rights). |
| 19855 | The purpose of society is to protect the rights of liberty, property, security and resistance [Mirabeau/committee] |
| Full Idea: The aim of all political associations is the conservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression. | |
| From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 02) | |
| A reaction: Radical thinkers will obviously be doubtful about property being on the list, because that entrenches huge inequalities, between peasants and their landlords. Resistance to oppression will bother the likes of Edmund Burke. |
| 3778 | The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham] |
| Full Idea: The interest of the community is the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it. | |
| From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], I.4) |
| 19856 | The law expresses the general will, and all citizens can participate [Mirabeau/committee] |
| Full Idea: The law is the expression of the general will. All citizens have the right to take part in person or through their representatives in its formulation. It must be the same for all, whether it protects or whether it punishes. | |
| From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 06) | |
| A reaction: Now you are wondering who qualifies as a 'citizen'. Rousseau would have been excited until he found that the citizens could send 'representatives', instead of voting themselves. Rousseau aimed at foundational laws, not all of the laws. |
| 19861 | There is only a constitution if rights are assured, and separation of powers defined [Mirabeau/committee] |
| Full Idea: Any society in which the guarantee of Rights is not assured, nor the separation of Power determined, has no Constitution. | |
| From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 16) | |
| A reaction: I wonder if they had Britain in mind with this one? The British latched onto Magna Carta in the early 19th century, because it offered some semblance of a constitution. |
| 19858 | No one should be molested for their opinions, if they do not disturb the established order [Mirabeau/committee] |
| Full Idea: No man is to be molested on account of his opinions, even his religious opinions, provided that their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law. | |
| From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 10) | |
| A reaction: Virtually any opinion will 'disturb' the established order a little bit, so this gives the option of suppressing quite mild beliefs, on the grounds of their small disturbance. It is still a wonderful proposal, though. |
| 19859 | Free speech is very precious, and everyone may speak and write freely (but take responsibility for it) [Mirabeau/committee] |
| Full Idea: The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of man's most precious rights. Every citizen may therefore speak, write, and publish freely; except that he shall be responsible for the abuse of that freedom in cases determined by law. | |
| From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 11) | |
| A reaction: Wonderful, and very nicely expressed. Tom Paine will have been a huge influence on this clause. |
| 19857 | All citizens are eligible for roles in the state, purely on the basis of merit [Mirabeau/committee] |
| Full Idea: All citizens being equal in the eyes of the law are equally eligible to all honours, offices, and public employments, according to their abilities and without other distinction than that of their virtues and talents. | |
| From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 06) | |
| A reaction: This proclamation of meritocracy must have rung bells around the cities of Europe, and was a reason why many people enjoyed being invaded by Napoleon. |
| 21003 | Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham] |
| Full Idea: Right, the substantive right, is the child of law; from real laws come real rights; but from imaginary laws, from 'law of nature' can come only imaginary rights. | |
| From: Jeremy Bentham (Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights [1796], II.523), quoted by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 17 'Ethics' | |
| A reaction: I am coming to agree with this. What are called 'natural rights' are just self-evident good reasons why someone should be allowed a right. A right can, of course, come from an informal agreement. The question is: why award that particular legal right? |
| 19862 | Property is a sacred right, breached only when essential, and with fair compensation [Mirabeau/committee] |
| Full Idea: Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no man may be deprived of it except when public necessity, lawfully constituted, evidently requires it; and on condition that a just indemnity be paid in advance. | |
| From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 17) | |
| A reaction: This covers compulsory purchase orders. Is the ownership of slaves inviolable? Will aristocrats be compensated for the confiscation of their vast estates? |
| 19860 | Everyone must contribute to the state's power and administration, in just proportion [Mirabeau/committee] |
| Full Idea: For the maintenance of public force and the expenses of administration, a common contribution is indispensable. It must be equally apportioned among all citizens according to their abilities. | |
| From: Mirabeau and committee (Declaration of the Rights of Man [1789], 13) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this enshrines graduated income tax, an eighteenth century invention. Could you contribute just by your labour, or by fighting for the army? Those may be greater contributions than mere money. |
| 20280 | Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham] |
| Full Idea: A full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational animal than an infant of a day, or even a month, old. But suppose they be otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? | |
| From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], XVIII 1 n), quoted by Peter Singer - Practical Ethics 03 | |
| A reaction: This is certainly an inspiring, and even shocking question, which never seems to have been so directly asked before in the entire history of European thought. Awesome. |
| 3779 | Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham] |
| Full Idea: Unnatural, when it means anything, means unfrequent. | |
| From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], II.14 n8.9) |
| 3780 | We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary to know first whether a thing is right in order to know from thence whether it be conformable to the will of God. | |
| From: Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], II.18) |
| 3029 | Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Stilpo asked a man whether Athena is the daughter of Zeus, and when he said yes, said,"But this statue of Athena by Phidias is the child of Phidias, so it is not a god." | |
| From: report of Stilpo (fragments/reports [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.10.5 |