Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Stilpo, Pythagoras and Henry Laycock

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


22 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Speak the truth, for this alone deifies man [Pythagoras, by Porphyry]
     Full Idea: Pythagoras advised above all things to speak the truth, for this alone deifies man.
     From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Porphyry - Life of Pythagoras §41
     A reaction: Idea 4421 (of Nietzsche) stands in contrast to this. I am not quite sure why speaking the truth has such a high value. I am inclined to a minimalist view, which is just that philosophy is an attempt to speak the truth, as fishermen try to catch fish.
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 2. Ancient Thought
Pythagoras discovered the numerical relation of sounds on a string [Pythagoras, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Pythagoras discovered the numerical relation of sounds on a string.
     From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 08.1.11
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]
     Full Idea: If a plural variable is said to have not a single value but some values (some clothes), then a non-count variable may have, more quirkier still, some value (some clothing, for instance) in ranging arbitrarily over the scattered stuff.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 4.4)
     A reaction: We seem to need the notion of a sample, or an archetype, to fit the bill. I hereby name them 'sample variables'. Damn - Laycock got there first, on p.137.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
     Full Idea: Plurality is a semantical but not also an ontological construction.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4)
     A reaction: I love it when philososphers make simple and illuminating remarks like this. You could read 500 pages of technical verbiage about plural reference without grasping that this is the underlying issue. Sounds right to me.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
For Pythagoreans 'one' is not a number, but the foundation of numbers [Pythagoras, by Watson]
     Full Idea: For Pythagoreans, one, 1, is not a true number but the 'essence' of number, out of which the number system emerges.
     From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE], Ch.8) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.8
     A reaction: I think this is right! Counting and numbers only arise once the concept of individuality and identity have arisen. Counting to one is no more than observing the law of identity. 'Two' is the big adventure.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock]
     Full Idea: The very words we class as non-count nouns may themselves be used for counting, of kinds or types, and phrases like 'several wines' are perfectly in order. ...Not only do we have 'less cheese', but we also have the non-generic 'fewer cheeses'.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n23)
     A reaction: [compressed] Laycock generally endorses the thought that what can be counted is not simply distinguished by a precise class of applied vocabulary. He offers lots of borderline or ambiguous cases in his footnotes.
Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock]
     Full Idea: Some words that seem to be semantically non-count can take syntactically plural forms: 'snows', 'sands', 'waters' and the like.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n24)
     A reaction: This seems to involve parcels of the stuff. The 'snows of yesteryear' occur at different times. 'Taking the waters' probably involves occasions. The 'Arabian sands' presumably occur in different areas. Semantics won't fix what is countable.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
     Full Idea: The central fact about the category of stuff or matter is that it is profoundly antithetical to reference.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Pref)
     A reaction: This is taking 'reference' in the strictly singular classical sense, but clearly we refer to water in various ways. Laycock's challenge is very helpful. We have been in the grips of a terrible orthodoxy.
Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
     Full Idea: The definite descriptions of stuff like water are neither singular descriptions denoting individual mereological aggregates, nor plural descriptions denoting multitudes of discrete units or semantically determined atoms.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 5.3)
     A reaction: Laycock makes an excellent case for this claim, and seems to invite a considerable rethink of our basic ontology to match it, one which he ultimately hints at calling 'romantic'. Nice. Conservatives try to force stuff into classical moulds.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock]
     Full Idea: Suppose that water, qua vapour, mixes with the atmosphere. Is there any abstract metaphysical principle, other than that of atomism, which implies that water must, in any such process, retain its identity? That claim seems indefensible.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 1.2 n22)
     A reaction: It can't be right that some stuff always loses its identity in a mixture, if the mixture was in a closed vessel, and then separated again. Dispersion is what destroys the identity, not mixing.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
     Full Idea: The notion of a part is such that parts must be of the same very general type - concrete, material or physical, for instance - as the wholes of which they are (said to be) parts.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], 2.9)
     A reaction: The phrase 'same very general type' cries out for investigation. Can an army contain someone who isn't much of a soldier? Can the Treasury contain a fear of inflation?
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock]
     Full Idea: Work is needed to distinguish abstract nouns ...from the generic uses of what are otherwise concrete nouns. The contrast is that of 'humility is a virtue' and 'water is a liquid'.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Intro 4 n25)
     A reaction: 'Work is needed' implies 'let me through, I'm an analytic philosopher', but I don't think they will separate very easily. What does 'watery' mean? Does water have concrete virtues?
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock]
     Full Idea: Some people hold that it is reference, in some more or less full-blooded sense, which constitutes our basic intellectual or psychological connection with the world.
     From: Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Pref)
     A reaction: This is the view which Laycock sets out to challenge, by showing that we talk about stuff like water without any singular reference occurring at all. I think he is probably right.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Pythagoras taught that virtue is harmony, and health, and universal good, and God [Pythagoras, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Pythagoras taught that virtue is harmony, and health, and universal good, and God.
     From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 08.1.19
     A reaction: I like the link with health, because I consider that a bridge over the supposed fact-value gap. Very Pythagorean to think that virtue is harmony. Plato liked that thought.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
For Pythagoreans, justice is simply treating all people the same [Pythagoras, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Some even think that what is just is simple reciprocity, as the Pythagoreans maintained, because they defined justice simply as having done to one what one has done to another.
     From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE], 28) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1132b22
     A reaction: One wonders what Pythagoreans made of slavery. Aristotle argues that officials, for example, have superior rights. The Pythagorean idea makes fairness the central aspect of justice, and that must at least be partly right.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
When musical harmony and rhythm were discovered, similar features were seen in bodily movement [Pythagoras, by Plato]
     Full Idea: When our predecessors discovered musical scales, they also discovered similar features in bodily movement, which should also be measured numerically, and called 'tempos' and 'measures'.
     From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Plato - Philebus 17d
Pythagoreans define timeliness, justice and marriage in terms of numbers [Pythagoras, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The Pythagoreans offered definitions of a limited range of things on the basis of numbers; examples are timeliness, justice and marriage.
     From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1078b
Pythagoreans think mathematical principles are the principles of all of nature [Pythagoras, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The Pythagoreans thought that the principles of mathematical entities were the principles of all entities.
     From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 985b
Pythagoreans say things imitate numbers, but Plato says things participate in numbers [Pythagoras, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Pythagoreans said that entities existed by imitation of the numbers, whereas Plato said that it was by participation.
     From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 987b
For Pythagoreans the entire universe is made of numbers [Pythagoras, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: For Pythagoreans the entire universe is constructed of numbers.
     From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1080b
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Stilpo said if Athena is a daughter of Zeus, then a statue is only the child of a sculptor, and so is not a god [Stilpo, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Stilpo asked a man whether Athena is the daughter of Zeus, and when he said yes, said,"But this statue of Athena by Phidias is the child of Phidias, so it is not a god."
     From: report of Stilpo (fragments/reports [c.330 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.10.5
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The modern idea of an immortal soul was largely created by Pythagoras [Pythagoras, by Watson]
     Full Idea: The modern concept of the immortal soul is a Greek idea, which owes much to Pythagoras.
     From: report of Pythagoras (reports [c.530 BCE]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.5
     A reaction: You can see why it caught on - it is a very appealing idea. Watson connects the 'modern' view with the ideas of heaven and hell. Obviously the idea of an afterlife goes a long way back (judging from the contents of ancient graves).