100 ideas
15682 | Even fairly simple animals make judgements based on categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: All organisms form categories: even mealworms have category-based preferences, and higher-order animals such as pigeons or octopi can display quite sophisticated categorical judgements. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: [She cites some 1980 research to support this] This comes as no surprise, as I take categorisation as almost definitive of what a mind is. My surmise is that some sort of 'labelling' system is at the heart of it (like Googlemail labels!). |
15691 | Children accept real stable categories, with nonobvious potential that gives causal explanations [Gelman] |
Full Idea: By five children assume that a variety of categories have rich inductive potential, are stable over outward transformations, include crucial nonobvious properties, have innate potential, privilege causal features, can be explained causally, and are real. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Intro') | |
A reaction: This is Gelman's helpful summary of the findings of research on childhood essentialising, and says the case for this phenomenon is 'compelling'. |
15700 | In India, upper-castes essentialize caste more than lower-castes do [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The notion of caste in India is more essentialized among upper-caste than lower-caste individuals. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 08 'Intro') | |
A reaction: In a book defending fairly innate essentialism in the human race, Gelman offers this point as a warning that large cultural ingredients can be involved. Racism is the classic difficulty with essentialism. |
15685 | Essentialism is either natural to us, or an accident of our culture, or a necessary result of language [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The two views contrasting with essentialism naturally emerging in childhood are the claim that essentialism is a historical accident emerging from Western philosophy, and that essentialism is an inherent consequence of naming things. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Background') | |
A reaction: Helpful. I take Idea 15682 to rule out the idea that it is just a feature of western culture. I can't conceive of early man surviving without essentialism. I don't think it rules out the naming view. Animals may do what emerges in us as full 'naming'. |
15684 | Children's concepts include nonobvious features, like internal parts, functions and causes [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Children incorporate a variety of nonobvious features into their concepts, including internal parts, functions, causes, and ontological distinctions. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: This remark sums up the general thesis of her book, which she supports with a wealth of first-hand evidence. It supports my view, that the desire and need for explanation is at the root of essentialist concepts. It's hard wired in us. |
15681 | Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We map types of essentialism by asking is it in the world or in our representations, is it sortal or causal or ideal, and is it specific particulars or placeholders for the unknown? | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: I am struck by the way that this practising experimental psychologist gets to ask questions and make distinctions much more extensively than most armchair philosophers on the subject. She focuses on the representational, causal, placeholder view. |
15678 | Essentialism says categories have a true hidden nature which gives an object its identity [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism is the view that categories have an underlying reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that gives an object its identity. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Intro') | |
A reaction: I think the introduction of categories here is a misunderstanding. Does an uncategorisable thing therefore have no identity (even though it has properties)? If categories give objects their identity, what gives categories their identity? |
15683 | Sortals are needed for determining essence - the thing must be categorised first [Gelman] |
Full Idea: I suggest that sortals are likewise required for determining essence. One cannot answer the question 'What is the essence of this?' without supplying the sortal - of this 'what'. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') | |
A reaction: I remain baffled by this view. I take the category to be an inductive generalisation from other similar individuals. It can't get off the ground if you don't start with the individuals. Sortals are just a shorthand. |
15697 | Kind (unlike individual) essentialism assumes preexisting natural categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: With kind essentialism the person assumes that the world is divided up into preexisting natural categories. Individual essentialism seems not to require any such commitment to kind realism. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Essentialism') | |
A reaction: This pinpoints my difficulty: how do we decide whether some category or attributed essence is part of a preexisting natural kind? Some natural kinds are self-evident, like water (roughly), but others need subtle teasing out. How is the teasing done? |
15687 | Kinship is essence that comes in degrees, and age groups are essences that change over time [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Kinship is essentialized, but admits of degrees, ...and people can be essentialist even about categories they do not view as fixed over time, such as age groupings. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 03 'Summary') | |
A reaction: Given my notion of essence are necessarily explanatory, I embrace both of these points. Being very athletic comes in degrees, and changes over times. |
15679 | Essentialism comes from the cognitive need to categorise [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism has its source in the cognitive requirement of categorization in certain domains - particularly as they affect the young learner. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Essentialist') | |
A reaction: I think the phenomenon is better understood as part of the cognitive requirement to understand and explain. Categorisation is just one way to aid explanation. Children try to understand (essentially) a new animal without categorisation. |
15698 | We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We found no evidence that mothers teach essentialism to their children. ...Mothers teach children about kinds, not about essences, and mothers help children identify which categories are richly structured. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 07 'Conclusions') | |
A reaction: This is a psychologist who specialises in this topic. If you think essentialism is inculcated by a our culture, you will have to blame the fathers. |
15709 | Essentialism is useful for predictions, but it is not the actual structure of reality [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism is a reasoning heuristic that allows us to make fairly good predictions much of the time, but it should not be confused with the structure of reality. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Discussion') | |
A reaction: She particularly cites biology as the area where it might be inaccurate. I'm beginning to think that the operations of induction are the place to look for an good understanding of essentialism. |
15696 | Peope favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is [Gelman] |
Full Idea: People favor historical paths over outward properties when determining what something is. ...An object looking like a knife is less likely to be called 'a knife' if it is described as having been created by accident. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Essentialism') | |
A reaction: I like this because it talks, suggestively, of 'historical paths' rather than of 'origin'. Thus we might judge a person's identity by their traumatic experience rather than by their birth. This doesn't challenge necessity of origin, but affects labels. |
15707 | There is intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist and deontological understanding [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The modes of understanding (or modes of construal) which have been proposed are intentional, mechanical, teleological, essentialist, vitalist (perhaps), and deontological. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Broadening') | |
A reaction: She cites psychological research to support this, and calls it 'a relatively small number' of modes. Compare Aristotle's four modes of cause/explanation. |
15703 | Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Memory is notorious for conforming to theory (rather than memory being a neutral source of information). | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 09 'Theory') | |
A reaction: This observation by a psychologist is music to sceptics about objectivity. Memory is so fundamental to our basic epistemology that it could even be the nature of thought itself. |
15708 | Inductive success is rewarded with more induction [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Inductive success is rewarded with more induction. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Broadening') | |
A reaction: I love this one. Neat, accurate, and central to how we understand the world. I take inductive success to be stored as labels, concepts, categories, words and general truths, which are then our resource for further attempts. |
15694 | Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We suggest that children overestimate the power of a single example. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'The role') | |
A reaction: This conclusion arises from extensive psychological research. 'My grandma smoked, and she lived to be 97' - adults do this too. Wittgenstein says assuming other minds because of your own is induction from one example! |
15695 | Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Because of their narrow focus, children's sensitivity to categories as the basis of induction is a reasoning bias that, though useful much of the time, results in systematic errors. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'The role') | |
A reaction: This is the bad sense of 'essentialism' which worries its opponents. Presumably, though, my favoured scientific essentialism will be 'scientific', and avoid this problem. The relation between categories and induction needs to be clear. |
15692 | People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman] |
Full Idea: People tend to be satisfied with rather shallow explanations. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'Is essentialism') | |
A reaction: She cites some psychological research to support this. Pretty obvious really. I take the so-called 'scientific method' to be nothing more than ceasing to be satisfied with such shallowness. |
15680 | Folk essentialism rests on belief in natural kinds, in hidden properties, and on words indicating structures [Gelman] |
Full Idea: The three components of essentialism as a folk belief are the idea that certain categories are natural kinds, the idea that some unobservable property causes the way things are, and the idea that words reflect real structures. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims') |
15686 | Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Labels may signal categories that are believed to embody an essence. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 02 'Privileged') | |
A reaction: This is quoted by her, as a summary of a substantial body of research which she endorses. I cite it because it pinpoints my own view. I take 'labels' to be basic to minds, as organisers of thought, and this ties essences to labels. Satisfying picture. |
15690 | Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Properties that enter into causally meaningful links are better remembered and are treated as more central to the category than properties that are not causally meaningful. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 05 'Causation2') | |
A reaction: This is a summary of considerable psychological research. This account not only sounds plausible, but would fit better withy why we form concepts and categories in the first place. We are trying to relate to the causations of nature. |
15688 | Categories are characterized by distance from a prototype [Gelman] |
Full Idea: On prototype views, categories are characterized by distance from a prototype. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 05 'Causation') | |
A reaction: Gelman observes that this view makes no reference to any causal features of things. This cuts them off from using underlying essences in the process of categorisation and concept-formation. How do you spot a prototype, with no category? |
15689 | Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Theory-based approaches to categories are a response to the limitations of mere similarities holding the category together, and require knowledge-rich explanatory models to say which features are more central to a concept. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 05 'Causation1') | |
A reaction: I see a promising account in linking theory theory to essentialism. For a physical object (or even for a process) infer a structure, and then identify what is most important in that structure. That gives you your stable, agreed concept. |
15699 | Prelinguistic infants acquire and use many categories [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Language does not appear to be necessary for forming categories, since prelinguistic infants acquire many categories, and even use categories to form inferences about unknown properties. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 08 'Intro') | |
A reaction: She cites lots of research in support of this claim. The idea may come as a surprise to some people, but not to me. I take it that categorisation is what a brain is for, including animal brains. |
7352 | Jesus said learning was unnecessary, and only the spirit of the Law was needed [Jesus, by Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: Jesus was a learned Jew who said that learning was not necessary, who took the spirit and not the letter as the essence of the Law. | |
From: report of Jesus (reports [c.32]) by Paul Johnson - The History of the Jews Pt II | |
A reaction: This seems to me the perfect opposite of Socrates's intellectualism, offering the essence of morality as 'purity of heart', rather than careful thought about virtue or principles. On the whole I am with Socrates, but the idea is interesting. |
19956 | True goodness is political, and consists of love of and submission to the laws [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The good man is he whose goodness is not Christian, but rather political, in the sense I have given. Such a man loves the laws of his land and is moved to act by them. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], Intro) | |
A reaction: I take this to have a lot in common with Aristotle, whose simple slogan for virtue I take to as 'be a good citizen'. |
6289 | Love your enemies [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Love your enemies. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.44 | |
A reaction: The germ of this idea had been around for several hundred years, but this very forceful statement is perhaps Jesus' most distinctive contribution to moral thought. It has the same clarion call as the Stoic demand for pure virtue. What about deserving? |
6292 | Love thy neighbour as thyself [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Love thy neighbour as thyself. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 19.19 | |
A reaction: It would be stronger and better to say 'Love your neighbour, even if you don't love yourself'. Self-loathing and vicious hatred often go together. For once Jesus does not attach an instant heavenly reward to obedience of the command. |
5356 | Treat others as you would have them treat you [Jesus] |
Full Idea: All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, so ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 07.12 | |
A reaction: A problem which probably didn't occur to Jesus and the prophets is that of masochists. Personally I like buying philosophy books, but most people have no such desire. The Rule needs restricting to the basics of pleasure and pain. |
6286 | Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.07 | |
A reaction: This appears to be a straightforward application of social contract morality, with God playing the role of Hobbes' absolute monarch. It highlights the uncomfortable fact at the heart of Christian morality, that the motivation for altruism is selfish. |
6290 | Except ye become as little children, ye shall not enter heaven [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 18.03 | |
A reaction: The appeal of such purity of heart is undeniable, but essentially I dislike this remark. It is the opponent of education, reason, autonomy, responsibility, democracy and maturity. It confirms the view that religion is the opium of the people. |
6287 | If you lust after a woman, you have committed adultery [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Whosoever look on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.28 | |
A reaction: Compare Democritus, Idea 503. Literally this idea seems absurd, but it is also at the heart of Greek virtue theory. Aristotle (Idea 34) defines virtue as an activity 'of the soul', not an action in the world. Excellence has become purity of soul. |
6285 | Blessed are the meek; for they shall inherit the earth [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Blessed are the meek; for they shall inherit the earth. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.05 | |
A reaction: If they are truly meek, why would they want to inherit the earth? This is the classic statement of Nietzsche's 'inversion of values', where the qualities of a good slave are elevated above those of the greatest human beings. |
6288 | Don't resist evil, but turn the other cheek [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Ye have heard it said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil, but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.38-9 | |
A reaction: Compare Socrates, Idea 346. The viciousness of many Hollywood movies is that they set up a character as thoroughly evil so that we can have the pleasure of watching him pulverised. On the whole, Jesus gives bad advice. 'Doormats' in game theory. |
6293 | It is almost impossible for the rich to go to heaven [Jesus] |
Full Idea: It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 19.24 | |
A reaction: Aristotle and others (Margaret Thatcher) have observed that you cannot practise charity if you are poor. Jesus implies that the human race should remain in poverty. No wonder autocratic medieval rulers taught Christianity to peasants. Cf. Matt 25.30. |
19962 | Men do not desire to subjugate one another; domination is a complex and advanced idea [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: It is unreasonable to impute to men, as Hobbes does, the desire to subjugate one another. The idea of sovereignty [l'empire] and domination is so complex and depends on so many other ideas, that it could not be the first to occur to men. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) |
19961 | Primitive people would be too vulnerable and timid to attack anyone, so peace would reign [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: A being concerned only with preservation would be very timid. In such a state every man would feel himself an inferior; he could scarcely imagine himself an equal. No one would seek to attack anyone else; peace would be the first law of nature. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
A reaction: Exactly the idea that Rousseau took up, and they both attack Hobbes for describing a more advanced stage of society, instead of focusing on the original state. A solitary individual would be crazy to launch attacks on other individuals. |
19963 | People are drawn into society by needs, shared fears, pleasure, and knowledge [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: To his sense of weakness, man would soon add his needs. Encouraged by indications that their fear was shared, men would soon come together. They would feel the pleasure (and sexual attraction) of their own species. Knowledge then draws them into society. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
A reaction: He doesn't make the point about 'knowledge' very clear. |
20008 | People are guided by a multitude of influences, from which the spirit of a nation emerges [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Men are ruled by many causes: climate, religion, laws, maxims of government, examples drawn from the pasts, customs, manners. Out of them is formed the general spirit of a nation. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.04) | |
A reaction: This is one step away from Rousseau's general will, which is an attempt to give precise expression to this 'spirit of a nation'. |
19993 | In small republics citizens identify with the public good, and abuses are fewer [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a small republic, the public good is more keenly felt, better known, closer to every citizen; abuses are spread less widely, and consequently, are less tolerated. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.16) | |
A reaction: This idea of very small republics now seems outdated, but this idea still applies. Small states like the Baltic States (or Scotland?) have a better chance of the citizens identifying with the whole community. |
19992 | In a large republic there is too much wealth for individuals to manage it [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a large republic, there are large fortunes, and therefore but little moderation in the minds of men. its resources are too considerable to be entrusted to a citizen. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.16) |
20005 | The rich would never submit to a lottery deciding which part of their society should be slaves [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: I do not believe that anyone of [that small part of a nation that is rich and voluptuous] would submit to a lottery determining which part of the nation would be free, and which slave. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.09) | |
A reaction: Wonderful! This is exactly Rawls's 'initial position' and 'veil of ignorance'. It is used here to deconstruct implausible arguments in favour of slavery. |
19995 | All states aim at preservation, and then have distinctive individual purposes [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Although all states share the same general objective, to preserve themselves, each has its own particular purpose (such as aggrandisement, war, religion, commerce, tranquillity, navigation, liberty, pleasures of the ruler, glory, individual independence). | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.05) | |
A reaction: [he gives examples for each of the list in brackets] I'm trying to think of the distinctive purpose of the UK, and can't get beyond sport, music gigs and comedy shows. |
19964 | The natural power of a father suggests rule by one person, but that authority can be spread [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Some have thought that because nature has established the power of the parent, the most natural government is that of a single person. But the example of paternal power proves nothing. The inheritance by a father's brothers would support rule by the many. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.03) | |
A reaction: [last bit compressed] Locke pointed out that the mother has similar entitlement, and he and Rousseau agree in rejecting this idea. |
19986 | Monarchies can act more quickly, because one person is in charge [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Monarchical government has the great advantage that, since public business is guided by a single person, the executive power can operate more speedily. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.10) | |
A reaction: Liberal democracies are particularly hopeless at quick action, because so many views have to be heard. |
19972 | The nobility are an indispensable part of a monarchy [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a sense, nobility is one part of the essence of monarchy, whose fundamenta maxim is: 'without a monarchy, no nobility; without a nobility, no monarchy'. There are, of course, despots, but they are something else. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
A reaction: Hence the worst vice associated with a monarchy is patronage, even when the monarch is weak and 'constitutional'. |
19974 | Monarchs must not just have links to the people; they need a body which maintains the laws [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a monarchy, it is not enough to have intermediary ranks; there must also be a body that is a depositary of laws. They must announce the laws when they are made, and recall them to the public's attention when they are forgotten. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
A reaction: This is the crucial difference between a monarch and a despot, because the monarch must be subservient to the law. |
19976 | Ambition is good in a monarchy, because the monarch can always restrain it [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a republic ambition is pernicious, but in a monarchy it has a good effect; it gives life to that type of government. Its advantage lies in that it is not dangerous, because a monarchy can continue to restrain it. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 03.07) | |
A reaction: That is sometimes offered as a defence of the very weak British monarchy. |
19978 | In monarchies, men's actions are judged by their grand appearance, not their virtues [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In monarchies, men's actions are judged, not by whether they are good, but whether they appear attractive [belles]; not by whether they are just, but whether they appear grand; not by whether they are reasonable, but by whether they appear extraordinary. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.02) | |
A reaction: A person that comes to mind is the Duke of Buckingham under James I and Charles I. Or the Earl of Essex under Elizabeth I. |
19985 | In a monarchy, the nobility must be hereditary, to bind them together [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a monarchy, the laws must make the nobility hereditary, not to serve as the boundary between the power of the ruler and the weakness of the people, but as the tie that binds them together.... | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.09) | |
A reaction: This seems rather disingenuous. If the nobility are bound together in some tight manner, this immediately serves as a sharp boundary between them and the rest of the people. Monarchs are bound to want the strict boundary. |
19988 | A despot's agents must be given power, so they inevitably become corrupt [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: A government cannot be unjust without putting some power in the hands of its agents; it is impossible that they not profit from their position. Embezzlement is, therefore, natural to such governments. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.15) |
19977 | Despotism and honour are incompatible, because honour scorns his power, and lives by rules [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: How could a despot permit honour? Honour depends upon scorning life; the despot has power only because he can deprive men of life. How could honour tolerate the despot? Honour has fixed rules, ...but the despot has no rule. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 03.08) | |
A reaction: The old German aristocracy seem to have been utterly alienated and isolated by the Nazi regime. |
20007 | Tyranny is either real violence, or the imposition of unpopular legislation [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: There are two sorts of tyranny: that which is real and consists of the violence of government; and the tyranny of opinion, when those who govern institute things contrary to a nation's mode of thought. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.03) | |
A reaction: By this reckoning the abolition of the death penalty by the UK partliament was tyrannous, as it went against popular enthusiasm for it. Representative democracy is always in danger of drifting towards mild tyranny. |
19975 | Despots are always lazy and ignorant, so they always delegate their power to a vizier [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Anyone whom his senses inform continually that he is everything, and others nothing, is naturally lazy, voluptuous, and ignorant. Hence the establishment of a vizier, with power the same as his own, is a law fundamental to a despotic state. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.05) |
19989 | The will of a despot is an enigma, so magistrates can only follow their own will [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Under despotism, the law is nothing more than the will of the ruler. Even if the despot were wise, how could a magistrate follow a will unknown to him? He has no choice but to follow his own. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.16) |
19970 | If the nobility is numerous, the senate is the artistocracy, and the nobles are a democracy [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: When the nobility is numerous, there must be a senate to regulate those matters which the body of nobles is incapable of deciding. Thus aristocracy of a kind resides in the senate, democracy in the body of nobles, while the people is nothing. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.03) | |
A reaction: This presumes that the body of nobles elects the senate. |
19971 | Aristocracy is democratic if they resemble the people, but not if they resemble the monarch [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Aristocratic families ought to be, as much as possible, members of the people. The more an aristocracy resembles a democracy, the more perfect it is; the more it resembles a monarchy, the more imperfect. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.03) | |
A reaction: Aristocrats far from the big cities seem remarkably like the rest of the people. As soon as they approach the monarch's court, they aspire to dignity and power, and begin to spurn the citizens. |
19984 | Great inequality between aristocrats and the rest is bad - and also among aristocrats themselves [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In aristocratic state there are two main sources of disorders: excessive inequality between those who govern and those who are governed, and the same degree of inequality among the different members of the ruling group [corps]. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.08) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a very historically accurate observation, since aristocrats are always at one another's throats. But maybe junior aristocrats just need to be kept more firmly in their place. |
19980 | If a government is to be preserved, it must first be loved [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Government is like everything else in this world: if it is to be preserved, it must first be loved. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.05) | |
A reaction: Nice one! Right now there seems to be a declining love for representative democracy, even though almost everyone endorses it. |
19996 | A government has a legislature, an international executive, and a domestic executive [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In every government there are three sorts of powers: the legislative; the executivem in regard to those matters determined by the laws of nations; and the executive, in regard to those matters determined by civil law. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) |
19997 | The judiciary must be separate from the legislature, to avoid arbitrary power [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Were the judicial power joined to the legislative, the life and liberty of the citizens would be subject to arbitrary power. For the judge would then be the legislator. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
A reaction: This is the key 'separation of powers', which seems to be a mantra for nearly all theories of the state. |
19965 | The fundamental laws of a democracy decide who can vote [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The laws fundamental to a democracy are those that establish who is eligible to vote. (p.118 No less fundamental is the method of voting itself). | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: Tricky groups now are teenagers, convicted criminals, people with damaged brains, and citizens who live abroad. Maybe people who evade paying tax should lose the right to vote. |
19968 | It is basic to a democracy that the people themselves must name their ministers [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: A democratic people may be said to have ministers only when these have been named by the people itself. Thus it is a maxim fundamental to this type of government that the people must name its ministers. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: In the UK we don't do this. We elect local representatives, usually of a preferred party, and then they chose the ministers, and even the leader. The people who run our country are a long way from direct democracy. |
19969 | Voting should be public, so the lower classes can be influenced by the example of notable people [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: When the people votes it should do so in public. ...For it is necessary that the lower classes be enlightened by those of higher rank, that the precipitous qualities of the lower classes be held in check by the grave example of certain notables. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: This sounds shocking to us, but the lower classes were largely illiterate. Nowadays we have television to tell us how the notables are going to vote, and the less notables seem to be increasingly unimpressed. |
19999 | All citizens (apart from the very humble poor) should choose their representatives [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: All citizens ought to have the right to choose their representatives by election. The only exception concerns those whose condition is so base that they are considered to have no will of their own. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
A reaction: This is an amazingly liberal view of the franchise for its time (though he may not be including women), but with a rather breathtaking coda! It may be hard for us now to grasp the very humble state of an illiterate peasant. |
19967 | In a democracy the people should manage themselves, and only delegate what they can't do [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a democracy, the people, which holds the sovereign power, ought itself to do everything it can do well; that which it cannot do well must be done by its ministers. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: This is just what you see when a group of residents manages their own building. Citizens in representative democracies become utterly lazy about running their society, so that they won't even pick up litter, or report communal problems. |
19966 | A democratic assembly must have a fixed number, to see whether everyone has spoken [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: It is essential to fix the number of citizens who can participate in assemblies. Otherwise it would be uncertain whether all the people had spoken, or only a part of it. At Sparta the number was fixed at ten thousand. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.02) | |
A reaction: This looks like an immediate injustice to the citizen who came 10,001 in the rankings. 10,000 is just a smallish football crowd, so we could manage it today. We could pick the 10,000 by sortition (by lot). Most people are fairly sensible! |
19998 | If deputies represent people, they are accountable, but less so if they represent places [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: When the deputies represent the body or estate of the people, as in Holland, they ought to be accountable to their constituents. When the deputies represent boroughs, as in England, the situation is not the same. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.06) | |
A reaction: Not sure how this works. Modern UK MPs are accountable to the residents of their borough. Did the Dutch actually name the citizens that a deputy represented? |
20003 | Slaves are not members of the society, so no law can forbid them to run away [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: What civil law could prevent a slave from running away? Since he is not a member of society, why should the laws of society concern him? | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
A reaction: Hm. Does this apply to children, who can't vote or stand for office? |
20000 | Slavery is entirely bad; the master abandons the virtues, and they are pointless in the slave [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: There is nothing good about the nature of slavery. The slave can achieve nothing by being virtuous. The master acquires all sorts of bad habits, and is accustomed to behaving with a total lack of moral virtues. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.01) | |
A reaction: Most slavery of that time took place in colonies, far remote from the moral judgments of the mother country. The temptations of such power over others are far too great for most masters to live virtuously. |
20006 | The demand for slavery is just the masters' demand for luxury [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The demand for slavery is the demand for luxury and voluptuousness; it has nothing to do with concern for public felicity. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.09) | |
A reaction: True monarchists and aristocratic elitists presumably think that a society should have one part which lives in great luxury. Where else are the fine arts and wonderful buildings going to come from? |
20009 | Freedom of speech and writing, within the law, is essential to preserve liberty [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: If a state is to enjoy and preserve liberty, everyone must be able to say what he thinks. In a free state, therefore, a citizen may speak and write anything not expressly forbidden by the laws. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 19.27) | |
A reaction: A commonplace now, but fairly bold then. I blame Freeborn John Lilburne for wild ideas like these. |
19994 | Freedom in society is ability to do what is right, and not having to do what is wrong [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In a society where laws exist, liberty can consist only in being able to do what one ought to will, and in not being contrained to do what one ought not to will. ...If a citizen could do what the law prohibits, all others would have the same power. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 11.03) | |
A reaction: This sounds pretty quaint in 2017, but I love it. |
19981 | No one even thinks of equality in monarchies and despotism; they all want superiority [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In monarchies and despotic states, no one aspires to equality. Not even the idea occurs; everyone aspires to superiority. People of the very lowest rank only wish to rise in order to become masters of others. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.04) |
19991 | Equality is not command by everyone or no one, but command and obedience among equals [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The spirit of true equality consists, not in creating a situation in which everyone commands, or in which no one is commanded, but rather in obeying or commanding only our equals. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.03) | |
A reaction: I love this idea, but it is so easy to feel superior when you command, or to feel inferior when you are commanded. I take the solution to be the appointment of everyone in authority by those they will command (but fat chance of that). |
19990 | Democracy is corrupted by lack of equality, or by extreme equality (between rulers and ruled) [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Democracy is corrupted in two ways: when it loses the spirit of equality, and when the spirit of equality becomes extreme, that is, when everyone wishes to be the equal of those he has chosen to command him. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 08.02) | |
A reaction: The latter seems to be what happens when a referendum is called (as in Brexit 2016). The winners come to despise the elected representatives, if the latter disagree with the outcome. |
19982 | Some equality can be achieved by social categories, combined with taxes and poor relief [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Equality is so difficult that exactitude is not possible. It is enough to place citizens by a census within categories that reduce or fix differences. Then laws compensate for inequalities by taxes on the rich and relief given to the poor. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.05) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Placing citizens within categories (e.g. 'nobility') has long gone out of fashion. He doesn't say whether you tax the capital or the income of the rich. |
19983 | Democracies may sometimes need to restrict equality [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In some cases, equality among citizens may be denied by democracy for the utility of democracy. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.05) | |
A reaction: He cites people who make sacrifices for the public, and lower orders who are getting above themselves! The desire for equality quickly comes into conflict with other values. |
19959 | Prior to positive laws there is natural equity, of obedience, gratitude, dependence and merit [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The relations of equity precede the positive laws that establish them. It is right to conform to laws in a society; intelligent beings should be grateful for benefits; we remain dependent on those who create us; an injury merits the same in return. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.01) | |
A reaction: [the examples are compressed] A nice statement of the idea of natural law. It doesn't follow that because an injury merits retaliation, that it should be implemented (just that no one can complain if it happens). |
19960 | Sensation gives animals natural laws, but knowledge can make them break them [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Animals have natural laws because they are united by sensation, ...but they do not invariably follow thieir natural laws; these are better observed by vegetables, which have neither knowledge nor sensation. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.02) | |
A reaction: With the example of vegetables the concept of natural law is drifting into the laws of nature, and evidently Montesquie makes no sharp distinction here. |
20002 | The death penalty is permissible, because its victims enjoyed the protection of that law [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: It is permissible to put a criminal to death because the law that punishes him was made to protect him. For example, a murderer has enjoyed the benefits of the law by which he is condemned. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
A reaction: Dubious! We could add torture, and life imprisonment for parking offences, if this argument is sufficient justification. |
20010 | If religion teaches determinism, penalties must be severe; if free will, then that is different [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: When religion teaches that human actions are predetermined, penalties imposed by law ought to be more severe, for without these measures men would behave with complete abandon. If the dogma of religion is free will, the situation is altogether different. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 24.14) | |
A reaction: Presumably persuasion and influence come into the free will picture. Calvinist Geneva was determinist, and Catholic France for free will. |
20001 | The only right victors have over captives is the protection of the former [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: War can confer only one right over captives, and that is to ensure that they no longer harm victors. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.02) | |
A reaction: He is arguing against both the killing of captives, and their enslavement. |
19973 | The clergy are essential to a monarchy, but dangerous in a republic [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: The power of the clergy is as dangerous in a republic, as it is appropriate to a monarchy. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 02.04) | |
A reaction: This makes me look at the UK in a new light, with the clergy hovering around when the monarch is crowned, and the bishops sitting by right in the House of Lords. |
19987 | Religion has the most influence in despotic states, and reinforces veneration for the ruler [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: In these [despotic] states, religion has more influence than anywhere else; it is fear added to fear. The peoples of the Mohammedan empires in part derive from their religion their extraordinary veneration for their rulers. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 05.14) | |
A reaction: I suppose religions have submission to authority built into them. |
20011 | Religion can support the state when the law fails to do so [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Religion can support the state when the laws themselves lack the power to do so. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 24.16) | |
A reaction: A thought which didn't occur to Spinoza, but then the thought merely confirms that religion offers a rival to the rule of law. |
20004 | French slavery was accepted because it was the best method of religious conversion [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Louis XIII was made extremely uneasy by the law that enslaved all the negroes in his colonies. But when told that this was the most efficacious way of converting them, he gave his consent. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 15.04) | |
A reaction: That is a spectaculary bad advert for giving an established religion a leading role in society. It is relevant to the upbringing of children, as well as to slaves. |
19979 | In monarchies education ennobles people, and in despotisms it debases them [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Just as the purpose of education in monarchies is to ennoble men's hearts, so its purpose in despotic states is to debase them. In despotic states education must be servile. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 04.03) | |
A reaction: This is an early insight into the way that all social institutions, such as education, are largely pawns of a larger political system. |
19957 | Teaching is the best practice of the general virtue that leads us to love everyone [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: It is when we instruct others that we can best practice that general virtue which teaches us to love everyone. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], Preface) | |
A reaction: A very nice thought. One tricky issue is that some people dislike, and even resent, being taught. If we all just adored both teaching and learning, we would be in a sort of paradise, but it doesn't seem to happen. |
15693 | One sample of gold is enough, but one tree doesn't give the height of trees [Gelman] |
Full Idea: We can confidently determine the chemical composition of gold from just a single sample, but we cannot determine the height of trees from just a single tree. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 06 'The role') | |
A reaction: The tricky word here is 'confidently'. If you meet one Latvian who is nice, do you assume they are all nice? At what point do you decide gold etc. really are natural kinds, where one sample tells all? Evolution of species... |
15701 | Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Children judged personal characteristics as more stable when they were referred to by a noun ('She is a carrot eater') than by a verbal predicate ('She eats carrots whenever she can') | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 08 'Naming') | |
A reaction: This fits with my feeling that 'labels' are the basis of how the mind works. The noun invokes a genuine category of thing, where a predicate attaches to some preselected category ('she'). Gelman says names encourage inductions. |
15705 | Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism encourages a 'scientific' mindset in thinking about the natural world, a belief that intensive study of a natural domain will yield ever more underlying properties. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Maybe scientists must be committed to essences, the way mathematicians must be committed to numbers? This idea spendidly opposes the doubts expressed by Popper. |
15702 | Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman] |
Full Idea: Essentialism does not entail that people know what the essence is. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 09 'Theory') | |
A reaction: This is a fundamental and (I would say) fairly obvious point, but it needs to be made to the more passionate opponents of essentialism. |
19958 | Laws are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things [Montesquieu] |
Full Idea: Laws, in the broadest meaning of the term, are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things. | |
From: Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757) [1748], 01.01) | |
A reaction: Montesquieu is about to discuss social laws, but this is the clearest statement I have ever met of the essentialist view of the laws of nature. |
15704 | Essentialism starts from richly structured categories, leading to a search for underlying properties [Gelman] |
Full Idea: If my speculations are correct, then essentialism starts out strictly as a belief that many categories are richly structured kinds, then additionally becomes a search for underlying inherent properties. | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 10 'Figuring') | |
A reaction: This is her summary of extensive essentialist research among children. She favours the priority of kinds and categories. We actually change taxonomies on the basis of revisions in our accounts of essence. Science negotiates. |
15706 | A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman] |
Full Idea: One major argument against the view that essences are real is the rampant essentializing of categories that are socially constructed (such as race, caste and occupation). | |
From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Is essentialism') | |
A reaction: You can't argue with that. It raises the question of whether the approach of scientific essentialism has any value in the social, rather than physical, sciences. We jokingly essentialise groups of people such as referees or Oxonians. |
6291 | No one is good except God [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one, that is, God. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 19.17 | |
A reaction: This remark raises the problem that if God is good, there must be some separate moral standard by which he can be judged good. What is that standard? It is related to the problem of whether Plato's Form of the Beautiful is itself beautiful. |
7351 | Jesus turned the ideas of Hillel into a theology reduced to its moral elements [Jesus, by Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: Jesus was a member of the school of Hillel the Elder, and may have sat under him. He repeated some of the sayings of Hillel, ...and turned his ideas into a moral theology, stripping the law of all but its moral and ethical elements. | |
From: report of Jesus (reports [c.32]) by Paul Johnson - The History of the Jews Pt II | |
A reaction: The crucial move, it seems to me, is to strip Judaism of its complexity, and reduce it to very simple moral maxims, which means that ordinary illiterate people no longer need priests to understand and follow it. Jesus was, above all, a great teacher. |