Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Theophrastus, Goodman,N/Quine,W and Dorion Sagan

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


4 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Scientists know everything about nothing, philosophers nothing about everything [Sagan,D]
     Full Idea: The scientist learns more and more about less and less, until she knows everything about nothing, whereas a philosopher learns less and less about more and more until he knows nothing about everything.
     From: Dorion Sagan (Cosmic Apprentice [2013])
     A reaction: [Came via Twitter] Not sure if this is true, but it is too nice to miss.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
We renounce all abstract entities [Goodman/Quine]
     Full Idea: We do not believe in abstract entities..... We renounce them altogether.
     From: Goodman,N/Quine,W (Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism [1947], p.105), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Defending the Axioms
     A reaction: Goodman always kept the faith here, but Quine decided to embrace sets, as a minimal commitment to abstracta needed for mathematics, which was needed for science. My sympathies are with Goodman. This is the modern form of 'nominalism'.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus]
     Full Idea: How could what is bitter for us be sweet and sour for others, if there is not some determinate nature for them?
     From: Theophrastus (On the Senses [c.321 BCE], 70)
     A reaction: The remark is aimed at Democritus. This is part of the general question of how you can even talk about relativism, without attaching stable meanings to the concepts employed.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk]
     Full Idea: Theophrastus questioned Aristotle's teaching on the extent to which teleological explanations could be applied to the natural world.
     From: report of Theophrastus (On Metaphysics (frags) [c.320 BCE]) by H.B. Gottschalk - Aristotelianism
     A reaction: It is interesting to see that Aristotle's own immediate successor had doubts about teleology. We usually assume that the ancients were teleological, and this was rejected in the seventeenth century (e.g. Idea 4826).