8 ideas
| 8808 | Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee] |
| Full Idea: Examples confirm that beliefs may be both involuntary and subject to epistemic evaluation. | |
| From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], II) | |
| A reaction: This is an extremely important point, which summarises the situation with beliefs that arise from (apparent) immediate perception. A belief cannot possibly be knowledge if it has been triggered, but no effort was made to evaluate it. |
| 8807 | Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee] |
| Full Idea: What we call 'evidentialism' is the view that the epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the believer's evidence for the belief. | |
| From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], I) | |
| A reaction: The immediate question is whether the believer knows the quality of their evidence. A detective might not recognise the crucial clue (like the dog not barking). The definition of 'quality' had better not turn out to be circular. Forgotten evidence? |
| 8809 | Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee] |
| Full Idea: One epistemically ought to have the doxastic attitudes that fit one's evidence. Being epistemically obligatory is equivalent to being epistemically justified. | |
| From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], III) | |
| A reaction: It is normal for someone to refuse to accept something, when another person believes the evidence is overwhelming. Evaluation of evidence must include an assessment of what other evidence might turn up. |
| 8810 | If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee] |
| Full Idea: If an arrogant young physicist refuses to recognise valid criticisms from a senior colleague, his or her character has nothing to do with the epistemic status of their belief in the theory. | |
| From: R Feldman / E Conee (Evidentialism [1985], III) | |
| A reaction: This rejects the idea that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of virtues and vices of character. That view is a version of reliabilism, and hence of externalism. I agree with the criticism, but epistemic virtues are still significant. |
| 15675 | We don't condemn people for being bad at reasoning [Finlayson] |
| Full Idea: We do not morally disapprove of people who are incompetent reasoners. | |
| From: James Gordon Finlayson (Habermas [2005], Ch.6:83) | |
| A reaction: Well, we don't morally disapprove simply of their lack of reasoning ability, but we may morally disapprove of their actions, which have arisen entirely from the disability. |
| 15674 | One can universalise good advice, but that doesn't make it an obligation [Finlayson] |
| Full Idea: 'Early to bed and early to rise' is a universalizable maxim, but, though it might be good advice, there is obviously no such obligation. | |
| From: James Gordon Finlayson (Habermas [2005], Ch.6:83) | |
| A reaction: I take it that Kant's rule won't distinguish moral guidance from prudential guidance. Unfair, I think. I may be a lark, but when I universalise this maxim I see that it can't be willed as a universal rule, because we should tolerate the owls. |
| 15662 | The 'culture industry' is an advertisement for the way things are [Finlayson] |
| Full Idea: Critical theory said that culture unwittingly played the role of an advertisement for the way things are. Horkheimer and Adorno referred to this phenomenon as the 'culture industry'. | |
| From: James Gordon Finlayson (Habermas [2005], Ch.1:04) | |
| A reaction: An interesting perspective. However, absolutely everything is an advertisement for what it offers. I think this is especially true of moral (and immoral) actions. |
| 1558 | Clearly the gods ignore human affairs, or they would have given us justice [Thrasymachus] |
| Full Idea: The gods pay no attention to human affairs; if they did, they would not have ignored justice, which is the greatest good for men; for we see that men do not act with justice. | |
| From: Thrasymachus (fragments/reports [c.426 BCE], B8), quoted by Hermias - Notes on Plato's 'Phaedrus' 239.22 |