9978
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Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait]
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Full Idea:
The tendency to attack forms of expression rather than attempting to appreciate what is actually being said is one of the more unfortunate habits that analytic philosophy inherited from Frege.
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From:
William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], IV)
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A reaction:
The key to this, I say, is to acknowledge the existence of propositions (in brains). For example, this belief will make teachers more sympathetic to pupils who are struggling to express an idea, and verbal nit-picking becomes totally irrelevant.
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9986
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The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait]
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Full Idea:
The conception that what can be numbered is some object (including flocks of sheep) relative to a partition - a choice of unit - survived even in the late nineteenth century in the form of the rejection of the null set (and difficulties with unit sets).
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From:
William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], IX)
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A reaction:
This old view can't be entirely wrong! Frege makes the point that if asked to count a pack of cards, you must decide whether to count cards, or suits, or pips. You may not need a 'unit', but you need a concept. 'Units' name concept-extensions nicely!
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9984
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We can have a series with identical members [Tait]
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Full Idea:
Why can't we have a series (as opposed to a linearly ordered set) all of whose members are identical, such as (a, a, a...,a)?
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From:
William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], VII)
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A reaction:
The question is whether the items order themselves, which presumably the natural numbers are supposed to do, or whether we impose the order (and length) of the series. What decides how many a's there are? Do we order, or does nature?
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13416
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Mathematics must be based on axioms, which are true because they are axioms, not vice versa [Tait, by Parsons,C]
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Full Idea:
The axiomatic conception of mathematics is the only viable one. ...But they are true because they are axioms, in contrast to the view advanced by Frege (to Hilbert) that to be a candidate for axiomhood a statement must be true.
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From:
report of William W. Tait (Intro to 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2005], p.4) by Charles Parsons - Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' §2
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A reaction:
This looks like the classic twentieth century shift in the attitude to axioms. The Greek idea is that they must be self-evident truths, but the Tait-style view is that they are just the first steps in establishing a logical structure. I prefer the Greeks.
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17770
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Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne]
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Full Idea:
Endorsing Clifford's dictum threatens to undermine our right to hold many of our most cherished beliefs about morality, politics, and philosophy, for these are domains in which it is notoriously difficult to secure consensus.
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From:
Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.7)
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A reaction:
I would say that those beliefs are amenable to evidence, but the evidence is often highly generalised, which is what makes those subjects notoriously difficult. The existence of a convention is a sort of evidence.
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9982
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Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait]
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Full Idea:
Although (in Cantor and Dedekind) abstraction does not (as has often been observed) play any role in their proofs, but it does play a role, in that it fixes the grammar, the domain of meaningful propositions, and so determining the objects in the proofs.
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From:
William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], V)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This is part of a defence of abstractionism in Cantor and Dedekind (see K.Fine also on the subject). To know the members of a set, or size of a domain, you need to know the process or function which created the set.
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9985
|
Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait]
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Full Idea:
A different reading of abstraction is that it concerns, not the individuating properties of the elements relative to one another, but rather the individuating properties of the set itself, for example the concept of what is its extension.
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From:
William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], VIII)
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A reaction:
If the set was 'objects in the room next door', we would not be able to abstract from the objects, but we might get to the idea of things being contain in things, or the concept of an object, or a room. Wrong. That's because they are objects... Hm.
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9980
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If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait]
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Full Idea:
If the power |A| is obtained by abstraction from set A, then if A is equipollent to set B, then |A| = |B|. But this does not imply that A = B. So |A| cannot just be A, taken in abstraction, unless that can identify distinct sets, ..or create new objects.
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From:
William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], V)
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A reaction:
An elegant piece of argument, which shows rather crucial facts about abstraction. We are then obliged to ask how abstraction can create an object or a set, if the central activity of abstraction is just ignoring certain features.
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2854
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Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B]
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Full Idea:
Prescriptivism holds that if you think one 'ought' to do a certain kind of act, and yet you are not committed to doing that act in the relevant circumstances, then you either spoke insincerely, or are using the word 'ought' in a weak sense.
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From:
Brad W. Hooker (Prescriptivism [1995], p.640)
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A reaction:
So that's an 'ought', but not a 'genuine ought', then? (No True Scotsman move). Someone ought to rescue that drowning child, but I can't be bothered.
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20883
|
Modern utilitarians value knowledge, friendship, autonomy, and achievement, as well as pleasure [Hooker,B]
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Full Idea:
Most utilitarians now think that pleasure, even if construed widely, is not the only thing desirable in itself. ...Goods also include important knowledge, friendship, autonomy, achievement and so on.
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From:
Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 2)
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A reaction:
That pleasure is desired is empirically verifiable, which certainly motivated Bentham. A string of other desirables each needs to be justified - but how? What would be the value of a 'friendship' if neither party got pleasure from it?
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20885
|
Euthanasia is active or passive, and voluntary, non-voluntary or involuntary [Hooker,B]
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Full Idea:
Six types of euthanasia: 1) Active voluntary (knowing my wishes), 2) Active non-voluntary (not knowing my wishes), 3) Active involuntary (against my wishes), 4) Passive voluntary, 5) Passive non-voluntary, 6) Passive involuntary.
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From:
Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 5)
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A reaction:
'Active' is intervening, and 'passive' is not intervening. A helpful framework.
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20882
|
Euthanasia may not involve killing, so it is 'killing or not saving, out of concern for that person' [Hooker,B]
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Full Idea:
Passive euthanasia is arguably not killing, and the death involved is often painful, so let us take the term 'euthanasia' to mean 'either killing or passing up opportunities to save someone, out of concern for that person'.
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From:
Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 1)
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A reaction:
This sounds good, and easily settled, until you think concern for that person could have two different outcomes, depending on whether the criteria are those of the decider or of the patient. Think of religious decider and atheist patient, or vice versa.
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