32 ideas
| 22664 | I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick] |
| Full Idea: I find that I do not mind at all the thought that I have some false beliefs (of US state capitals), and there are many truths I do not care to know at all (total grains of sand on the beach). | |
| From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.67) | |
| A reaction: A useful corrective to anyone who blindly asserts that truth is the supreme human value. I would still be annoyed if someone taught me lies about these two types of truth. |
| 22665 | Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick] |
| Full Idea: We might see William James's pragmatic view that truth is what works as depicting the value of truth, and not its nature. | |
| From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.68) | |
| A reaction: James didn't think that he was doing this. He firmly says that this IS truth, not just the advantages of truth. Another view is that pragmatists are giving a test for truth. |
| 3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
| Full Idea: Nozick suggests that knowledge is just belief which 'tracks the truth' (hence leaving out justification). | |
| From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981]) by Michael Williams - Problems of Knowledge Ch. 2 |
| 17771 | How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne] |
| Full Idea: A claim that might be very plausible given one set of background beliefs might be highly implausible when evaluated in the light of a different set of background beliefs. | |
| From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.7) |
| 17770 | Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne] |
| Full Idea: Endorsing Clifford's dictum threatens to undermine our right to hold many of our most cherished beliefs about morality, politics, and philosophy, for these are domains in which it is notoriously difficult to secure consensus. | |
| From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: I would say that those beliefs are amenable to evidence, but the evidence is often highly generalised, which is what makes those subjects notoriously difficult. The existence of a convention is a sort of evidence. |
| 2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: Nozick says Gettier cases aren't knowledge because the proposition would be believed even if false. Proper justification must be more sensitive to the truth ("track the truth"). | |
| From: report of Robert Nozick (Philosophical Explanations [1981], 3.1) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 3.1 | |
| A reaction: This is a bad idea. I see a genuine tree in my garden and believe it is there, so I know it. That I might have believed it if I was in virtually reality, or observing a mirror, won't alter that. |
| 17766 | Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne] |
| Full Idea: The motivations for physicalism about the mind are that it accounts for correlations between states of the brain and states of thought, ...that it accounts for the causal role of thoughts, ...and that it does justice to the continuity of nature. | |
| From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: [summary] That is a pretty good summary of why I am a physicalist about the mind. I take all other theories to be dead footnotes in the history of thought - unless someone can produce a really good new argument. Which they can't. |
| 22662 | In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick] |
| Full Idea: On the instrumental conception of rationality, it consists in the effective and efficient achievement of goals, ends, and desires. About the goals themselves it has little to say. | |
| From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.64) | |
| A reaction: [He quotes Russell 1954 p.viii as expressing this view] A long way from Greek logos, which obviously concerns the rational selection of right ends (for which, presumably, reasons can be given). In practice our ends may never be rational, of course. |
| 22663 | Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick] |
| Full Idea: The two themes permeating the philosophical literature are that rationality is a matter of reasons, or that rationality is a matter of reliability. | |
| From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.64) | |
| A reaction: Since a clock can be reliable, I would have thought it concerns reasons. Or an unthinking person could reliably recite truths from memory. There is also the instrumental view of rationality. |
| 22666 | Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick] |
| Full Idea: If a mother is presented with convincing evidence that her son has committed a grave crime, but were she to believe it that would make her life thereafter miserable, is it rational for her to believe her son is guilty? | |
| From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.69) | |
| A reaction: I assume there is a conflict of rationalities, because there are conflicting ends. Presumably most mothers love the truth, but most of us also aim for happy lives. It is perfectly rational to avoid discovering a horrible family truth. |
| 22667 | Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick] |
| Full Idea: Rationality involves some degree of self-consciousness. Not only reasons are evaluated, but also the processes by which information arrives, is stored, and recalled. | |
| From: Robert Nozick (The Nature of Rationality [1993], p.74) | |
| A reaction: I defend the idea that animals have a degree of rationality, because they can make sensible judgements, but I cannot deny this idea. Rationality comes in degrees, and second-level thought is a huge leap forward in degree. |
| 17768 | Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne] |
| Full Idea: One striking feature of human thought involves our ability to disengage the focus of thought from that of our perceptual attention. ...To get a fix on what an animal is thinking about, one need only determine the object of its perceptual attention. | |
| From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: What happens when an animal closes its eyes, or stirs violently during sleep? I take the hallmark of human thought to be its multi-level character, and this offers nice evidence for that view. Doing philosophy while driving a car is very revealing. |
| 17769 | Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne] |
| Full Idea: Egocentric conceptions of space employ a frame of reference that is focused on oneself; ...geocentric conceptions of space, by contrast, employ a frame of reference that is centred on the earth. | |
| From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: Famously, Europeans nearly always employ the egocentric conception, but many other cultures are geocentric. Thus the salt cellar is either 'to my left' or 'to the west'. In the latter view, everyone always knows their orientation (even indoors?). |
| 17767 | The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne] |
| Full Idea: One could think that the structure of thought has more in common with that of maps or diagrams, and is not particularly language-like. | |
| From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: It seems unwise to be ensnared by analogies on this one, since the phenomenon is buried deep. You can no more infer what goes on underneath than you can infer electrons from looking at trees? |
| 18648 | Freedom to live according to our own conception of the good is the ultimate value [Nozick, by Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Nozick says that the freedom to lead our lives in accordance with our own conception of the good is the ultimate value, so important that it cannot be sacrificed for other social ideals (e.g. equality of opportunity). | |
| From: report of Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.2.b.ii | |
| A reaction: Clearly this ultimate value will not apply to children, so this view needs a sharp dislocation between children and adults. But some adults need a lot of looking after. Maybe we ALL need looking after (by one another)? |
| 6012 | We must choose in which of the virtues we wish to excel [Panaetius] |
| Full Idea: Humans have four roles in life, of which the fourth involves choices, of career, and of the virtue in which one wishes to excel. | |
| From: Panaetius (fragments/reports [c.145 BCE]), quoted by Elizabeth Asmis - Panaetius | |
| A reaction: Panaetius strikes me as exceptionally wise. A big gap in Aristotle is the fact that we cannot excel in all virtues, and that therefore some choice is required. By what criteria? We have the Gauguin problem (excel in one, disgraceful in the others). |
| 6013 | Panaetius said we should live according to our natural starting-points [Panaetius, by Asmis] |
| Full Idea: Panaetius reformulated the Stoic goal as living in accordance with the starting-points given to us by nature. | |
| From: report of Panaetius (fragments/reports [c.145 BCE]) by Elizabeth Asmis - Panaetius | |
| A reaction: This sounds remarkably like the substitution of meritocratic equality of opportunity for communistic actual equality. In other words, it doesn't sound very Stoic. 'Live according to nature' implies more restraint than this ambitious version. |
| 6014 | Panaetius identified courage with great-mindedness, preferring civic courage to military [Panaetius, by Asmis] |
| Full Idea: Panaetius recast the virtue of courage as 'greatmindedness' (Aristotle's paramount virtue), he demoted military valour and gave priority to courage displayed in civic life. | |
| From: report of Panaetius (fragments/reports [c.145 BCE]) by Elizabeth Asmis - Panaetius | |
| A reaction: I find this very appealing, as I am increasingly horrified by our denigration of the people who implement our democracy for us. We urgently need to get back to the Greek idea of civic virtue, and this idea of Panaetius should be widely promulgated. |
| 20585 | If an experience machine gives you any experience you want, should you hook up for life? [Nozick] |
| Full Idea: Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired ...such as writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. ...Should you plug into this machine for life? | |
| From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], 3 'Experience') | |
| A reaction: A classic though experiment which crystalises a major problem with hedonistic utilitarianism. My addition is a machine which maximises the pleasure of my family and friends, to save me the bother of doing it. |
| 18643 | A minimal state should protect, but a state forcing us to do more is unjustified [Nozick] |
| Full Idea: A minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified. | |
| From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref) | |
| A reaction: This has some plausibility for a huge modern state, where we don't know one another, but it would be a ridiculous attitude in a traditional village. |
| 18642 | Individual rights are so strong that the state and its officials must be very limited in power [Nozick] |
| Full Idea: Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do. | |
| From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref) | |
| A reaction: This claim appears to be an axiom, but I'm not sure that the notion of 'rights' make any sense unless someone is granting the rights, where the someone is either a strong individual, or the community (perhaps represented by the state). |
| 18644 | States can't enforce mutual aid on citizens, or interfere for their own good [Nozick] |
| Full Idea: A state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purposes of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection. | |
| From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], Pref) | |
| A reaction: You certainly can't apply these principles to children, so becoming an 'adult' seems to be a very profound step in Nozick's account. At what age must we stop interfering with people for their own good. If the state is prohibited, are neighbours also? |
| 22661 | My Anarchy, State and Utopia neglected our formal social ties and concerns [Nozick on Nozick] |
| Full Idea: The political philosophy represented in Anarchy, State and Utopia ignored the importance of joint and official symbolic statement and expression of our social ties and concern, and hence (I have written) is inadequate. | |
| From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.32) by Robert Nozick - The Nature of Rationality p.32 | |
| A reaction: In other words, it was far too individualistic, and neglected community, even though it has become the sacred text for libertarian individualism. Do any Nozick fans care about this recantation? |
| 18641 | If people hold things legitimately, just distribution is simply the result of free exchanges [Nozick, by Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: If we assume that everyone is entitled to the goods they currently possess (their 'holdings'), then a just distribution is simply whatever distribution results from people's free exchanges. | |
| From: report of Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.1.b | |
| A reaction: If people's current 'legitimate' holdings are hugely unequal, it seems very unlikely that the ensuing exchanges will be 'free' in the way that Nozick envisages. |
| 20539 | Property is legitimate by initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, or rectification of injustice [Nozick, by Swift] |
| Full Idea: Nozick identified three ways in which people can acquire a legitimate property holding: initial acquisition, voluntary transfer, and rectification (of unjust transfers). | |
| From: report of Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 1 'Nozick' | |
| A reaction: I think it is a delusion to look for justice in the ownership of property. You can't claim justice for buying property if the money to do it was acquired unjustly. And what rights over those who live on the land come with the 'ownership'? |
| 18645 | Nozick assumes initial holdings include property rights, but we can challenge that [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
| Full Idea: Nozick assumes that the initial distribution of holdings includes full property-rights over them, ..but our preferred theory may not involve distributing such particular rights to particular people. ...The legitimacy of such rights is what is in question. | |
| From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.1.c | |
| A reaction: [somewhat compressed] All of these political philosophies seem to have questionable values (such as freedom or equality) built into their initial assumptions. |
| 18646 | How did the private property get started? If violence was involved, we can redistribute it [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
| Full Idea: How did these natural resources, which were not initially owned by anyone, come to be part of someone's private property? ...The fact that the initial acquisition often involved force means there is no moral objection to redistributing existing wealth. | |
| From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.2.b | |
| A reaction: [He cites G.A. Cphen 1988 for the second point] Put like this, Nozick's theory just looks like the sort of propaganda which is typically put out by the winners. Is there an implicit threat of violent resistance in his advocacy of individual rights? |
| 20521 | Can I come to own the sea, by mixing my private tomato juice with it? [Nozick] |
| Full Idea: If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea? | |
| From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.175) | |
| A reaction: This is a reductio of Locke's claim that I can own land by 'mixing' my labour with it. At first glance, mixing something with something would seem to have nothing to do with ownership. |
| 18647 | If property is only initially acquired by denying the rights of others, Nozick can't get started [Kymlicka on Nozick] |
| Full Idea: If there is no way that people can appropriate unowned resources for themselves without denying other people's claim to equal consideration, then Nozick's right of transfer never gets off the ground. | |
| From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.2.b.i | |
| A reaction: The actual history of these things is too complex to judge. Early peoples desperately wanted a lord to rule over them, and their lord's ownership of the land implied the people's right to live there. See Anglo-Saxon poetry. |
| 21737 | Unowned things may be permanently acquired, if it doesn't worsen the position of other people [Nozick] |
| Full Idea: One may acquire a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing, as long as the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is not thereby worsened. | |
| From: Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.178), quoted by G.A. Cohen - Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? 2 | |
| A reaction: Cohen attacks this vigorously. His main point is that Nozick has a very narrow view of what the acquisition should be compared with. There are many alternatives. Does being made unable to improve something 'worsen' a person's condition? |
| 21738 | Maybe land was originally collectively owned, rather than unowned? [Cohen,GA on Nozick] |
| Full Idea: Why should we not regard land as originally collectively owned rather than, as Nozick takes for granted, owned by no one? | |
| From: comment on Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974], p.178) by G.A. Cohen - Are Freedom and Equality Compatible? 2 | |
| A reaction: Did native Americans and Australians collectively own the land? Lots of peoples, I suspect, don't privately own anything, because the very concept has never occured to them (and they have no legal system). |
| 5888 | Souls are born, since they are sensitive and inherited, so they must perish [Panaetius, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Panaetius says that whatever is born must perish, and souls are clearly born, as shown by the resemblance of children to their parents in disposition as well as body; also, anything sensible of pain is susceptible to sickness, and hence perishes. | |
| From: report of Panaetius (fragments/reports [c.145 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Tusculan Disputations I.xxxii | |
| A reaction: These seem to be rather good arguments. If we actually observe what someone's soul is like (through character) it seems rooted in a family and culture, and it certainly seems susceptible to disease. An empirical approach. |