30 ideas
9065 | S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: S5 collapses iterated modalities (so ◊□P → □P, and ◊◊P → ◊P). | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §5) | |
A reaction: It is obvious why this might be controversial, and there seems to be a general preference for S4. There may be confusions of epistemic and ontic (and even semantic?) possibilities within a single string of modalities. |
9064 | Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: A common intuition is that a vague object has indeterminate or fuzzy spatio-temporal boundaries, such as a cloud. Mount Everest can only have arbitrary boundaries placed around it, so in nature it must have fuzzy boundaries. | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §5) | |
A reaction: We would have to respond by questioning whether Everest counts precisely as an 'object'. At the microscopic or subatomic level it seems that virtually everything has fuzzy boundaries. Maybe boundaries don't really exist. |
9044 | If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: If Tek is borderline tall, the unclarity does not seem to be epistemic, because no amount of further information about his exact height (or the heights of others) could help us decide whether he is tall. | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §1) | |
A reaction: One should add also that information about social conventions or conventions about the usage of the word 'tall' will not help either. It seems fairly obvious that God would not know whether Tek is tall, so the epistemic view is certainly counterintuitive. |
9048 | The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: The simplest approach to vagueness is to retain classical logic and semantics. Borderline cases are either true or false, but we don't know which, and, despite appearances, vague predicates have well-defined extensions. Vagueness is ignorance. | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §1) | |
A reaction: It seems to me that you must have a rather unhealthy attachment to the logicians' view of the world to take this line. It is the passion of the stamp collector, to want everything in sets, with neatly labelled properties, and inference lines marked out. |
9055 | The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: A key question for the epistemic view of vagueness is: why are we ignorant of the facts about where the boundaries of vague predicates lie? | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §2) | |
A reaction: Presumably there is a range of answers, from laziness, to inability to afford the instruments, to limitations on human perception. At the limit, with physical objects, how do we tell whether it is us or the object which is afflicted with vagueness? |
9049 | Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: The supervaluationist view of vagueness is that 'tall' comes out true or false on all the ways in which we can make 'tall' precise. There is a gap for borderline cases, but 'tall or not-tall' is still true wherever you draw a boundary. | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §1) | |
A reaction: [Kit Fine is the spokesperson for this; it preserves classical logic, but not semantics] This doesn't seem to solve the problem of vagueness, but it does (sort of) save the principle of excluded middle. |
9056 | Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: The supervaluationist view of vagueness proposes that a sentence is true iff it is true on all precisifications, false iff false on all precisifications, and neither true nor false otherwise. | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: This seems to be just a footnote to the Russell/Unger view, that logic works if the proposition is precise, but otherwise it is either just the mess of ordinary life, or the predicate doesn't apply at all. |
9058 | Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: Supervaluationist logic (now with a 'definite' operator D) fails to preserve certain classical principles about consequence and rules of inference. For example, reduction ad absurdum, contraposition, the deduction theorem and argument by cases. | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: The aim of supervaluationism was to try to preserve some classical logic, especially the law of excluded middle, in the face of problems of vagueness. More drastic views, like treating vagueness as irrelevant to logic, or the epistemic view, do better. |
9059 | The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: The semantics of supervaluational views is not classical. A disjunction can be true without either of its disjuncts being true, and an existential quantification can be true without any of its substitution instances being true. | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: There is a vaguely plausible story here (either red or orange, but not definitely one nor tother; there exists an x, but which x it is is undecidable), but I think I will vote for this all being very very wrong. |
9060 | Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: Why should we think vague language is explained away by how things would be if it were made precise? Supervaluationism misrepresents vague expressions, as vague only because we have not bothered to make them precise. | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: The theory still leaves a gap where vagueness is ineradicable, so the charge doesn't seem quite fair. Logicians always yearn for precision, but common speech enjoys wallowing in a sea of easy-going vagueness, which works fine. |
9050 | A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: One approach to predications in borderline cases is to say that they have a third truth value - 'neutral', 'indeterminate' or 'indefinite', leading to a three-valued logic. Or a degree theory, such as fuzzy logic, with infinite values between 0 and 1. | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §1) | |
A reaction: This looks more like a strategy for computer programmers than for metaphysicians, as it doesn't seem to solve the difficulty of things to which no one can quite assign any value at all. Sometimes you can't be sure if an entity is vague. |
9061 | People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: There is no complete ordering of people by niceness, and two people could be both fairly nice, nice to intermediate degrees, while there is no fact of the matter about who is the nicer. | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §4) | |
A reaction: This is a difficulty if you are trying to decide vague predicates by awarding them degrees of truth. Attempts to place a precise value on 'nice' seem to miss the point, even more than utilitarian attempts to score happiness. |
9062 | If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: Many-valued theories still seem to have a sharp boundary between sentences taking truth-value 1 and those taking value less than 1. So there is a last man in our sorites series who counts as 'completely tall'. | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §4) | |
A reaction: Lovely. Completely nice, totally red, perfectly childlike, an utter mountain, one hundred per cent amused. The enterprise seems to have the same implausibility found in Bayesian approaches to assessing evidence. |
9063 | How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: What could determine which is the correct function, settling that my coat is red to degree 0.322 rather than 0.321? | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §4) | |
A reaction: It is not just the uncertainty of placing the coat on the scale. The two ends of the scale have all the indeterminacy of being red rather than orange (or, indeed, pink). You are struggling to find a spot on the ruler, when the ruler is placed vaguely. |
9045 | Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: Three interrelated features of vague predicates such as 'tall', 'red', 'heap', 'child' are that they have borderline cases (application is uncertain), they lack well-defined extensions (objects are uncertain), and they're susceptible to sorites paradoxes. | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §1) | |
A reaction: The issue will partly depend on what you think an object is: choose from bundles of properties, total denial, essential substance, or featureless substance with properties. The fungal infection of vagueness could creep in at any point, even the words. |
9047 | Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional. 'Big' of people depends on both height and volume; 'nice' does not even have clear dimensions; whether something is a 'heap' depends both the number of grains and their arrangement. | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §1) | |
A reaction: Anyone who was hoping for a nice tidy theory for this problem should abandon hope at this point. Huge numbers of philosophical problems can be simplified by asking 'what exactly do you mean here?' (e.g. tall or bulky?). |
9053 | If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith] |
Full Idea: If a predicate G has a sharply-bounded set of cases falling in between the positive and negative, this shows that merely having borderline cases is not sufficient for vagueness. | |
From: R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §1) | |
A reaction: Thus you might have 'pass', 'fail' and 'take the test again'. But there seem to be two cases in the border area: will decide later, and decision seems impossible. And the sharp boundaries may be quite arbitrary. |
17771 | How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne] |
Full Idea: A claim that might be very plausible given one set of background beliefs might be highly implausible when evaluated in the light of a different set of background beliefs. | |
From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.7) |
17770 | Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne] |
Full Idea: Endorsing Clifford's dictum threatens to undermine our right to hold many of our most cherished beliefs about morality, politics, and philosophy, for these are domains in which it is notoriously difficult to secure consensus. | |
From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: I would say that those beliefs are amenable to evidence, but the evidence is often highly generalised, which is what makes those subjects notoriously difficult. The existence of a convention is a sort of evidence. |
23513 | Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth] |
Full Idea: It is increasingly apparent that even single neurons are capable of carrying out highly complex functions all by themselves. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.1 n) | |
A reaction: Bang goes the simple connectionist account of consciousness. |
23514 | The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth] |
Full Idea: The cerebellum [at the back] has about four times as many neurons as the rest of the brain put together, but seems barely involved in consciousness. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.2) | |
A reaction: I wonder if it also has four times as many connections? |
23516 | Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth] |
Full Idea: The main claim of Tononi's 'integrated information theory' is that a system is conscious to the extent that its whole generates more information than its parts. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.3) | |
A reaction: Seth seems to present this as an 'interesting' proposal. I find it unlikely that consciousness could be explain in terms of information, or that a machine constructed on this principle would thus become conscious. (Databases pass this test). |
23519 | The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG] |
Full Idea: The elements of a self are 1) embodied - related directly to the body, 2) perspectival - having a viewpoint, 3) volitional - being an agent, 4) narrative - aware of past and future, and 5) social - as others perceive me. | |
From: report of Anil Seth (Being You [2021], III.8) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: [summarised] Seth says there are distinctive emotions associated with each of these aspects of the self. This list is very helpful, as a discouragement for anyone who wants to pick one of these as the sole true nature of the self. |
17766 | Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne] |
Full Idea: The motivations for physicalism about the mind are that it accounts for correlations between states of the brain and states of thought, ...that it accounts for the causal role of thoughts, ...and that it does justice to the continuity of nature. | |
From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: [summary] That is a pretty good summary of why I am a physicalist about the mind. I take all other theories to be dead footnotes in the history of thought - unless someone can produce a really good new argument. Which they can't. |
17768 | Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne] |
Full Idea: One striking feature of human thought involves our ability to disengage the focus of thought from that of our perceptual attention. ...To get a fix on what an animal is thinking about, one need only determine the object of its perceptual attention. | |
From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: What happens when an animal closes its eyes, or stirs violently during sleep? I take the hallmark of human thought to be its multi-level character, and this offers nice evidence for that view. Doing philosophy while driving a car is very revealing. |
17769 | Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne] |
Full Idea: Egocentric conceptions of space employ a frame of reference that is focused on oneself; ...geocentric conceptions of space, by contrast, employ a frame of reference that is centred on the earth. | |
From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Famously, Europeans nearly always employ the egocentric conception, but many other cultures are geocentric. Thus the salt cellar is either 'to my left' or 'to the west'. In the latter view, everyone always knows their orientation (even indoors?). |
17767 | The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne] |
Full Idea: One could think that the structure of thought has more in common with that of maps or diagrams, and is not particularly language-like. | |
From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: It seems unwise to be ensnared by analogies on this one, since the phenomenon is buried deep. You can no more infer what goes on underneath than you can infer electrons from looking at trees? |
23518 | Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth] |
Full Idea: Much of today's AI is best described as sophisticated machine-based pattern recognition. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], IV.13) | |
A reaction: Personally I wouldn't want to underestimate the extent to which human intelligence is also pattern recognition (across time as well as in space). |
23517 | Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth] |
Full Idea: The experience of volition is defined by 1) the feeling that I am doing what I want to do, 2) that I could have done otherwise, and 3) that voluntary actions seem to come from within. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], III.11) | |
A reaction: Note that these can all be cited without reference to their feeling 'free'. |
23515 | Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth] |
Full Idea: Human exceptionalism has repeatedly plagued biology, and has darkened the history of human thought everywhere. | |
From: Anil Seth (Being You [2021], I.2) | |
A reaction: I increasingly agree with this, as much in philosophy as in biology. We really need to get used to our place in evolution. |