34 ideas
1542 | Diogenes of Apollonia was the last natural scientist [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Simplicius] |
Full Idea: Diogenes of Apollonia was more or less the last of those who made a study of natural science. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], A05) by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 9.25.1 | |
A reaction: He quotes Theophrastus |
18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
Full Idea: The sheer lack of structure demanded by truthmaker theorists means that it is easier to run model-theoretic arguments against them than against correspondence theorists. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 02.3) | |
A reaction: Truthmaking is a vague relation, where correspondence is fairly specific. Model arguments say you can keep the sentences steady, but shuffle around what they refer to. |
18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
Full Idea: According to the coherence theory of truth, for our thoughts to be true is not for them to be about objects, but only for them to cohere with one another. This is rather terrifying. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 14.2) | |
A reaction: Davidson espoused this view in 1983, but then gave it up. It strikes me as either a daft view of truth, or a denial of truth. The coherence theory of justification, on the other hand, is correct. |
18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
Full Idea: The Permutation Theorem says that any theory with a non-trivial model has many distinct isomorphic models with the same domain. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 02.1) | |
A reaction: This may be the most significant claim of model theory, since Putnam has erected an argument for anti-realism on it. See the ideas of Tim Button. |
4986 | A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: If multiple realisability means that psychological terms cannot be translated into physics, one weaker kind of reductionism resorts to 'bridge laws' which link the theory to be reduced to the reducing theory. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §3.8) | |
A reaction: It seems to me that reduction is all-or-nothing, so there can't be a 'weaker' kind. If they are totally separate but linked by naturally necessary laws (e.g. low temperature and ice), they are supervenient, but not reducible to one another. |
18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
Full Idea: External realists have three principles: Independence - the world is objects that are independent of mind, language and theory; Correspondence - truth involves some correspondence of thoughts and things; Cartesian - an ideal theory might be false. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 01.1-3) | |
A reaction: [compressed; he cites Descartes's Demon for the third] Button is setting these up as targets. I subscribe to all three, in some form or other. Of course, as a theory approaches the success implying it is 'ideal', it becomes highly likely to be accurate. |
18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
Full Idea: Indeterminacy arguments aim to show that if there is any way to make a theory true, then there are many ways to do so. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 02.1) | |
A reaction: Button says the simplest indeterminacy argument is Putnam's Permutation Argument - that you can shuffle the objects in a formal model, without affecting truth. But do we belief that metaphysics can be settled in this sort of way? |
18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
Full Idea: If realists think an ideal theory could be false, then the theory is consistent, and hence complete, and hence finitely modellable, and hence it is guaranteed that there is some way to make it true. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 02.2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This challenges the realists' supposed claim that even the most ideal of theories could possibly be false. Presumably for a theory to be 'ideal' is not all-or-nothing. Are we capable of creating a fully ideal theory? [Löwenheim-Skolem] |
489 | Each thing must be in some way unique [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
Full Idea: No one thing among things subject to change can possibly be exactly like any other thing, without becoming the same thing. | |
From: Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B05), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 153.8 | |
A reaction: This is said to be the first ever formulation of the principle of identity of indiscernible. |
483 | Start a thesis with something undisputable [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
Full Idea: In starting any thesis, it seems to me, one should put forward as one's point of departure something incontrovertible. | |
From: Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B01), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.57 |
1544 | Perception must be an internal matter, because we can fail to perceive when we are preoccupied [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Theophrastus] |
Full Idea: That it is the inner air that perceives, as being a fragment of the god, is shown by the fact that often when our minds are preoccupied with other matters we fail to see or hear. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], A19) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 42 |
18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
Full Idea: Cartesian scepticism agonises over whether our beliefs are true or false, whereas Kantian scepticism agonises over how it is even possible for beliefs to be true or false. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 07.2) | |
A reaction: Kant's question is, roughly, 'how can our thoughts succeed in being about the world?' Kantian scepticism is the more drastic, and looks vulnerable to a turning of the tables, but asking how Kantian worries can even be expressed. |
18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
Full Idea: The empirical 'content' of a theory is all its observable predictions. Two theories with the same predictions are empirically 'equivalent'. A theory which gets it all right at this level is empirically 'adequate'. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 05.1) |
5001 | Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: Many philosophers today have adopted the view that we can achieve an enormous simplification by reducing the two components of the mind-body problem - intentionality and consciousness - into one; ...consciousness is no more than representations. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §8.4) | |
A reaction: One would then see subjective experience and informational content as two consequences of a single mental activity. This strikes me as the correct route to go. We do, after all, learn BY experiencing. Hence concepts are tied in with qualia. |
4993 | If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: When a bird pulls a worm from the ground, then swallows it piece by piece, there is a sense in which its behaviour can be said to be about the worm. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §5.4) | |
A reaction: This is preparing the ground for a possible behaviourist account of intentionality. Reply: you could say rain is about puddles, or you could say we have adopted Dennett's 'intentional stance' to birds, but it tells us nothing about their psychology. |
5000 | Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: The conflict over whether intentionality is a matter of behavioural relations with the rest of the world, or of the internal states of the subject, is at its most dramatic in the contrast between behaviourism and the language of thought hypothesis. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §7.10) | |
A reaction: I just don't believe any behaviourist external account of intentionality, which ducks the question of how it all works. Personally I am more drawn to maps and models than to a language of thought. I plan my actions in an imagined space-time world. |
4982 | Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: If the mind causes brain events, then they are not caused by other brain events, and such causal gaps should be detectable by scientists; there should also be a gap of brain-events which cause no other brain events, because they are causing mind events. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §2.5) | |
A reaction: This is the double causation problem which Spinoza had spotted (Idea 4862). Expressed this way, it seems a screamingly large problem for dualism. We should be able to discover some VERY strange physical activity in the brain. |
4991 | Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: For many kinds of mental states, notably intentional ones such as beliefs and desires, behaviourism is appealing, ..but for sensations and experiences such as pain, it seems grossly implausible. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §5.1) | |
A reaction: The theory does indeed make a bit more sense for intentional states, but it still strikes me as nonsense that there is no more to my belief that 'Whales live in the Atlantic' than a disposition to say something. WHY do I say this something? |
4994 | Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: There is a temptation to think that 'aboutness', and the 'contents' of thoughts, and the relation of 'reference', are single and unitary relationships, but behaviourism offers an alternative approach. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §5.5) | |
A reaction: Personally I wouldn't touch behaviourism with a barge-pole (as it ducks the question of WHY certain behaviour occurs), but a warning against simplistic accounts of intentional states is good. I am sure there cannot be a single neat theory of refererence. |
4992 | In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: There is a non-reductive version of behaviourism ( which we can call 'global' or 'holistic') which says there is no more to having mental states than having a complex of certain kinds of behavioural dispositions. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §5.2) | |
A reaction: This is designed to meet a standard objection to behaviourism - that there is no straight correlation between what I think and how I behave. The present theory is obviously untestable, because a full 'complex' of human dispositions is never repeated. |
4990 | The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §4.5) | |
A reaction: Thus, my behaviour at traffic lights should be identical, even if I have a lifelong inversion of red and green. A good objection. Note that physicalists can believe in inverted qualia as well a dualists, as long as the brain states are also inverted. |
24042 | The older Diogenes said the soul is air, made of the smallest particles [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
Full Idea: Diogenes [of Apollonia] took the soul to be air, thnking that of all things air is composed of the smallest particles and is a starting point. | |
From: Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], DK 64), quoted by Aristotle - De Anima 405a21 | |
A reaction: This suggests that Diogenes of Apollonia was an atomist, if the soul is made of particles. See also Met 984a5, which says Anaxagoras had the same view. |
4984 | All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: All psychological statements which are meaningful, that is to say, which are in principle verifiable, are translatable into propositions which do not involve psychological concepts, but only the concepts of physics. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §3.8) | |
A reaction: This shows how eliminativist behaviourism arises out of logical positivism (by only allowing what is verifiable). The simplest objection: we can't verify the mental states of others, because they are private, but they are still the best explanation. |
4998 | Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: In a connectionist system, information is represented not by sentences but by the total distribution of connection strengths. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §7.6) | |
A reaction: Neither sentences (of a language of thought) NOR connection strengths strike me as very plausible ways for a brain to represent things. It must be something to do with connections, but it must also be to do with neurons, or we get bizarre counterexamples. |
4985 | If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: If psychological states are multiply realisable it is hard to see how they could possibly be translated into physical terms. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §3.8) | |
A reaction: Reductive funtionalism would do it. A writing iimplement is physical and multiply realisable. Personally I prefer the strategy of saying mental states are NOT multiply realisable. If frog brains differ from ours, they probably don't feel pain like us. |
4997 | It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: It is widely accepted that for many concepts, if not all, grasping the concept requires grasping some theory, ...which makes difficulties for the view that concepts are not learned: for 'radical concept nativism', as Fodor calls it. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §7.3) | |
A reaction: Not a problem for traditional rationalist theories, where the whole theory can be innate along with the concept, but a big objection to modern more cautious non-holistic views (such as Fodor's). Does a bird have a concept AND theory of a nest? |
18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
Full Idea: A sentence's truth conditions comprise an exhaustive list of the situations in which that sentence would be true. | |
From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 03.4) | |
A reaction: So to know its meaning you must know those conditions? Compare 'my cat is licking my finger' with 'dramatic events are happening in Ethiopia'. It should take an awful long time to grasp the second sentence. |
4999 | For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: Behaviourists regard the use of language as just a special kind of behaviour. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §7.9) | |
A reaction: This is not an intuitively obvious view of language. We behave, and then we talk about behaviour. Performative utterances (like promising) have an obvious behavioural aspect, as do violent threats, but not highly theoretical language (such as maths). |
4995 | Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R] |
Full Idea: To most behaviourists it seems misguided to expect there to be a single relation that connects referring expressions with their referents. | |
From: Robert Kirk (Mind and Body [2003], §5.5) | |
A reaction: You don't need to be a behaviourist to feel this doubt. Think about names of real people, names of fictional people, reference to misunderstood items, or imagined items, or reference in dreams, or to mathematical objects, or negations etc. |
5995 | Diogenes of Apollonia offered the first teleological account of cosmology [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Robinson,TM] |
Full Idea: Credit for the first clear assertion of teleological explanation in cosmology goes to Diogenes of Apollonia, for whom air is the divine and intelligent ground of the real and disposes things in the best possible way. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE]) by T.M. Robinson - Classical Cosmology (frags) | |
A reaction: The first teleological explanation seems to be based on a conscious mind. There also emerges the possibility of some sort of non-conscious teleology, closer to the laws of physics than to God. |
488 | Air is divine, because it is in and around everything, and arranges everything [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
Full Idea: Air in itself seems to me to be God and to reach everywhere and to arrange everything and to be in everything. | |
From: Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B05), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 152.22- | |
A reaction: So water and fire and air have been offered as the ultimate explanans, though no one seems to offer earth, which is too grubby and miserable (and was denied a Form by Plato). 'Air is God' could ground a nice modern religious sect. |
484 | Everything is ultimately a variation of one underlying thing [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
Full Idea: It seems to me that all existing things are created by the alteration of the same thing, and are the same thing. | |
From: Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B02), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 151.31- |
486 | Plants and animals can only come into existence if something fixes their species [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
Full Idea: No plant could grow out of the earth, and no animal or any other thing could come into being, unless it were so compounded as to be the same. | |
From: Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B02), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 151.31- |
485 | Things must retain their essential nature during change, or mixing would be impossible [Diogenes of Apollonia] |
Full Idea: If any existing thing were different in its own essential nature, and were not the same thing which was transformed in many ways and changed, in no way could things mix with one another. | |
From: Diogenes (Apoll) (fragments/reports [c.440 BCE], B02), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 151.31- |