9 ideas
| 17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
| Full Idea: In the heyday of modal logic, philosophers typically tried to account for any metaphysical notions in modal terms. | |
| From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: Lewisian realism about possible worlds actually gets rid of purely 'modal' terms, but I suppose they include possible worlds in their remark. Annoying for modal logicians to be told they had a 'heyday' - a nice example of the rhetoric of philosophy. |
| 17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| Full Idea: What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts. | |
| From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational! |
| 10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
| Full Idea: Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics. | |
| From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934]) |
| 10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
| Full Idea: A restricted Platonism does not claim to be more than, so to speak, an ideal projection of a domain of thought. | |
| From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.261) | |
| A reaction: I have always found Platonism to be congenial when it talks of 'ideals', and ridiculous when it talks of a special form of 'existence'. Ideals only 'exist' because we idealise things. I may declare myself, after all, to be a Restricted Platonist. |
| 10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
| Full Idea: Mathematical abstraction does not have a lesser degree than logical abstraction, but rather another direction. | |
| From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.268) | |
| A reaction: His point is that the logicists seem to think that if you increasingly abstract from mathematics, you end up with pure logic. |
| 17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
| Full Idea: We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims. | |
| From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3) | |
| A reaction: I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole). |
| 17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
| Full Idea: To us it seems advisable to separate the objective notion of grounding, which belongs to the field of metaphysics, from the epistemically loaded notion of explanation. | |
| From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.2) | |
| A reaction: Paul Audi is the defender of the opposite view. I'm with Audi. The 'epistemically loaded' pragmatic aspect is just contextual - that we have different interests in different aspects of the grounding on different occasions. |
| 17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
| Full Idea: There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are. | |
| From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term. |
| 2975 | That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so [Timon] |
| Full Idea: That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree that it appears so. | |
| From: Timon (On Sensations (frags) [c.285 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.104-5 |