Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Tom Clark, Robin Le Poidevin and Alvin I. Goldman

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65 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman]
     Full Idea: If mere consistency is our aim in achieving a coherent set of beliefs, then new evidence and experiments are irrelevant.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (The Internalist Conception of Justification [1980], §VIII)
     A reaction: An important reminder. What epistemic duty requires us to attend to anomalous observations, instead of sweeping them under the carpet?
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The tenseless stance is quite clear: all times are equally real, so there are truth-makers for the future-tense statements, which consequently have determinate truth-values.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], Intro)
     A reaction: The tenseless view is linked to the B-series view, and to eternalism. This seems to mean that Aristotle took a tensed A-series view of time.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman]
     Full Idea: It has been proposed (on the basis of observations) that young children have three innate principles of counting - one-to-one correspondence of number to item, stable order for numbers, and cardinality (which labels the nth item counted).
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.60)
     A reaction: I like the idea of observed patterns as central (which is the one-to-one principle). But the other two principles are plausible, and show why pure empiricism won't work.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman]
     Full Idea: Rats can determine the number of times they have pressed a lever up to at least twenty-four presses,…and can consistently turn down the fifth tunnel on the left in a maze.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.58)
     A reaction: This seems to encourage an empirical view of maths (pattern recognition?) rather than a Platonic one. Or numbers are innate in rat brains?
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: It is a powerful argument for something's non-existence that it would make absolutely no difference.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 02 'Everything')
     A reaction: Powerful, but not conclusive. Neutrinos don't seem to do much, so it isn't far from there to get a particle which does nothing.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman]
     Full Idea: Infant behaviour implies inbuilt ontological categories of thing, place, event, path, action, sound, manner, amount and number. ...There is an algebra of relationships between them.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.109)
     A reaction: Interesting. We would expect the categories in infant brains to have instrumental value, but we don't have to accept them as true. Adults (even Aristotle) are big infants.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman]
     Full Idea: An elephant may be fully represented by nine primitive shapes ('geons'), but it may require as few as three geons in appropriate relations to be correctly identified.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.7)
     A reaction: Encouraging the idea of the mind as a maker of maps and models
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman]
     Full Idea: A unique yellow experience may be evoked with monochrome light of 580nm, or a mixture of 540nm and 670nm. ..Our interpretation of colour experience is a highly idiosyncratic artefact of our visual system.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.117)
     A reaction: This confirms what I have always thought - that colour (as qualia) is strictly a feature of minds, not of the world.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman]
     Full Idea: Gestalt psychology claims that there are at least four unlearned factors in perceptual grouping - the principles of proximity (close things), of similarity, of good continuation (extending lines in a smooth course), and closure (which completes figures).
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (Phil Applications of Cognitive Science [1993], p.103)
     A reaction: This offers a bridge between Hume's associationism and rationalist claims of innate ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman]
     Full Idea: A characteristic case in which a belief is justified though the cognizer doesn't know that it's justified is where the original evidence for the belief has long since been forgotten.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II)
     A reaction: This is a central problem for any very literal version of internalism. The fully rationalist view (to which I incline) will be that the cognizer must make a balanced assessment of whether they once had the evidence. Were my teachers any good?
We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman]
     Full Idea: Strong internalism says only current conscious states can justify beliefs, but this has the problem of Stored Beliefs, that most of our beliefs are stored in memory, and one's conscious state includes nothing that justifies them.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §2)
     A reaction: This point seems obviously correct, but one could still have a 'fairly strong' version, which required that you could always call into consciousness the justificiation for any belief that you happened to remember.
Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman]
     Full Idea: Even weak internalism has the problem of Forgotten Evidence; the agent once had adequate evidence that she subsequently forgot; at the time of epistemic appraisal, she no longer has adequate evidence that is retrievable from memory.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §3)
     A reaction: This is certainly a basic problem for any account of justification. It will rule out any strict requirement that there be actual mental states available to support a belief. Internalism may be pushed to include non-conscious parts of the mind.
Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman]
     Full Idea: The problem for internalists of Doxastic Decision Interval says internal justification must avoid mental change to preserve the justification status, but must also allow enough time to compute the formal relations between beliefs.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §4)
     A reaction: The word 'compute' implies a rather odd model of assessing coherence, which seems instantaneous for most of us where everyday beliefs are concerned. In real mental life this does not strike me as a problem.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman]
     Full Idea: If one shares my view that justified belief is, at least roughly, well-formed belief, surely animals and young children can have justified beliefs.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], III)
     A reaction: I take this to be a key hallmark of the externalist view of knowledge. Personally I think we should tell the animals that they have got true beliefs, but that they aren't bright enough to aspire to 'knowledge'. Be grateful for what you've got.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
     Full Idea: The problem of Concurrent Retrieval is a problem for internalism, notably coherentism, because an agent could ascertain coherence of her entire corpus only by concurrently retrieving all of her stored beliefs.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §3)
     A reaction: Sounds neat, but not very convincing. Goldman is relying on scepticism about short-term memory, but all belief and knowledge will collapse if we go down that road. We couldn't do simple arithmetic if Goldman's point were right.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman]
     Full Idea: The justificational status of a belief is a function of the reliability of the processes that cause it, where (provisionally) reliability consists in the tendency of a process to produce beliefs that are true rather than false.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II)
     A reaction: Goldman's original first statement of reliabilism, now the favourite version of externalism. The obvious immediate problem is when a normally very reliable process goes wrong. Wise people still get it wrong, or right for the wrong reasons.
Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman]
     Full Idea: Reliability involves truth, and truth (on the usual assumption) is external.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §6)
     A reaction: As an argument for externalism this seems bogus. I am not sure that truth is either 'internal' or 'external'. How could the truth of 3+2=5 be external? Facts are mostly external, but I take truth to be a relation between internal and external.
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
We want illuminating theories, rather than coherent theories [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Don't ask, which theory is more coherent? Ask, which theory is more illuminating?
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense [1998], 5)
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Not all explanations are causal. We can explain some things by showing what follows logically from what, or what is required by the definition of a term, or in terms of purpose.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 05 'Limits')
     A reaction: Would these fully qualify as 'explanations'? You don't explain the sea by saying that 'wet' is part of its definition.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
A very powerful computer might have its operations restricted by the addition of consciousness [Clark,T]
     Full Idea: It seems possible that if a powerful multi-tasking computer was then given consciousness, this might restrict its operations instead of enhancing them.
     From: Tom Clark (talk [2003]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A nice thought, because it challenges the usual view - that consciousness brings huge intellectual liberty to a mind, and that a mind without it is necessarily restricted. Maybe consciousness is a bottleneck.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman]
     Full Idea: Introspection should be regarded as a form of retrospection. Thus, a justified belief that I am 'now' in pain gets its justificational status from a relevant, though brief, causal history.
     From: Alvin I. Goldman (What is Justified Belief? [1976], II)
     A reaction: He cites Hobbes and Ryle as having held this view. See Idea 6668. I am unclear why the history must be 'causal'. I may not know the cause of the pain. I may not believe an event which causes a proposition, or I may form a false belief from it.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: In describing a time as 'now' one is not merely describing the world from one's own point of view, but describing the world as it is.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 08 'Mystery')
     A reaction: If we accept this view (which implies absolute time, and the A-series view), then 'now' is not an indexical, in the way that 'I' and 'here' are indexicals.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: For the A-theorists called 'presentists' the past is as unreal as the future, and reality leaves us behind once we die, which is disturbing; but B-theorists, who see time as unreal, say we are just as real after our deaths as we were beforehand.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
     A reaction: See Idea 6865 for A and B theories. I wonder if this problem is only superficially 'disturbing'. Becoming unreal may sound more drastic than becoming dead, but they both sound pretty terminal to me.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The view that evil is an illusion is self-refuting: that is, if there is no evil, the illusion that there is evil is certainly evil.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 2)
     A reaction: [The idea comes from McTaggart, and Le Poidevin is quoting Dummett on it]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: I take existentialism to be the focus on the freedom and self-making of the human being, and his or her insertion into the world.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.222)
     A reaction: I take 'self-making' to be the key here. If neuroscientists somehow 'proved' that there was no free will, I don't see that making any difference to existentialism. 'Insertion' seems odd, unless it refers to growing up.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The usual logical properties of the causal relation are asymmetry (one-way), transitivity and irreflexivity (no self-causing).
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 05 'Great')
     A reaction: If two balls rebound off each other, that is only asymmetric if we split the action into two parts, which may be a fiction. Does a bomb cause its own destruction?
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: If the midpoint on a line between the chair and the window is five feet from the end of the bookcase. This can be true, but if no object occupies that midpoint, then unoccupied points exist
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 03 'Lessons')
     A reaction: We can also locate perfect circles (running through fairy rings, or the rings of Saturn), so they must also exist. But then we can also locate the Loch Ness monster. Hm.
If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: If there are such things as points in space, independently of any other object, then these points are by definition stationary (since to be stationary is to stay in the same place, and a point is a place).
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 03 'Search')
     A reaction: So what happens if the whole universe moves ten metres to the left? Is the universe defined by the objects in it (which vary), or by the space that contains them? Why can't a location move, even if that is by definition undetectable?
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Absolutists say space plays a number of roles. It is what we refer to when we talk of positions. It makes other things possible (by moving into unoccupied positions). And it explains geometrical truths.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 03 'Redundancy')
     A reaction: I am persuaded by these, and am happy to treat space (and time) as a primitive of metaphysics.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: For the relationist, if Archytas goes to the edge of space and extends his arm, he is creating a new spatial relation between objects, and thus extending space, which is, after all, just the collection of thos relations.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 05 'beyond')
     A reaction: The obvious point is what are you moving your arm into? And how can some movements be in space, while others create new space? It's a bad theory.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The most characteristic features of time, which distinguish it from space, are the fact that time passes, and the fact that the present is in some sense unique
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 08 'Mystery')
     A reaction: The B-series view tries to avoid passing time and present moments. I suspect that modern proponents of the B-series mainly want to unifying their view of time with Einstein's, to give us a scientific space-time.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Since, by definition, nothing happens in a temporal vacuum, there is no possible means of determining its length.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 02 'without change')
     A reaction: This is offered a part of a dubious proof that a temporal vacuum is impossible. I like Shoemaker's three worlds thought experiment, which tests this idea to the limit.
Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Three arguments that a temporal vacuum is impossible: we can't experience it, we can't measure it, and it would have no reason to ever terminate.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 03 'Lessons')
     A reaction: [summarised] The first two reasons are unimpressive. The interiors of black holes are off limits for us. The arrival of time into a timeless situation may actually have occurred, but be beyond our understanding.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: If the future is unreal, future individuals are ontologically problematic. Any apparent obligations towards them cannot, it seems, have an object.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 5)
     A reaction: I certainly 'feel' obligations to the future, but I am not sure whether I 'have' them. How far into the future do the extend? Should I care if homo sapiens is replaced by a different dominant species?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: It would appear that any denial of the existence of continuants entails a denial of change.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 1)
     A reaction: [He cites Lowe for this view] Presumably we don't just accept change at face value, in that case. Indeed, views about temporal parts or time-worms give a different account of change (though perhaps a less convincing one).
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Processes can speed up or slow down, but surely the passage of time is not something that can speed up or slow down?
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 08 'Mystery')
     A reaction: If something is a process we can ask 'process of what?', but the only answer seems to be that it's a process of processing. So it is that which makes processes possible (and so, as I keep saying) it is best viewed as a primitive.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: A worry haunts the denial of tense: if tense is just mind-dependent, then minds at least themselves must be tensed.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 2)
Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: If we cannot coherently adopt a tensed perspective on events within fiction, then fictional discourse seems to provide an example of a tenseless language of before and after which is quite independent of the language of tense.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 7)
It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: It is crucially one's view of the status of the future that makes one a tensed or a tenseless theorist.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense [1998], 5)
     A reaction: If you believe in the reality of the future, you are an eternalist and like the B-series. If you deny the existence of the future, you must opt for Presentism or the Growing Block (depending on the status of the past).
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past) [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The crucial distinction is that in the B-series positions in time are unchanging. Positions in the A-series, in contrast, do change: what is now present was once future and will be past.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense [1998], 1 (a))
     A reaction: So does A-series time consist of a property which things gain and then lose, or a location which things enter and then leave? Neither analogy seems to throw much light.
Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Events and objects that have ceased to exist change their A-series position (by becoming increasingly past), but persisting objects, in contrast, change their present B-series position.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 1 n2)
     A reaction: The second half seems to imply a 'moving spotlight' of the present. This distinction is important, as it creates problems for all theories. The asymmetry seems weird.
A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The A-theory regards our intuitive distinction of time into past, present and future as objective, and takes seriously the idea that time flows; the B-theory says this just reflects our perspective, like the spatial distinction between here and there.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
     A reaction: The distinction comes from McTaggart. Physics seems to be built on an objective view of time, and yet Einstein makes time relative. What possible evidence could decide between the two theories?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: It has been argued that the tensed view of time is actually committed to the unreality, not just of the future, but of the past also.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], Intro)
     A reaction: There seem to be strong and weak version here, since if you are committed to tenses, you are presumably committed to the possibility of truths about the past and future. The strong version (denying past and future) seems to make tenses pointless.
Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Tensed theorists typically seek to reduce facts about tenseless relations to tensed facts.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense [1998], 4 (b))
     A reaction: This presumably involves denial of tenseless truths like '2+2=4', which might become '2+2 is always 4'. I can't see an objection to that. Tooley 1997 is cited as an exception to this idea.
We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: We appear to share a common now, but not a common here.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 2)
     A reaction: Personally I take this to be quite a strong argument against the simplistic view that there is just something called 'spacetime', with no distinction of dimensions.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The new tenseless theory has given up Russell's attempt to reduce tensed statements (in terms of 'simultaneous with'), and instead give tenseless truth-conditions (in terms of indexicals).
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 3)
     A reaction: [compressed]
To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The causal connection between the past and the present seems to require that the past is as real as the present.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 08 'First')
     A reaction: Cause and effect need to conjoin in space, but their subsequent separation doesn't seem to be a problem. The idea that causes and their effects must be eternally compresent is an absurdity.
The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: How can anything change in a B-universe?
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 08 'Second')
     A reaction: It seems that change needs time to move on. A timeless series of varying states doesn't seem to be the same thing as change. B-seriesers must be tempted to deny change, and yet nothing seems more obvious to us than change.
If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: What in the B-universe determines my temporal perspective? I can move around in space at will, but I have no choice over where I am in time. What time I am is something that changes, and again I have no control over that
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 08 'Second')
     A reaction: The B-series always has to be asserted from the point of view of eternity (e.g. by Einstein). Yet an omniscient mind would still see each of us trapped in our transient moments, so that is part of eternal reality.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: If there is no temporal gap between cause and effect, then the causal analysis of time's arrow is doomed.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 12 'simultaneous')
     A reaction: A number of recent commentators have rejected the sharp distinction between cause and effect, seeing it as a unified process (which takes time to occur).
An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: A series can be ordered without being directed (such as the series of integers), …but the passage of time indicates a preferred direction, moving from earlier to later events, and never the other way around.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 12 'Hidden')
     A reaction: I wonder what 'preferred' means here? It is not just memory versus anticipation. The saddest words in the English language are 'Too late!'. It is absurd to say that being too late is an illusion.
If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: An objection to the Causal analysis of time's arrow is that it is surely possible for non-simultaneous events to be causally unconnected.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 12 'Seeds')
     A reaction: I suppose the events could be linked causally by intermediaries. If reality is a vast causal nexus, everything leads to everything else, in some remote way. It's still a good objections, though.
If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: If the Psychological account of time's arrow is correct …then there is nothing to prevent different minds from imposing different orders on the world.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 12 'The mind's')
     A reaction: All we need is for two people to disagree about the order of some past events. The idea that we are psychologically creating time's arrow when everyone feels they are its victims strikes me as a particularly silly theory.
There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The three most significant arrows of time are the Thermodynamic (the direction from order to disorder), the Psychological (from perceptions of events to memories), and the Causal (from cause to effect).
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 12 'Three')
     A reaction: It would be nice if one of these explained the other two. Le Poidevin rejects the Psychological arrow, and seems to favour the Causal. Since I favour taking time as a primitive, I'm inclined to think that the arrow is included in the deal.
Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: One consequence of the Thermodynamic analysis of time's arrow is that a universe in which things are as disordered as they could be would exhibit no direction of time at all, because there would be no more significant changes in entropy.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 12 'Three')
     A reaction: And presumably time would gradually fizzle out, rather than ending abruptly. If entropy then went into reverse, there would be no time interval between the end and the new beginning. Entropy can vary locally, so it has to be universal.
If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The Second Law of Thermodynamics says it is overwhelmingly probable that entropy will increase. This leaves the door open for occasional isolated instances of decrease. But the thermodynamic arrow makes the increase a necessity.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 12 'Three')
     A reaction: Le Poidevin sees this as a clincher against the thermodynamic explanation of the arrow. I'm now sure how the Second Law can even be stated without explicit or implicit reference to time.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / i. Time and motion
Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Being in motion at a particular time can be an intrinsic property of an object, as a disposition to be elsewhere than the place it is.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 09 'in present')
     A reaction: This needs an ontology which includes unrealised dispositions. People trapped in boring meetings have a disposition to be elsewhere, but they are stuck. I think 'power' is a better word here than 'disposition'. The disposition isn't just for 'elsewhere'.
The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: According to the dynamic account of motion, an object's being in motion is a primitive event, not further analysable in terms of objects, properties and times.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 09 'Zeno')
     A reaction: [The rival view is 'static'] Physics suggests that motion may be indefinable, but acceleration can be given a reductive account. If time and space are taken as primitive (which seems sensible to me), then making motion also primitive is a bit greedy.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: If any number of pasts are compatible with the present state of affairs, and it is only the present state of affairs which can make true or false statements about the past, then no statement about the past is either true or false.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 08 'First')
     A reaction: He suggests an explosion which could have had innumerable different causes. The explosion could have had different origins, but not sure that the whole of present reality could. Presentists certainly have problems with truthmakers for the past.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The present is the boundary between past and future, therefore if there was a first moment of time, it could not have been present - because there can be no past at the beginning of time.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 05 'Limits')
     A reaction: How about at the start of a race the athletes cannot be running. How about 'all moments of time have preceding moments - apart from the first moment'?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Intervals of time can be viewed as primitive, and not decomposable into a series of instants.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 09 'in present')
     A reaction: Given that instants are nothing, and intervals are something, the latter are clearly the better candidates to be the parts of time. Is there a smallest interval?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Assuming time to be infinitely divisible, the present can have no duration at all, for if it did, we could divide it into parts, and some parts would be earlier than others.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 09 'in present')
     A reaction: I quite like Aristotle's view that things only have parts when you actually divide them. In modern physics fields don't seem to be infinitely divisible. It's a puzzle, though, innit?
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The multiverse is not just a collection of distinct spaces, it is also a collection of distinct time-series.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 11 'Objections')
     A reaction: This boggles the imagination even more than distinct spatial universes.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Is God within, or outside time? How can God causally interact with the universe? How are 'all times present to God'? If the future is not real, can God not know the future? How would he then be omniscient? Does God know the truth of tensed assertions?
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 6)
     A reaction: This lot constitutes one of the main reasons why I cannot believe in God. In brief, the concept is incoherent. The metaphysical convolutions needed to reconcile these problems smack of the absurd aspects of medieval theology.
How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Could a timeless being now know what the time was? If so, does this show that there must be something wrong with the idea of God as both timeless and omniscient?
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 09 'Questions')
     A reaction: This is a potential contradiction between the perfections of a supreme God which I had not noticed before. Leibniz tried to refute such objections, but not very successfully, I think.