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7950
|
Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C]
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Full Idea:
Philosophical problems are problems about how what is actual is possible, given that what is actual appears, because of some faulty argument, to be impossible.
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|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6)
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A reaction:
[She is discussing universals when she makes this comment] A very appealing remark, given that most people come into philosophy because of a mixture of wonder and puzzlement. It is a rather Wittgensteinian view, though, that we must cure our own ills.
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|
7923
|
'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
In 'She did it for the sake of her country' no one thinks that the expression 'the sake' refers to an individual thing, a sake. But given that, how can we work out what the ontological commitments of a theory actually are?
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|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.1)
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|
A reaction:
For these sorts of reasons it rapidly became obvious that ordinary language analysis wasn't going to reveal much, but it is also a problem for a project like Quine's, which infers an ontology from the terms of a scientific theory.
|
|
7944
|
Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
There are four kinds of reduction: the identifying of entities of two theories by means of bridge or correlation laws; the elimination of entities in favour of the other theory; reducing by bridge laws and property identities; and merely reducing talk.
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|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3 n5)
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|
A reaction:
[She gives references] The idea of 'bridge laws' I regard with caution. If bridge laws are ceteris paribus, they are not much help, and if they are strict, or necessary, then there must be an underlying reason for that, which is probably elimination.
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|
7967
|
Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
The relation of being taller than is an external relation, since it relates two independent material substances, but the relation of instantiation or exemplification is internal, in that it relates a substance with a property.
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|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6)
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|
A reaction:
An interesting revival of internal relations. To be plausible it would need clear notions of 'property' and 'substance'. We are getting a long way from physics, and I sense Ockham stropping his Razor. How do you individuate a 'relation'?
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|
7934
|
Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
Tropes are abstract entities, at least in the sense that more than one can be in the same place at the same time (e.g. redness and roundness). But they are not universals, because they have unique and particular locations.
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|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)
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|
A reaction:
I'm uneasy about the reification involved in this kind of talk. Does a coin possess a thing called 'roundness', which then has to be individuated, identified and located? I am drawn to the two extreme views, and suspicious of compromise.
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|
7972
|
Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
Trope 'Nominalism' is not a version of nominalism, because tropes are abstract particulars, rather than concrete particulars. Of course, a trope account of the relations between particulars and their properties has ramifications for concrete particulars.
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|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6 n16)
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|
A reaction:
Cf. Idea 7971. At this point the boundary between nominalist and realist theories seems to blur. Possibly that is bad news for tropes. Not many dilemmas can be solved by simply blurring the boundary.
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|
7960
|
Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
Of all the nominalist solutions, Trope Nominalism is the only one that tries to solve the problem at issue by introducing entities; all the others try to get by with concrete particulars and sets of them. This might invite Ockham's Razor.
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|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6)
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|
A reaction:
We could reply that tropes are necessities. The issue seems to be a key one, which is whether our fundamental onotology should include properties (in some form or other). I am inclined to exclude them (Ideas 3322, 3906, 4029).
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|
7951
|
Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
We can distinguish between numerical identity and qualitative identity. Numerical sameness is explained by a theory of identity, but what explains qualitative sameness?
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|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6)
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|
A reaction:
The distinction is between type and token identity. Tokens are particulars, and types are sets, so her question comes down to the one of what entitles something to be a member of a set? Nothing, if sets are totally conventional, but they aren't.
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|
7971
|
Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
All real forms of Nominalism should hold that the only objects relevant to the explanation of generality are concrete particulars, words (i.e. word-tokens, not word-types), and perhaps sets.
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|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6 n16)
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|
A reaction:
The addition of sets seems controversial (see Idea 7970). The context is her rejection of the use of tropes in nominalist theories. I would doubt whether a theory still counted as nominalist if it admitted sets (e.g. Quine).
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|
7961
|
A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
The so-called 'laws of thinghood' govern particulars, saying that one thing cannot be wholly present at different places at the same time, and two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time.
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|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6)
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|
A reaction:
Is this an empirical observation, or a tautology? Or might it even be a priori synthetic? What happens when two water drops or clouds merge? Or an amoeba fissions? In what sense is an image in two places at once? Se also Idea 2351.
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|
7926
|
We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
We can usefully refer to 'individuation conditions', to distinguish objects of that kind from objects not of that kind, and to 'identity conditions', to distinguish objects within that kind from one another.
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|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.2)
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|
A reaction:
So we individuate types or sets, and identify tokens or particulars. Sounds good. Should be in every philosopher's toolkit, and on every introductory philosophy course.
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|
7932
|
A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
Commitment to the view that only what can be an object of possible sensory experience can exist eliminates the possibility of distinguishing between substance and attribute, leaving only one alternative, namely the bundle view.
|
|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)
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|
A reaction:
Phenomenalism strikes me as a paradigm case of confusing ontology with epistemology. Presumably physicists (even empiricist ones) are committed to the 'interior' of quarks and electrons, but no one expects to experience them.
|
|
7929
|
A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
The three main theories of substance are the bundle theory (Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Ayer), the bare substratum theory (Locke and Bergmann), and the essentialist theory.
|
|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)
|
|
A reaction:
Macdonald defends the essentialist theory. The essentialist view immediately appeals to me. Properties must be OF something, and the something must have the power to produce properties. So there.
|
|
7941
|
Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
A rival to the bundle theory says that, for each substance, there is a constituent of it that is not a property but is both essential and unique to it, this constituent being referred to as a 'bare particular' or 'substratum'.
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|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)
|
|
A reaction:
This doesn't sound promising. It is unclear what existence devoid of all properties could be like. How could it 'have' its properties if it was devoid of features (it seems to need property-hooks)? It is an ontological black hole. How do you prove it?
|
|
7942
|
The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
If there is a substratum or bare particular within a substance, this gives an explanation of the unity of substances, and it is something which can survive intact when a substance changes.
|
|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)
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|
A reaction:
[v. compressed wording] Many problems here. The one that strikes me is that when things change they sometimes lose their unity and identity, and that seems to be decided entirely from observation of properties, not from assessing the substratum.
|
|
7943
|
A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C]
|
|
Full Idea:
There seems to be no way of identifying a substratum as the bearer of qualities without qualifiying it as bare (having the property of being bare?), ..and they cannot be used to individuate things, because they are necessarily indiscernible.
|
|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)
|
|
A reaction:
The defence would probably be a priori, claiming an axiomatic necessity for substrata in our thinking about the world, along with a denial that bareness is a property (any more than not being a contemporary of Napoleon is a property).
|
|
7927
|
At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
There are three distinct versions of Leibniz's Law, all traced to remarks made by Leibniz: the Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing), the Indiscernibility of Identicals (same thing, same properties), and the Substitution Principle.
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|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.2)
|
|
A reaction:
The best view seems to be to treat the second one as Leibniz's Law (and uncontroversially true), and the first one as being an interesting but dubious claim.
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|
7947
|
In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C]
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|
Full Idea:
What matters to continuity is not just the beginning and end states of the process by which a thing persists, perhaps through change, but the process itself.
|
|
From:
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.4)
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|
A reaction:
This strikes me as being a really important insight. Compare Idea 4931. If this is the key to understanding mind and personal identity, it means that the concept of a 'process' must be a central issue in ontology. How do you individuate a process?
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|
20584
|
Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf]
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|
Full Idea:
Critics of desire satisfaction theory argue that it gets things backward. We desire things because we already think they are good in some way. Desire theory puts it the other way round.
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 1 'Is happiness')
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|
A reaction:
Not persuasive. It looks to me as if skiing is a spendid pastime, but I have no desire to do it. More exercise would even be a good for me, but I don't desire that either. Indeed, right now I desire more cake, which is very naughty.
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|
20598
|
In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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|
Full Idea:
In any democratic state, who are 'the people' who get to rule themselves? That is, who gets to participate in the public decision process, and who is excluded?
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is')
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|
A reaction:
In the modern world this may be clear-cut when a democracy gets started, but people move around so much more that every democracy is faced with new types of residents. Then there is age, criminality, mental health...
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|
20596
|
For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf]
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|
Full Idea:
Imagine a new original position where we adopted rules for global justice without knowing which country we would inhabit.
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 4 'Cosmopolitan')
|
|
A reaction:
Nice question. North Korea!! Rawls says it is only within a nation, because there is a co-operative enterprise going on. That is, I presume, that the choosers involved are a 'people'. See Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' for an alternative.
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|
20593
|
The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf]
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|
Full Idea:
The veil of ignorance ensures that the original position is fair, but it also guarantees that agreement will be unanimous (which would be impossible if each person insisted that justice should match her own conception).
|
|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 4 'Original')
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|
A reaction:
Not clear about this. If I choose very cautiously, but others choose very riskily, and they win, why I should I fall in with their unanimity? That can only be if we agree to be unanimous in backing the result. Like a democratic election?
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|
20608
|
Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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|
Full Idea:
Legitimacy and perceived legitimacy do not always go together: people can believe that their institutions are just, but they may be wrong. Is the reverse also possible? Can institutions be legitimate if people believe they are not?
|
|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What are')
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|
A reaction:
Nice thoughts. An institution cannot be just merely because it is seen that way (if someone gets away with rigging an election). If they are just but seen as unjust, I presume they are legitimate (which is objective), but disfunctional.
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|
20597
|
If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf]
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|
Full Idea:
If we let people's influence on election outcomes depend on their wealth, then we don't have a democracy any more. We have a plutocracy, where the people who have all the wealth have all the political power too.
|
|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Intro')
|
|
A reaction:
[see Michael Walzer on 'complex equality'] This is startling true in the United States, but still somewhat true elsewhere. Being wealthy enough to control the media is the key in modern democracies.
|
|
20600
|
Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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|
Full Idea:
Are there areas which are excluded from democratic decision making? Or should all issues of public concern be decided through a democratic process?
|
|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is')
|
|
A reaction:
Crucially, are we discussing direct democracy, or representative democracy? In Britain all major decisions are made by the cabinet. Our representatives appoint leaders, who then appoint the decision makers. Judiciary is non-democratic.
|
|
20609
|
If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf]
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|
Full Idea:
It is possible that the people who supported several losing candidates might have joined forces and had a majority. For that reason, many countries have a runoff election.
|
|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Does democracy')
|
|
A reaction:
The problem is that there is no rationale as to who stands in an election. If their views are evenly spread, the first result seems OK. If there are five left-wingers and one right-winger, a runoff seems to be produce a more just result.
|
|
20599
|
How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf]
|
|
Full Idea:
A major question for democracy is how are the contributions of different people aggregated into a collective decision? Must votes have equal weight and consideration, or is it permissible for different people's votes to count differently?
|
|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is')
|
|
A reaction:
Mill hoped that wise and knowledgeable people would have a strong influence over the others, but we have recently moved into the post-truth era, where we are swamped by bogus facts. Does that strengthen the case for elite voting?
|
|
20613
|
We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf]
|
|
Full Idea:
Many of our most important obligations are things we did not consent to. If you think you have obligations to your family, did you choose to have them as family members?
|
|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 6 'Gratitude')
|
|
A reaction:
A question that gets close to the heart of the communitarian ideal, I think. We choose to have children, and we bring them up, but even then we don't choose who our children are.
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|
20604
|
Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf]
|
|
Full Idea:
Choice theorists hold that rights protect our rights to make autonomous judgements, because our basic right to autonomy must be protected, The theory has a problem with people unable to exercise autonomy (such as infants and animals).
|
|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Interest')
|
|
A reaction:
The problem of infants and animals looks like a decisive objection to me. We obviously don't protect dangerous or hostile autonomous judgements, and it is not clear why protecting stupid autonomy should be basic.
|
|
20615
|
Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf]
|
|
Full Idea:
Classical just war theory: resist aggression; just cause must be the real reason; must be proportionate; last resort; not futile; made by a nation's authority.
|
|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 9 'Ius ad')
|
|
A reaction:
[My squashed summary of Tuckness and Wolf] A very helpful list, from Cicero, Augustine and Aquinas. So where is the sticking point for pacifists? Presumably it is never the last resort, and aggression should not answer aggression.
|
|
20616
|
During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf]
|
|
Full Idea:
Classical just war theory during a war: force must be proportional; only legitimate targets; avoid prohibited weapons; safety for prisoners of war; no reprisals.
|
|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 9 'In the conduct')
|
|
A reaction:
What of massacre if a besieged city refuses to surrender? It was commonplace, and sometimes the only way to achieve victory. What if the enemy breaks all the rules? Nice rules though. At the heart of civilisation.
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|
24043
|
Soul must be immortal, since it continually moves, like the heavens [Alcmaeon, by Aristotle]
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|
Full Idea:
Alcmaeon says that the soul is immortal because it resembles immortal things and that this affection belongs to it because it is always in movement, like divine things, such the moon, the sun, the stars and the whole heaven.
|
|
From:
report of Alcmaeon (fragments/reports [c.490 BCE], DK 24) by Aristotle - De Anima 405a30
|
|
A reaction:
Hm. Fish and rivers seem to be continually moving too. Presumably we are like gods, but then Greek gods seem awfully like humans. I don't know the history of belief in immortality; an interesting topic.
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