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13076
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Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
The scholastics treated it as a step in the right explanatory direction to analyze a relational statement of the form 'aRb' into two subject-predicate statements, attributing different relational predicates to a and to b.
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 2.2.1)
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A reaction:
The only alternative seems to be Russell's view of relations as pure universals, having a life of their own, quite apart from their relata. Or you could take them as properties of space, time (and powers?), external to the relata?
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13102
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If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
If we go for the necessity-of-origins view, A and B are different if the origin of A is different from the origin of B. But one is left with the further question 'When is the origin of A distinct from the origin of B?'
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
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A reaction:
There may be an answer to this, in a regress of origins that support one another, but in the end the objection is obviously good. You can't begin to refer to an 'origin' if you can't identify anything in the first place.
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13103
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Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
Scholastics distinguished criteria of numerical difference from questions of individuation proper, since numerical difference is a symmetrical notion.
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
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A reaction:
This apparently old-fashioned point appears to be conclusively correct. Modern thinkers, though, aren't comfortable with proper individuation, because they don't believe in concepts like 'essence' and 'substance' that are needed for the job.
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13104
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Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
There is a contemporary property construal of haecceities, ...and a Scotistic construal as primitive, 'colourless' thisnesses which, unlike singleton-set haecceities, are aimed to do some explanatory work.
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.4)
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A reaction:
[He associates the contemporary account with David Kaplan] I suppose I would say that individuation is done by properties, but not by some single property, so I take it that I don't believe in haecceities at all. What individuates a haecceity?
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13100
|
Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
We could think of 'substance' on the model of a mass noun, rather than a count noun.
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.3)
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A reaction:
They offer this to help Leibniz out of a mess, but I think he would be appalled. The proposal seems close to 'prime matter' in Aristotle, which never quite does the job required of it. The idea is nice, though, and should be taken seriously.
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13068
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We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
In the 'blueprint' approach to substance, we confront at least three questions: What is it for a thing to be an individual substance? What is it for a thing to be the kind of substance that it is? What is it to be that very individual substance?
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.1)
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A reaction:
My working view is that the answer to the first question is that substance is essence, that the second question is overrated and parasitic on the third, and that the third is the key question, and also reduces to essence.
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13069
|
The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
There is a widespread assumption, now and in the past, that substances are essentially substances: nothing is actually a substance but possibly a non-substance.
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2)
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A reaction:
It seems to me that they clearly mean, in this context, that substances are 'necessarily' substances, not that they are 'essentially' substances. I would just say that substances are essences, and leave the necessity question open.
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13101
|
Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
A necessity-of-origins approach cannot work to distinguish things that come into being genuinely ex nihilo, and cannot work to distinguish things sharing a single origin.
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 7.4.1)
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A reaction:
Since I am deeply suspicious of essentiality or necessity of origin (and they are not, I presume, the same thing) I like these two. Twins have always bothered me with the second case (where order of birth seems irrelevant).
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13071
|
We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
The philosopher comfortable with an 'order of being' has richer resources to make sense of the 'in virtue of' relation than that provided only by causal relations between states of affairs, positing in addition other sorts of explanatory relationships.
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.2)
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A reaction:
This might best be characterised as 'ontological dependence', and could be seen as a non-causal but fundamental explanatory relationship, and not one that has to depend on a theistic world view.
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20584
|
Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Critics of desire satisfaction theory argue that it gets things backward. We desire things because we already think they are good in some way. Desire theory puts it the other way round.
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 1 'Is happiness')
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A reaction:
Not persuasive. It looks to me as if skiing is a spendid pastime, but I have no desire to do it. More exercise would even be a good for me, but I don't desire that either. Indeed, right now I desire more cake, which is very naughty.
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20598
|
In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
In any democratic state, who are 'the people' who get to rule themselves? That is, who gets to participate in the public decision process, and who is excluded?
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is')
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A reaction:
In the modern world this may be clear-cut when a democracy gets started, but people move around so much more that every democracy is faced with new types of residents. Then there is age, criminality, mental health...
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20596
|
For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Imagine a new original position where we adopted rules for global justice without knowing which country we would inhabit.
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 4 'Cosmopolitan')
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A reaction:
Nice question. North Korea!! Rawls says it is only within a nation, because there is a co-operative enterprise going on. That is, I presume, that the choosers involved are a 'people'. See Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' for an alternative.
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20593
|
The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
The veil of ignorance ensures that the original position is fair, but it also guarantees that agreement will be unanimous (which would be impossible if each person insisted that justice should match her own conception).
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 4 'Original')
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A reaction:
Not clear about this. If I choose very cautiously, but others choose very riskily, and they win, why I should I fall in with their unanimity? That can only be if we agree to be unanimous in backing the result. Like a democratic election?
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20608
|
Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Legitimacy and perceived legitimacy do not always go together: people can believe that their institutions are just, but they may be wrong. Is the reverse also possible? Can institutions be legitimate if people believe they are not?
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What are')
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|
A reaction:
Nice thoughts. An institution cannot be just merely because it is seen that way (if someone gets away with rigging an election). If they are just but seen as unjust, I presume they are legitimate (which is objective), but disfunctional.
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20597
|
If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
If we let people's influence on election outcomes depend on their wealth, then we don't have a democracy any more. We have a plutocracy, where the people who have all the wealth have all the political power too.
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From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Intro')
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|
A reaction:
[see Michael Walzer on 'complex equality'] This is startling true in the United States, but still somewhat true elsewhere. Being wealthy enough to control the media is the key in modern democracies.
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20600
|
Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Are there areas which are excluded from democratic decision making? Or should all issues of public concern be decided through a democratic process?
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is')
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A reaction:
Crucially, are we discussing direct democracy, or representative democracy? In Britain all major decisions are made by the cabinet. Our representatives appoint leaders, who then appoint the decision makers. Judiciary is non-democratic.
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20609
|
If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
It is possible that the people who supported several losing candidates might have joined forces and had a majority. For that reason, many countries have a runoff election.
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Does democracy')
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|
A reaction:
The problem is that there is no rationale as to who stands in an election. If their views are evenly spread, the first result seems OK. If there are five left-wingers and one right-winger, a runoff seems to be produce a more just result.
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20599
|
How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
A major question for democracy is how are the contributions of different people aggregated into a collective decision? Must votes have equal weight and consideration, or is it permissible for different people's votes to count differently?
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is')
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|
A reaction:
Mill hoped that wise and knowledgeable people would have a strong influence over the others, but we have recently moved into the post-truth era, where we are swamped by bogus facts. Does that strengthen the case for elite voting?
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20613
|
We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Many of our most important obligations are things we did not consent to. If you think you have obligations to your family, did you choose to have them as family members?
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 6 'Gratitude')
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|
A reaction:
A question that gets close to the heart of the communitarian ideal, I think. We choose to have children, and we bring them up, but even then we don't choose who our children are.
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20604
|
Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Choice theorists hold that rights protect our rights to make autonomous judgements, because our basic right to autonomy must be protected, The theory has a problem with people unable to exercise autonomy (such as infants and animals).
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Interest')
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|
A reaction:
The problem of infants and animals looks like a decisive objection to me. We obviously don't protect dangerous or hostile autonomous judgements, and it is not clear why protecting stupid autonomy should be basic.
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20615
|
Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Classical just war theory: resist aggression; just cause must be the real reason; must be proportionate; last resort; not futile; made by a nation's authority.
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 9 'Ius ad')
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|
A reaction:
[My squashed summary of Tuckness and Wolf] A very helpful list, from Cicero, Augustine and Aquinas. So where is the sticking point for pacifists? Presumably it is never the last resort, and aggression should not answer aggression.
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20616
|
During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf]
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Full Idea:
Classical just war theory during a war: force must be proportional; only legitimate targets; avoid prohibited weapons; safety for prisoners of war; no reprisals.
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|
From:
Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 9 'In the conduct')
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|
A reaction:
What of massacre if a besieged city refuses to surrender? It was commonplace, and sometimes the only way to achieve victory. What if the enemy breaks all the rules? Nice rules though. At the heart of civilisation.
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