7 ideas
11257 | The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle praises the Pythagoreans for being the first to offer definitions. | |
From: report of Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4 | |
A reaction: This sounds like a hugely important step in the development of Greek philosophy which is hardly ever mentioned. |
11235 | 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis] |
Full Idea: It is crucial not to confuse 'true' with 'true of'. 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words. | |
From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 1.4) | |
A reaction: A beautifully simple distinction which had never occurred to me, and which (being a thoroughgoing realist) I really like. |
12427 | All of mathematics is properties of the whole numbers [Kronecker] |
Full Idea: All the results of significant mathematical research must ultimately be expressible in the simple forms of properties of whole numbers. | |
From: Leopold Kronecker (works [1885], Vol 3/274), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 09.5 | |
A reaction: I've always liked Kronecker's line, but I'm beginning to realise that his use of the word 'number' is simply out-of-date. Natural numbers have a special status, but not sufficient to support this claim. |
10091 | God made the integers, all the rest is the work of man [Kronecker] |
Full Idea: God made the integers, all the rest is the work of man. | |
From: Leopold Kronecker (works [1885]), quoted by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Intro | |
A reaction: This famous remark was first quoted in Kronecker's obituary. A response to Dedekind, it seems. See Idea 10090. Did he really mean that negative numbers were the work of God? We took a long time to spot them. |
11277 | Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis] |
Full Idea: We may be unfamiliar with the question 'What is being?' because there appear to be no contrastive questions of the form: how do beings differ from things that are not beings? | |
From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 4.1) | |
A reaction: We can, of course, contrast actual beings with possible beings, or imaginary beings, or even logically impossible beings, but in those cases 'being' strikes me as an entirely inappropriate word. |
11248 | Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis] |
Full Idea: An essence is true in virtue of what the thing is in itself, but a necessary truth may be relational, as the consequence of the relation between two things and their essence. The necessary relation may be two-way, but the essential relation one-way. | |
From: Vassilis Politis (Aristotle and the Metaphysics [2004], 2.3) | |
A reaction: He is writing about Aristotle, but has in mind Kit Fine 1994 (qv). Politis cites Plato's answer to the Euthyphro Question as a good example. The necessity comes from the intrinsic nature of goodness/piety, not from the desire of the gods. |
8338 | A phenomenalist about objects has to be a regularity theorist about causation [Strawson,G] |
Full Idea: If you are a phenomenalist about objects, then there is an important sense in which you ought to be a Regularity theorist about what causation is, in such objects. | |
From: Galen Strawson (The Secret Connexion [1989], App C) | |
A reaction: Strawson is denying that Hume is a phenomenalist. One might go a little further, and say that a phenomenalist should abandon the idea of causation (as Russell did). |