32 ideas
15842 | An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Judicious use of an opponent's assumptions is quite capable of producing a perfectly reasonable ad hominem refutation of the opponent's thesis. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.6) |
3340 | Von Neumann defines each number as the set of all smaller numbers [Neumann, by Blackburn] |
Full Idea: Von Neumann defines each number as the set of all smaller numbers. | |
From: report of John von Neumann (works [1935]) by Simon Blackburn - Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy p.280 |
15943 | Limitation of Size is not self-evident, and seems too strong [Lavine on Neumann] |
Full Idea: Von Neumann's Limitation of Size axiom is not self-evident, and he himself admitted that it seemed too strong. | |
From: comment on John von Neumann (An Axiomatization of Set Theory [1925]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite VII.1 |
3355 | Von Neumann wanted mathematical functions to replace sets [Neumann, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Von Neumann suggested that functions be pressed into service to replace sets. | |
From: report of John von Neumann (works [1935]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.23 |
15841 | Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Historically, the evolution of mereology was associated with the desire to find alternatives to set theory for those with nomimalist qualms about the commitment to abstract objects like sets. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.2) | |
A reaction: Goodman, for example. It is interesting to note that the hardline nominalist Quine, pal of Goodman, eventually accepted set theory. It is difficult to account for things by merely naming their parts. |
13489 | Von Neumann treated cardinals as a special sort of ordinal [Neumann, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Von Neumann's decision was to start with the ordinals and to treat cardinals as a special sort of ordinal. | |
From: report of John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 3 | |
A reaction: [see Hart 73-74 for an explication of this] |
22716 | Von Neumann defined ordinals as the set of all smaller ordinals [Neumann, by Poundstone] |
Full Idea: At age twenty, Von Neumann devised the formal definition of ordinal numbers that is used today: an ordinal number is the set of all smaller ordinal numbers. | |
From: report of John von Neumann (works [1935]) by William Poundstone - Prisoner's Dilemma 02 'Sturm' | |
A reaction: I take this to be an example of an impredicative definition (not predicating something new), because it uses 'ordinal number' in the definition of ordinal number. I'm guessing the null set gets us started. |
12336 | A von Neumann ordinal is a transitive set with transitive elements [Neumann, by Badiou] |
Full Idea: In Von Neumann's definition an ordinal is a transitive set in which all of the elements are transitive. | |
From: report of John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by Alain Badiou - Briefings on Existence 11 |
18179 | For Von Neumann the successor of n is n U {n} (rather than {n}) [Neumann, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: For Von Neumann the successor of n is n U {n} (rather than Zermelo's successor, which is {n}). | |
From: report of John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.2 n8 |
18180 | Von Neumann numbers are preferred, because they continue into the transfinite [Maddy on Neumann] |
Full Idea: Von Neumann's version of the natural numbers is in fact preferred because it carries over directly to the transfinite ordinals. | |
From: comment on John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.2 n9 |
15925 | Each Von Neumann ordinal number is the set of its predecessors [Neumann, by Lavine] |
Full Idea: Each Von Neumann ordinal number is the set of its predecessors. ...He had shown how to introduce ordinal numbers as sets, making it possible to use them without leaving the domain of sets. | |
From: report of John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite V.3 |
13672 | All the axioms for mathematics presuppose set theory [Neumann] |
Full Idea: There is no axiom system for mathematics, geometry, and so forth that does not presuppose set theory. | |
From: John von Neumann (An Axiomatization of Set Theory [1925]), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Foundations without Foundationalism 8.2 | |
A reaction: Von Neumann was doubting whether set theory could have axioms, and hence the whole project is doomed, and we face relativism about such things. His ally was Skolem in this. |
15858 | Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Earth, air, fire and water, viewed as elements, are, by tradition, the leading candidates for being the things that persist through change. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 4.4) | |
A reaction: Physics still offers us things that persist through change, as conservation laws. |
15848 | Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Mereologists do suppose that constitution is a criterion of identity. This view is enshrined in the Mereological axiom of extensionality; that objects with the same parts are identical. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 3.1) | |
A reaction: A helpful explanation of why classical mereology is a very confused view of the world. It is at least obvious that a long wall and a house are different things, even if built of identical bricks. |
15837 | What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: The difficulty with the claim that a whole is (just) the sum of its parts is what are we to understand by 'the sum'? ...If we say wholes are 'composites' of parts, how are we to understand the relation of composition? | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) |
15839 | If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: Holism inherits all the difficulties associated with the term 'sum' and adds one of its own, when it says a whole is 'more than' the sum of its parts. This seems to say it has something extra? Is this something extra a part? | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Most people take the claim that a thing is more than the sum of its parts as metaphorical, I would think (except perhaps emergentists about the mind, and they are wrong). |
15838 | The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V] |
Full Idea: For my money, the real problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular. | |
From: Verity Harte (Plato on Parts and Wholes [2002], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Her point is that the surface grammar makes you accept a unity here, with no account of what unifies it, or even whether there is a unity. Does classical mereology have a concept (as the rest of us do) of 'disunity'? |
22673 | Wherever there is a small community, the association of the people is natural [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: The village or township is the only association which is so perfectly natural that, wherever a number of men are collected, it seems to constitute itself. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.04) | |
A reaction: Seems like a chicken and egg issue. I would have thought that association precedes the development of a village. |
22676 | The people are just individuals, and only present themselves as united to foreigners [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: The people in themselves are only individuals; and the special reason why they need to be united under one government is that they may appear to advantage before foreigners. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
A reaction: I take this to be an observation on 1830s America, rather than a universal truth. It fits modern western societies rather well though. |
22679 | Vast empires are bad for well-being and freedom, though they may promote glory [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: Nothing is more opposed to the well-being and the freedom of men than vast empires. …But there is a love of glory in those who regard the applause of a great people as a worthy reward. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
A reaction: Presumably the main the problem is the central dominance over distant colonies. There may also be some freedom in being distant from the centres, especially in 1830. The Wild West. |
22680 | People would be much happier and freer in small nations [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: If none but small nations existed, I do not doubt that mankind would be more happy and more free. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
A reaction: In modern times many small states have appeared in Europe (in the Balkans and on the Baltic), and it looks to me a good thing. The prospect of Scottish independence may currently be looming, and De Tocqueville would approve. |
22675 | In American judges rule according to the Constitution, not the law [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: The Americans have acknowledged the right of judges to found their decisions on the Constitution, rather than on the laws. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.05) | |
A reaction: Obviously the Constitution is one short document, so the details must be enshrined in the laws (which presumably defer to the Constitution). |
22677 | A monarchical family is always deeply concerned with the interests of the state [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: The advantages of a monarchy are that the private interests of a family are connected with the interests of the state, …and at least there is always someone available to conduct the affairs of a monarchy. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
A reaction: The second one is not much of a reason! The same defence can be given for the dominance of the Mafia. His defences are deliberately feeble, I suspect. England had plenty of monarchs who showed limited interest. |
22683 | Despots like to see their own regulations ignored, by themselves and their agents [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: In despotic states the sovereign is so much attached to his power that he dislikes the constraints even of his own regulations, and likes to see his agents acting irregularly. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.11) | |
A reaction: A nice observation. What would Machiavelli say? At least the citizens can see where the real power resides. |
22669 | Aristocracy is constituted by inherited landed property [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: Land is the basis of an aristocracy; …it is by landed property handed down from generation to generation that an aristocracy is constituted. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.01) | |
A reaction: Presumably there can be aristocrats by mere royal patronage, who have perhaps gambled away their land. They need protection by the other aristocrats. |
22674 | In Europe it is thought that local government is best handled centrally [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: The partisans of centralisation in Europe are wont to maintain that the government can administer the affairs of each locality better than the citizens can do it for themselves. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.04) | |
A reaction: In the modern UK we have lots of local government, which is thoroughly starved of funds by the central government. He is contrasting it with the strong local system in the U.S. |
22678 | An election, and its lead up time, are always a national crisis [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: The period which immediately precedes an election, and that during which the election is taking place, must always be considered as a national crisis. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.07) | |
A reaction: Rousseau said something similar. Election day in modern Britain is very peaceful and civilised, but it used to be chaotic. The weeks preceding it are invariably nasty. |
22682 | Universal suffrage is no guarantee of wise choices [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: Universal suffrage is by no means a guarantee of the wisdom of the popular choice. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.11) | |
A reaction: This was precisely Plato's fear about democracy. There seems no way at all of preventing the people from electing representatives on superficial grounds of personality. |
22670 | Slavery undermines the morals and energy of a society [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: Slavery dishonours labour; it introduces idleness into society, and with idleness, ignorance and pride, luxury and distress. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.01) | |
A reaction: A pretty feeble reason (in the 1830s) for disliking slavery. He seems only concerned with the adverse effects on the slave-owning society, and shows no interest in the slaves themselves. |
22681 | The liberty of the press is more valuable for what it prevents than what it promotes [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: I approve of the liberty of the press from a consideration more of the evils it prevents than of the advantages it ensures. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.10) | |
A reaction: He accepts the freedom of the press as inevitable in a democracy, but he found U.S. newspapers to be nearly as bad then as they are now. |
22672 | It is admirable to elevate the humble to the level of the great, but the opposite is depraved [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: One manly and lawful passion for equality elevates the humble to the rank of the great. But there exists also a depraved taste for equality, which impels the weak to attempt to lower the powerful to their own level. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.02) | |
A reaction: There is a distinction in modern political rhetoric between 'levelling down' and 'levelling up'. Since levelling down is just destructive, and levelling up is unaffordable, it seems obvious that true equality needs to be a compromise. |
22671 | Equality can only be established by equal rights for all (or no rights for anyone) [Tocqueville] |
Full Idea: I know of only two methods of establishing equality in the political world; rights must be given to every citizen, or none at all to anyone. | |
From: Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America (abr Renshaw) [1840], 1.02) | |
A reaction: We may have a vague concept of 'natural' rights, but primarily they are a tool of social engineering. You could grant equal rights on inheritance, for example, which turn out in practice to hugely favour the rich. |