Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for W Wimsatt/W Beardsley, Jaakko Hintikka and Jack Joslin

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9 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

15785	Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka]
	Full Idea: We must distinguish between what we are committed to existing in the actual world or a possible world ('ontology'), and what we are committed to as a part of our ways of dealing with the world conceptually, as a part of our conceptual system ('ideology').
	From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02
	A reaction: I think this is the most illuminating idea I have read on the subject of ontological commitment. I'm fighting for the idea that what we think is true should be kept separate from what we think exists. Ideology is a nice addition to the mix.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

15786	Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka]
	Full Idea: Quantification over members of one particular world is a measure of ideology, quantification that crosses possible worlds is often a measure of ideology.
	From: Jaakko Hintikka (Semantics for Propositional Attitudes [1969], p.95), quoted by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 02
	A reaction: I like this. See Idea 15785 for the underlying distinction. It leaves the question open of what we might mean by 'ideological commitment'.

21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions

20400	Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
	Full Idea: Wimsatt and Beardsley claimed that either the intention succeeded, so one does not need to look outside the work for its meaning, or the intention failed, so external evidence does not help.
	From: report of W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946]) by Stephen Davies - The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) 5.3
	A reaction: Actually, the external evidence may tell you much more clearly and accurately what the intention was than the work itself does. The best example may be the title of the work, which is presumably outside the work.

7266	The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: This famous proposal may have been misunderstood. Note that it is a comment about judging the work, not about understanding it. The idea allows for a work being much more successful than the author's humble intentions (e.g. Pepys).

7267	Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: Poetry differs from practical messages, which are successful if and only if we correctly infer the intention.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: I am not convinced by this claim. It is plausible that a work does much more than it intends (Astaire said he danced "to make a buck"), but it is rather odd to rate very highly a work of which you have missed the point.

7268	The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: We ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic speaker, and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: Wrong. If in Browning's "My Last Duchess" (say), we only inferred the mind of the speaker (and his Duchess), and took no interest in Browning's view of things, we would miss the point. We might end up respecting the Duke, which would be daft.

7269	The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The intentional fallacy is a romantic one.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §II)
	A reaction: Wrong. Even with those most famous of anonymous artists, the architects and carvers of medieval cathedrals, without some discernment of the purpose you won't get it. The Taj Mahal is a love letter, not a potential ice cream parlour.

7271	Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The use of biographical evidence need not involve intentionalism, because while it may be evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §IV)
	A reaction: I am very keen to penetrate the author's intentions, but I have always be doubtful about the use of biography as a means to achieve this. Most of the effort to infer intentions must come from a study of the work itself, not introductions, letters etc.

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique

7417	God can't have silly perfections, but how do we decide which ones are 'silly'? [Joslin]
	Full Idea: It is clear that God cannot have all conceivable perfections, because otherwise he would have absurd perfections (like being the perfect prawn sandwich), so a line must be drawn, and how are we to decide which perfections are appropriate and essential?
	From: Jack Joslin (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: This is an excellent question for curbing the absurdities of those who want to load God with every good thing that can possibly be conceived. Is the God who is also a perfect prawn sandwich more perfect than the one who isn't?