Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for W Wimsatt/W Beardsley, Johann Herbart and Richard Cumberland

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13 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
If a decision is in accord with right reason, everyone can agree with it [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: No decision can be in accord with right reason unless all can agree on it.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.V.XLVI)
     A reaction: Personally I think anyone who disagrees with this should get out of philosophy (and into sociology, fantasy fiction, ironic game-playing, crime…). Of course 'can' agree is not the same as 'will' agree. You must have faith that good reasons are persuasive.
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Objects can be beautiful which express nothing at all, such as the rainbow [Herbart, by Tolstoy]
     Full Idea: Objects are often beautiful which express nothing at all, as, for instance, the rainbow, which is beautiful for its lines and colours and not for its mythological connexion with Iris, or Noah's rainbow.
     From: report of Johann Herbart (works [1830]) by Leo Tolstoy - What is Art? Ch.3
     A reaction: A nice counterexample to Tolstoy's own theory. The example is one of a natural beauty, but it would be harder to find examples in human art. How much the artist may feel, though, has little to do with the success of a work of art.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
     Full Idea: Wimsatt and Beardsley claimed that either the intention succeeded, so one does not need to look outside the work for its meaning, or the intention failed, so external evidence does not help.
     From: report of W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946]) by Stephen Davies - The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) 5.3
     A reaction: Actually, the external evidence may tell you much more clearly and accurately what the intention was than the work itself does. The best example may be the title of the work, which is presumably outside the work.
The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: The design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
     A reaction: This famous proposal may have been misunderstood. Note that it is a comment about judging the work, not about understanding it. The idea allows for a work being much more successful than the author's humble intentions (e.g. Pepys).
Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: Poetry differs from practical messages, which are successful if and only if we correctly infer the intention.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
     A reaction: I am not convinced by this claim. It is plausible that a work does much more than it intends (Astaire said he danced "to make a buck"), but it is rather odd to rate very highly a work of which you have missed the point.
The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: We ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic speaker, and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
     A reaction: Wrong. If in Browning's "My Last Duchess" (say), we only inferred the mind of the speaker (and his Duchess), and took no interest in Browning's view of things, we would miss the point. We might end up respecting the Duke, which would be daft.
The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: The intentional fallacy is a romantic one.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §II)
     A reaction: Wrong. Even with those most famous of anonymous artists, the architects and carvers of medieval cathedrals, without some discernment of the purpose you won't get it. The Taj Mahal is a love letter, not a potential ice cream parlour.
Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: The use of biographical evidence need not involve intentionalism, because while it may be evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §IV)
     A reaction: I am very keen to penetrate the author's intentions, but I have always be doubtful about the use of biography as a means to achieve this. Most of the effort to infer intentions must come from a study of the work itself, not introductions, letters etc.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Natural law is supplied to the human mind by reality and human nature [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: Some truths of natural law, concerning guides to moral good and evil, and duties not laid down by civil law and government, are necessarily supplied ot the human mind by the nature of things and of men.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.I)
     A reaction: I agree that some moral truths have the power of self-evidence. If you say they are built into the mind, we now ask what did the building, and evolution is the only answer, and hence we distance ourselves from the truths, seeing them as strategies.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: If there be posited different ultimate ends, whose causes are opposed to each other, then there will be truly good actions likewise opposed to each other, which is impossible.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.V.XVI)
     A reaction: A very interesting argument for there being one good rather than many, and an argument which I don't recall in any surviving Greek text. A response might be to distinguish between what is 'right' and what is 'good'. See David Ross.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
The happiness of individuals is linked to the happiness of everyone (which is individuals taken together) [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: The happiness of each person cannot be separated from the happiness of all, because the whole is no different from the parts taken together.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.VI)
     A reaction: Sounds suspiciously like the fallacy of composition (Idea 6219). An objection to utilitarianism is its assumption that a group of people have a 'total happiness' that is different from their individual states. Still, Cumberland is on to utilitarianism.
The happiness of all contains the happiness of each, and promotes it [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: The common happiness of all contains the greatest happiness for each, and most effectively promotes it. …There is no path leading anyone to his own happiness, other than the path which leads all to the common happiness.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.VI)
     A reaction: I take this as a revolutionary idea, which leads to utilitarianism. It is doing what seemed to the Greeks unthinkable, which is combining hedonism with altruism. There is no proof for it, but it is a wonderful clarion call for building a civil society.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural law is immutable truth giving moral truths and duties independent of society [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: Natural law is certain propositions of immutable truth, which guide voluntary actions about the choice of good and avoidance of evil, and which impose an obligation to act, even without regard to civil laws, and ignoring compacts of governments.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.I)
     A reaction: Not a popular view, but I am sympathetic. If you are in a foreign country and find a person lying in pain, there is a terrible moral deficiency in anyone who just ignores such a thing. No legislation can take away a person's right of self-defence.