Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for W Wimsatt/W Beardsley, Michael Burke and Jennifer Hornsby

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15 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind

16235	Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
	Full Idea: Burke says a single object cannot have incompatible persistence conditions, for this would entail that there are events in which the object would both survive and perish. He says one sortal 'dominates' the other (sweater dominates thread).
	From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.3
	A reaction: This I take to be the most extreme version of sortal essentialism, and strikes me as incredibly gerrymandered and unacceptable. It is just too anthropocentric to count as genuine metaphysics. I may care more about the thread.

14753	The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
	Full Idea: Burke claims that the 'dominant' sortal is the one whose satisfaction entails possession of the widest range of properties. For example, the statue (unlike the lump of clay) also possesses aesthetic properties, and hence is dominant.
	From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.4
	A reaction: [there are three papers by Burke on this; see all the quotations from Burke] Presumably one sortal could entail a single very important property, and the other sortal entail a huge range of trivial properties. What does being a 'thing' entail?

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates

16072	'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
	Full Idea: Burke distinguishes three different readings of 'the rock'. It can be a singular description denoting an object, or a plural description denoting all the little pieces of rock, or a mass description the relevant rocky stuff.
	From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 5
	A reaction: Idea 16068 is an objection to the second reading. Only the first reading seems plausible, so we must just get over all the difficulties philosophers have unearthed about knowing exactly what an 'object' is. I offer you essentialism. Rocks have unity.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail

14751	Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
	Full Idea: Burke argues that Tib (the whole cat apart from its tail) goes out of existence when the tail is lost. His essentialist principle is that if something is ever of a particular sort (such as 'cat') then it is always of that sort. Tib is not initially a cat.
	From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.4
	A reaction: This I take to be a souped up version of Wiggins, and I just don't buy that identity conditions are decided by sortals, when it seems obvious that sortals are parasitic on identities.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay

16071	Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
	Full Idea: On Burke's view, the process of sculpting a lump of clay into a statue destroys one object (a mere lump of clay) and replaces it with another (a statue).
	From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 5
	A reaction: There is something right about this, but how many intermediate objects are created during the transition. It seems to make the notion of an object very conventional.

16234	Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
	Full Idea: Michael Burke argues that a sweater is identical with the thread that consitutes it, that both were created at the moment when they began to coincide, and that the original thread was destroyed in the process.
	From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.3
	A reaction: [Burke's ideas are spread over three articles] It is the thread which is destroyed, because the sweater is the 'dominant sortal' (which strikes me as a particularlyd desperate concept).

13278	Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
	Full Idea: Burke has argued in a series of papers that the lump of clay which constitutes the statue is numerically distinct from the lump of clay which exists before or after the statue exists. The first is a statue, while the second is merely a lump of clay.
	From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Kathrin Koslicki - The Structure of Objects
	A reaction: Koslicki objects that this introduces radically different persistence conditions from normal. It would mean that a pile of sugar was a different pile of sugar every time a grain moved (even slightly). You couldn't step into the same sugar twice.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects

14750	Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
	Full Idea: Michael Burke has given an account that avoids distinguishing coinciding entities. ...The statue/lump satisfies both 'lump' and 'statue', but only the latter determines that object's persistence conditions, and so is that object's 'dominant sortal'.
	From: report of Michael Burke (Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution [1994]) by Theodore Sider - Four Dimensionalism 5.4
	A reaction: Presumably a lump on its own can have its own persistance conditions (as a 'lump'), but those would presumably be lost if you shaped it into a statue. Burke concedes that. Can of worms. Using a book as a doorstop...

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 5. Action as Trying

20082	Bodily movements are not actions, which are really the tryings within bodily movement [Hornsby, by Stout,R]
	Full Idea: Hornsby claims the basic description of action is in terms of trying, that all actions (even means of doing other actions) are actions of trying, and that tryings (and therefore actions) are interior to bodily movements (which are thus not essential).
	From: report of Jennifer Hornsby (Actions [1980]) by Rowland Stout - Action 9 'Trying'
	A reaction: [compression of his summary] There is no regress with explaining the 'action' of trying, because it is proposed that trying is the most basic thing in all actions. If you are paralysed, your trying does not result in action. Too mentalistic?

21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions

20400	Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
	Full Idea: Wimsatt and Beardsley claimed that either the intention succeeded, so one does not need to look outside the work for its meaning, or the intention failed, so external evidence does not help.
	From: report of W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946]) by Stephen Davies - The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) 5.3
	A reaction: Actually, the external evidence may tell you much more clearly and accurately what the intention was than the work itself does. The best example may be the title of the work, which is presumably outside the work.

7266	The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: This famous proposal may have been misunderstood. Note that it is a comment about judging the work, not about understanding it. The idea allows for a work being much more successful than the author's humble intentions (e.g. Pepys).

7267	Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: Poetry differs from practical messages, which are successful if and only if we correctly infer the intention.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: I am not convinced by this claim. It is plausible that a work does much more than it intends (Astaire said he danced "to make a buck"), but it is rather odd to rate very highly a work of which you have missed the point.

7268	The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: We ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic speaker, and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
	A reaction: Wrong. If in Browning's "My Last Duchess" (say), we only inferred the mind of the speaker (and his Duchess), and took no interest in Browning's view of things, we would miss the point. We might end up respecting the Duke, which would be daft.

7269	The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The intentional fallacy is a romantic one.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §II)
	A reaction: Wrong. Even with those most famous of anonymous artists, the architects and carvers of medieval cathedrals, without some discernment of the purpose you won't get it. The Taj Mahal is a love letter, not a potential ice cream parlour.

7271	Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
	Full Idea: The use of biographical evidence need not involve intentionalism, because while it may be evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance.
	From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §IV)
	A reaction: I am very keen to penetrate the author's intentions, but I have always be doubtful about the use of biography as a means to achieve this. Most of the effort to infer intentions must come from a study of the work itself, not introductions, letters etc.