9 ideas
| 5437 | The claim of hermeneutics to give knowledge through understanding is challenged by positivism [Mautner on Dilthey] |
| Full Idea: The claim of hermeneutics to give understanding instead of explanation can be seen as part of the theory of knowledge, but it seems to be incompatible with the most accepted aspects of positivism. | |
| From: comment on Wilhelm Dilthey (works [1883]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.248 | |
| A reaction: So much the worse for positivism. The same conflict occurs in modern philosophy of mind. God can be a positivist if he likes, but we must settle for hermeneutics for a lot of our knowledge. We are discussing method, not ontology. |
| 5436 | Natural science seeks explanation; human sciences seek understanding [Dilthey, by Mautner] |
| Full Idea: In the natural sciences we seek for causes and ask for explanation (erklären), but in the human or cultural sciences we seek understanding (verstehen) by means of interpretation. | |
| From: report of Wilhelm Dilthey (works [1883]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.144 | |
| A reaction: This seems a nice distinction. The prospects of finding the causes or explanations of Shakespeare's plays don't look good, and when you have explained the causes of a chemical reaction you probably have all you need. |
| 4988 | Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false [Kirk,R on Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: It may well be that completed neuroscience will not include a reduction of folk psychology, but why should that be a reason to regard it as false? It would only be a reason if irreducibility entailed that they could not possibly both be true. | |
| From: comment on Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981]) by Robert Kirk - Mind and Body §3.9 | |
| A reaction: If all our behaviour had been explained by a future neuro-science, this might not falsify folk psychology, but it would totally marginalise it. It is still possible that dewdrops are placed on leaves by fairies, but this is no longer a hot theory. |
| 4987 | Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: Eliminative materialism says our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena is a radically false theory, so defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced (rather than reduced). | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981], Intro) | |
| A reaction: It is hard to see what you could replace the idea of a 'belief' with in ordinary conversation. We may reduce beliefs to neuronal phenomena, but we can't drop the vocabulary of the macro-phenomena. The physics of weather doesn't eliminate 'storms'. |
| 7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II) | |
| A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws. |
| 7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
| A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology. |
| 7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
| Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future. | |
| From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177. |
| 22022 | Beauty motivates morality, by harmonising feeling and reason [Schiller, by Pinkard] |
| Full Idea: On Schiller's view, only beauty could shape or evince the necessary harmony between sensibility and reason (between inclination and duty) which provides the crucial motivation for the moral life. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Schiller (works [1794]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 06 | |
| A reaction: Maybe. Reason should probably be drawn towards feelings which seem inspiring. |
| 7675 | Schiller speaks obsessively of freedom throughout his works [Schiller, by Berlin] |
| Full Idea: Schiller constantly speaks of spiritual freedom: freedom of reason, the kingdom of freedom, our free self, inner freedom, freedom of mind, moral freedom, the free intelligence - a very favourite phrase - holy freedom, the impregnable citadel of freedom. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Schiller (works [1794]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism | |
| A reaction: Kant's philosophy and his Kingdom of Ends are an obvious source for this, but I trace the sentiment back to 'Freeborn John' Lilburne during the English Civil War. The English, thanks to Voltaire, embodied freedom in the Enlightenment. |