100 ideas
22659 | It is wisdom to believe what you desire, because belief is needed to achieve it [James] |
Full Idea: Clearly it is often the part of wisdom to believe what one desires; for the belief is one of indispensable preliminary conditions of the realisation of its object. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.43) | |
A reaction: Roughly, action is impossible without optimism about possible success. This may count as instinct, rather than 'wisdom'. |
4697 | There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The Social Turn is as defining a characteristic of contemporary philosophy as the Linguistic Turn has been of the earlier twentieth century period. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: A helpful observation. It ties in with externalism about concepts (Twin Earth), impossibility of Private Language, and externalism about knowledge. |
22657 | All good philosophers start from a dumb conviction about which truths can be revealed [James] |
Full Idea: Every philosopher whose initiative counts for anything in the evolution of thought has taken his stand on a sort of dumb conviction that the truth must lie in one direction rather than another, and a preliminary assurance that this can be made to work. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.40) | |
A reaction: I would refer to this as 'intuition', which I think of as reasons (probably good reasons) which cannot yet be articulated. Hence I like this idea very much, except for the word 'dumb'. It is more like a rational vision, yet to be filled in. |
22647 | A complete system is just a classification of the whole world's ingredients [James] |
Full Idea: A completed theoretic philosophy can never be anything more than a completed classification of the world's ingredients. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.23) | |
A reaction: I assume this is not just the physical ingredients, but must also include our conceptual scheme - but then we must first decide which is the best conceptual scheme to classify, and that's where the real action is. [He scorns such classifation later]. |
4731 | Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The four basic principles of rationality are 1) avoid contradiction, 2) enhance coherence, 3) avoid ignoring evidence, and 4) maximise evidence. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: I like this, and can't think of any additions. 'Coherence' is the vaguest of the conditions. Maximising evidence is still the driving force of science, even if it does sound quaintly positivist. |
22648 | A single explanation must have a single point of view [James] |
Full Idea: A single explanation of a fact only explains it from a single point of view. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.23) | |
A reaction: I take this to imply that multiple viewpoints lead us towards objectivity. The single viewpoint of an expert is of much greater value than that of a novice, on the whole. |
22642 | Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James] |
Full Idea: After man's interest in breathing freely, the greatest of all his interests (because it never fluctuates or remits….) is his interest in consistency, in feeling that what he now thinks goes with what he thinks on other occasions. | |
From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Seventh') | |
A reaction: People notoriously contradict themselves all the time, but I suspect that it is when they get out of their depth in complexities such as politics. They probably achieve great consistency within their own expertise, and in common knowledge. |
22644 | Our greatest pleasure is the economy of reducing chaotic facts to one single fact [James] |
Full Idea: Our pleasure at finding that a chaos of facts is the expression of single underlying fact is like a musician's relief at discovering harmony. …The passion for economy of means in thought is the philosophic passion par excellence. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.21) | |
A reaction: We do, though, possess an inner klaxon warning against stupid simplistic reductions. Reducing all the miseries of life to the workings of the Devil is not satisfactory, even it it is economical. Simplicities are dangerously tempting. |
4735 | Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: A map that is identical in all respects with that which is mapped is just useless. So reductionism is not just a good thing - it is essential to thought. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: A useful warning, when thinking about truth. It is folly to want your thoughts to exactly correspond to reality. I want to understand the world, but not if it requires being the world. |
4701 | To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Weak alethic relativism holds that while a statement may be true in one framework, it is inexpressible in another. Strong alethic relativism is where a sentence is true relative to one framework, but false relative to another. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The weak version will be Kuhn's 'incommensurability' of scientific theories, while the strong version will be full Protagorean relativism, saying all beliefs are true. |
4703 | The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality'. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Dangerous nonsense. This leaves truth shifting as our theories change, it leads to different truths in different cultures, and no palpable falsehood in ignorant cultures. Don't give it house-room. |
6710 | You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James] |
Full Idea: Pragmatism insists that statements and beliefs are inertly and statically true only by courtesy: they practically pass for true; but you cannot define what you mean by calling them true without referring to their functional possibilities. | |
From: William James (The Meaning of the Word "Truth" [1907], p.2) | |
A reaction: I think this clarifies an objection to pragmatism, because all functional definitions (e.g. of the mind, or of moral behaviour) are preceded by the question of WHY this thing is able to function in this way. What special quality makes this possible? |
18986 | Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James] |
Full Idea: Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification-processes, just as 'health' is a name for other processes in life. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: So the slogan is 'truth is success in belief'? Suicide and racist genocide can be 'successful'. I would have thought that truth was the end of a process, rather than the process itself. |
18983 | In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James] |
Full Idea: When you speak of the 'time-keeping function' of a clock, it is hard to see exactly what your ideas can copy. ...Where our ideas cannot copy definitely their object, what does agreement with that object mean? | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: This is a very good criticism of the correspondence theory of truth. It looks a lovely theory when you can map components of a sentence (like 'the pen is in the drawer') onto components of reality - but it has to cover the hard cases. |
18972 | Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James] |
Full Idea: Pragmatists say that ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: I'm struck by the close similarity (at least in James) of the pragmatic view of truth and the coherence theory of truth (associated later with Blanshard). Perhaps the coherence theory is one version of the pragmatic account |
18973 | New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James] |
Full Idea: A new opinion counts as 'true' just in proportion as it gratifies the individual's desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs in stock. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: Note the tell-tale locution 'counts as' true, rather than 'is' true. The obvious problem is that someone with a big stock of foolish beliefs will 'count as' true some bad interpretation which is gratifyingly assimilated to their current confusions. |
22305 | If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James] |
Full Idea: On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. | |
From: William James (The Meaning of the Word "Truth" [1907], p.299), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 35 'Prag' | |
A reaction: How you get from 'widely satisfactory' to 'true' is beyond my comprehension. This is dangerous nonsense. This view of truth seems to be a commonplace in American culture. Peirce hurray! James boo! James accepted verification, where possible. |
18984 | True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James] |
Full Idea: True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: The immediate question is why you should label something as 'false' simply on the grounds that you can't corroborate it. Proving the falsity is a stronger position than the ignorance James seems happy with. 'Assimilate' implies coherence. |
15716 | If axioms and their implications have no contradictions, they pass my criterion of truth and existence [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: If the arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict each other with all their consequences, then they are true and the things defined by the axioms exist. For me this is the criterion of truth and existence. | |
From: David Hilbert (Letter to Frege 29.12.1899 [1899]), quoted by R Kaplan / E Kaplan - The Art of the Infinite 2 'Mind' | |
A reaction: If an axiom says something equivalent to 'fairies exist, but they are totally undetectable', this would seem to avoid contradiction with anything, and hence be true. Hilbert's idea sounds crazy to me. He developed full Formalism later. |
4705 | Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Logical relativism emerges if one defends the existence of two or more rival systems that one may legitimately choose between, or move back and forth between. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: All my instincts rebel against this possibility. All of Aristotle's and Kant's philosophy would be rendered meaningless. Obviously you can create artificial logics (like games), but I believe there is a truth logic. (Pathetic, isn't it?) |
4700 | A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Suggestions for a third value for truth are "indeterminate", or a scale running from "true", through "mostly true", "mainly true", "half true", "mainly false", "mostly false", to "false", or maybe even "0.56 true". | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Anything on a sliding scale sounds wrong, as it seems to be paracitic on an underlying fixed idea of 'true'. "Indeterminate", though, seems just right for the truth of predictions ('sea-fight tomorrow'). |
18844 | You would cripple mathematics if you denied Excluded Middle [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: Taking the principle of Excluded Middle away from the mathematician would be the same, say, as prohibiting the astronomer from using the telescope or the boxer from using his fists. | |
From: David Hilbert (The Foundations of Mathematics [1927], p.476), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 9.4 | |
A reaction: [p.476 in Van Heijenoort] |
4704 | Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: While Russell and Whitehead used five primitive logical symbols in their system, Wittgenstein suggested in his 'Tractatus' that this be reduced to one. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This certainly captures why Russell was so impressed by him. In retrospect what looked like progress presumably now looks like the beginning of the collapse of the enterprise. |
17963 | The facts of geometry, arithmetic or statics order themselves into theories [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The facts of geometry order themselves into a geometry, the facts of arithmetic into a theory of numbers, the facts of statics, electrodynamics into a theory of statics, electrodynamics, or the facts of the physics of gases into a theory of gases. | |
From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [03]) | |
A reaction: This is the confident (I would say 'essentialist') view of axioms, which received a bit of a setback with Gödel's Theorems. I certainly agree that the world proposes an order to us - we don't just randomly invent one that suits us. |
17966 | Axioms must reveal their dependence (or not), and must be consistent [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: If a theory is to serve its purpose of orienting and ordering, it must first give us an overview of the independence and dependence of its propositions, and second give a guarantee of the consistency of all of the propositions. | |
From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [09]) | |
A reaction: Gödel's Second theorem showed that the theory can never prove its own consistency, which made the second Hilbert requirement more difficult. It is generally assumed that each of the axioms must be independent of the others. |
12456 | I aim to establish certainty for mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The goal of my theory is to establish once and for all the certitude of mathematical methods. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184) | |
A reaction: This is the clearest statement of the famous Hilbert Programme, which is said to have been brought to an abrupt end by Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. |
8717 | Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) [Hilbert, by Friend] |
Full Idea: Hilbert wanted to derive ideal mathematics from the secure, paradox-free, finite mathematics (known as 'Hilbert's Programme'). ...Note that for the realist consistency is not something we need to prove; it is a precondition of thought. | |
From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900], 6.7) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: I am an intuitive realist, though I am not so sure about that on cautious reflection. Compare the claims that there are reasons or causes for everything. Reality cannot contain contradicitions (can it?). Contradictions would be our fault. |
12461 | We believe all mathematical problems are solvable [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The thesis that every mathematical problem is solvable - we are all convinced that it really is so. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.200) | |
A reaction: This will include, for example, Goldbach's Conjecture (every even is the sum of two primes), which is utterly simple but with no proof anywhere in sight. |
13472 | Hilbert aimed to eliminate number from geometry [Hilbert, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: One of Hilbert's aims in 'The Foundations of Geometry' was to eliminate number [as measure of lengths and angles] from geometry. | |
From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 2 | |
A reaction: Presumably this would particularly have to include the elimination of ratios (rather than actual specific lengths). |
9633 | No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.191), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics | |
A reaction: This is Hilbert's famous refusal to accept any account of mathematics, such as Kant's, which excludes actual infinities. Cantor had laid out a whole glorious hierarchy of different infinities. |
12460 | We extend finite statements with ideal ones, in order to preserve our logic [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: To preserve the simple formal rules of ordinary Aristotelian logic, we must supplement the finitary statements with ideal statements. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.195) | |
A reaction: I find very appealing the picture of mathematics as rooted in the physical world, and then gradually extended by a series of 'idealisations', which should perhaps be thought of as fictions. |
12462 | Only the finite can bring certainty to the infinite [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: Operating with the infinite can be made certain only by the finitary. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.201) | |
A reaction: See 'Compactness' for one aspect of this claim. I think Hilbert was fighting a rearguard action, and his idea now has few followers. |
12455 | The idea of an infinite totality is an illusion [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: Just as in the limit processes of the infinitesimal calculus, the infinitely large and small proved to be a mere figure of speech, so too we must realise that the infinite in the sense of an infinite totality, used in deductive methods, is an illusion. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184) | |
A reaction: This is a very authoritative rearguard action. I no longer think the dispute matters much, it being just a dispute over a proposed new meaning for the word 'number'. |
12457 | There is no continuum in reality to realise the infinitely small [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: A homogeneous continuum which admits of the sort of divisibility needed to realise the infinitely small is nowhere to be found in reality. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.186) | |
A reaction: He makes this remark as a response to Planck's new quantum theory (the year before the big works of Heisenberg and Schrödinger). Personally I don't see why infinities should depend on the physical world, since they are imaginary. |
17967 | To decide some questions, we must study the essence of mathematical proof itself [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: It is necessary to study the essence of mathematical proof itself if one wishes to answer such questions as the one about decidability in a finite number of operations. | |
From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [53]) |
9546 | Euclid axioms concerns possibilities of construction, but Hilbert's assert the existence of objects [Hilbert, by Chihara] |
Full Idea: Hilbert's geometrical axioms were existential in character, asserting the existence of certain geometrical objects (points and lines). Euclid's postulates do not assert the existence of anything; they assert the possibility of certain constructions. | |
From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 01.1 | |
A reaction: Chihara says geometry was originally understood modally, but came to be understood existentially. It seems extraordinary to me that philosophers of mathematics can have become more platonist over the centuries. |
18742 | Hilbert's formalisation revealed implicit congruence axioms in Euclid [Hilbert, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
Full Idea: In his formal investigation of Euclidean geometry, Hilbert uncovered congruence axioms that implicitly played a role in Euclid's proofs but were not explicitly recognised. | |
From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R - Mathematical Methods in Philosophy 2 | |
A reaction: The writers are offering this as a good example of the benefits of a precise and formal approach to foundational questions. It's hard to disagree, but dispiriting if you need a PhD in maths before you can start doing philosophy. |
18217 | Hilbert's geometry is interesting because it captures Euclid without using real numbers [Hilbert, by Field,H] |
Full Idea: Hilbert's formulation of the Euclidean theory is of special interest because (besides being rigorously axiomatised) it does not employ the real numbers in the axioms. | |
From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by Hartry Field - Science without Numbers 3 | |
A reaction: Notice that this job was done by Hilbert, and not by the fictionalist Hartry Field. |
17965 | The whole of Euclidean geometry derives from a basic equation and transformations [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The linearity of the equation of the plane and of the orthogonal transformation of point-coordinates is completely adequate to produce the whole broad science of spatial Euclidean geometry purely by means of analysis. | |
From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [05]) | |
A reaction: This remark comes from the man who succeeded in producing modern axioms for geometry (in 1897), so he knows what he is talking about. We should not be wholly pessimistic about Hilbert's ambitious projects. He had to dig deeper than this idea... |
17964 | Number theory just needs calculation laws and rules for integers [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The laws of calculation and the rules of integers suffice for the construction of number theory. | |
From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [05]) | |
A reaction: This is the confident Hilbert view that the whole system can be fully spelled out. Gödel made this optimism more difficult. |
17697 | The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The standpoint of pure experience seems to me to be refuted by the objection that the existence, possible or actual, of an arbitrarily large number can never be derived through experience, that is, through experiment. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic [1904], p.130) | |
A reaction: Alternatively, empiricism refutes infinite numbers! No modern mathematician will accept that, but you wonder in what sense the proposed entities qualify as 'numbers'. |
17698 | Logic already contains some arithmetic, so the two must be developed together [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: In the traditional exposition of the laws of logic certain fundamental arithmetic notions are already used, for example in the notion of set, and to some extent also of number. Thus we turn in a circle, and a partly simultaneous development is required. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic [1904], p.131) | |
A reaction: If the Axiom of Infinity is meant, it may be possible to purge the arithmetic from the logic. Then the challenge to derive arithmetic from it becomes rather tougher. |
10113 | The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The solid philosophical attitude that I think is required for the grounding of pure mathematics is this: In the beginning was the sign. | |
From: David Hilbert (works [1900]), quoted by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: Why did people invent those particular signs? Presumably they were meant to designate something, in the world or in our experience. |
10115 | Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Hilbert replaced a semantic construal of inconsistency (that the theory entails a statement that is necessarily false) by a syntactic one (that the theory formally derives the statement (0 =1 ∧ 0 not-= 1). | |
From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: Finding one particular clash will pinpoint the notion of inconsistency, but it doesn't seem to define what it means, since the concept has very wide application. |
22293 | Hilbert said (to block paradoxes) that mathematical existence is entailed by consistency [Hilbert, by Potter] |
Full Idea: Hilbert proposed to circuvent the paradoxes by means of the doctrine (already proposed by Poincaré) that in mathematics consistency entails existence. | |
From: report of David Hilbert (On the Concept of Number [1900], p.183) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 19 'Exist' | |
A reaction: Interesting. Hilbert's idea has struck me as weird, but it makes sense if its main motive is to block the paradoxes. Roughly, the idea is 'it exists if it isn't paradoxical'. A low bar for existence (but then it is only in mathematics!). |
12459 | The subject matter of mathematics is immediate and clear concrete symbols [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The subject matter of mathematics is the concrete symbols themselves whose structure is immediately clear and recognisable. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.192) | |
A reaction: I don't think many people will agree with Hilbert here. Does he mean token-symbols or type-symbols? You can do maths in your head, or with different symbols. If type-symbols, you have to explain what a type is. |
10116 | Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: Hilbert's project was to establish the consistency of classical mathematics using just finitary means, to convince all parties that no contradictions will follow from employing the infinitary notions and reasoning. | |
From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: This is the project which was badly torpedoed by Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. |
18112 | Mathematics divides in two: meaningful finitary statements, and empty idealised statements [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: We can conceive mathematics to be a stock of two kinds of formulas: first, those to which the meaningful communications of finitary statements correspond; and secondly, other formulas which signify nothing and which are ideal structures of our theory. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.196), quoted by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.1 |
4711 | Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The anti-realist says we have theories about the world that are incompatible with each other, and irreducible to each other. They often cite wave-particle duality, which postulate incompatible properties to reality. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Most physicists, of course, hate this duality, precisely because they can't conceive how the two properties could be real. I say realism comes first, and the theories must try to accommodate that assumption. |
4698 | What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: What counts as a fact partly depends on human input, such as the availability of concepts to describe such facts. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: The point must be taken. I am happy to generalise about 'The Facts', meaning 'whatever is the case', but the individuation of specific facts is bound to hit the current problem. |
22641 | Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James] |
Full Idea: Realities are not true, they are; and beliefs are true of them. | |
From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth') | |
A reaction: At last, a remark by James about truth which I really like. For 'realities' I would use the word 'facts'. |
22649 | Classification can only ever be for a particular purpose [James] |
Full Idea: Every way of classifying a thing is but a way of handling it for some particular purpose. Conceptions, 'kinds', are teleological instruments. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.24) | |
A reaction: Could there not be ways of classifying which suit all of our purposes? If there were a naturally correct way to classifying things, then any pragmatist would probably welcome that. (I don't say there is such a way). |
4715 | We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Those defending the claim that objects exist with identity conditions not imposed by us, do not have to say that there is just one account of those objects possible. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This seems right, but the test question is whether the mind of God contains a single unified theory/account. Are multiple accounts the result of human inadequacy? Yes, I surmise. |
18987 | A 'thing' is simply carved out of reality for human purposes [James] |
Full Idea: What shall we call a 'thing' anyhow? It seems quite arbitrary, for we carve out everything, just as we carve out constellations, to suit our human purposes. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 7) | |
A reaction: James wrote just before the discovery of galaxies, which are much more obviously 'things' than constellations like the Plough are! This idea suggests a connection between pragmatism and the nihilist view of objects of Van Inwagen and co. |
18981 | 'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James] |
Full Idea: 'Substance' appears now only as another name for the fact that phenomena as they come are actually grouped and given in coherent forms. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 4) | |
A reaction: This is the strongly empirical strain in James's empiricism. This sounds like a David Lewis comment on the Humean mosaic of experience. We Aristotelians at least believe that the groups run much deeper than the surface of experience. |
4719 | Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: A weaker form of relativism holds that developments in logic, in maths and in geometry have shown how a relativised notion of the a priori is possible. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is non-Euclidean geometry, and multiple formalisations of logic. Personally I don't believe it. You can expand these subjects, and pursue whimsical speculations, but I have faith in their stable natural core. Neo-Platonism. |
18974 | Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James] |
Full Idea: Truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. The true is whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: The trouble is that false optimism can often often be what is 'good in the way of belief'. That said, I think quite a good way to specify 'truth' is 'success in belief', but I mean intrinsically successful, not pragmatically successful. |
9636 | My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: The goal of my theory is to establish once and for all the certitude of mathematical methods. | |
From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This dream is famous for being shattered by Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem a mere six years later. Neverless there seem to be more limited certainties which are accepted in mathematics. The certainty of the whole of arithmetic is beyond us. |
4720 | Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The reason sense-data were immune from doubt was because they were so primitive; they were unstructured and below the level of conceptualisation. Once they were given structure and conceptualised, they were no longer safe from sceptical challenge. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The question of whether sense-data are conceptualised doesn't have to be all-or-nothing. As concepts creep in, so does scepticism, but so what? Sensible philosophers live with scepticism, like a mad aunt in the attic. |
18989 | Pragmatism accepts any hypothesis which has useful consequences [James] |
Full Idea: On pragmatic principles we cannot reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow from it. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 8) | |
A reaction: Most governments seem to find lies more useful than the truth. Maybe most children are better off not knowing the truth about their parents. It might be disastrous to know the truth about what other people are thinking. Is 'useful but false' meaningful? |
4722 | Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The two dichotomies which set the agenda in contemporary epistemology are the foundationalist-coherentist debate, and the internalist-externalist debate. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Helpful. Roughly, foundationalists are often externalists (if they are empiricists), and coherentists are often internalists (esp. if they are rationalists). An eccentric combination would make a good PhD. |
4724 | Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Internalism about justification says that the reasons one has for a belief must be in some sense available to the knowing subject, ..while externalism holds that it is possible for a person to have a justified belief without having access to the reason. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: It strikes me that internalists are talking about the believer being justified, and externalists talk about the belief being justified. I'm with the internalists. If this means cats don't know much, so much the worse for cats. |
4723 | Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Coherentist justification is more than absence of contradictions, and will involve issues like explanatory support and evidential support, and perhaps issues about probability and confirmation too. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Something like this is obviously essential. Is the notion of 'relevance' also needed (e.g. to avoid the raven paradox of induction)? Coherence of justification will combine with correspondence for truth. |
22640 | We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James] |
Full Idea: We find satisfaction in consistency between the present idea and the entire rest of our mental equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and that of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock previously acquired truths. | |
From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth') | |
A reaction: I like this, apart from the idea that the criterion of good coherence seems to be subjective 'satisfaction'. We should ask why some large set of beliefs is coherent. I assume nature is coherent, and truth is the best explanation of our coherence about it. |
4709 | Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Ontological relativists are anti-realists in the strong sense; they hold as meaningless the view that our theories carve nature at the joints. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints my disagreement with such relativism, as it seems obvious to me that nature has 'joints', and that we would agree with any sensible alien about lots of things. |
4725 | Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Contextualist about knowledge say that "to know" means different things in different context. For example, a warehouse may be empty for a furniture owner, but not for a bacteriologist or a physicist. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: There is obviously some truth in this, but we might say that 'empty' is a secondary quality, or that 'empty for furniture' is not relative. We needn't accept relativism here. |
22655 | Scientific genius extracts more than other people from the same evidence [James] |
Full Idea: What is the use of being a genius, unless with the same scientific evidence as other men, one can reach more truth than they? | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.40) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Clifford's famous principle. He isn't actually contraverting the principle, but it is a nice point about evidence. Simple empiricists think detectives only have to stare at the evidence and the solution creates itself. |
22658 | Experimenters assume the theory is true, and stick to it as long as result don't disappoint [James] |
Full Idea: Each tester of the truth of a theory …acts as if it were true, and expects the result to disappoint him if his assumption is false. The longer disappointment is delayed, the stronger grows his faith in his theory. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.42) | |
A reaction: This is almost exactly Popper's falsificationist proposal for science, which interestingly shows the close relationship of his view to pragmatism. Believe it as long as it is still working. |
18971 | Theories are practical tools for progress, not answers to enigmas [James] |
Full Idea: Theories are instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest. We don't lie back upon them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid. Pragmatism unstiffens all our theories, limbers them up and sets each one to work. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: This follows his criticism of the quest for 'solving names' - big words that give bogus solutions to problems. James's view is not the same as 'instrumentalism', though he would probably sympathise with that view. The defines theories badly. |
18985 | True thoughts are just valuable instruments of action [James] |
Full Idea: The possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of action. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: It looks to me like we should distinguish 'active' and 'passive' instrumentalism. The passive version says there is no more to theories and truth than what instruments record. James's active version says truth is an instrument for doing things well. |
18982 | Pragmatism says all theories are instrumental - that is, mental modes of adaptation to reality [James] |
Full Idea: The pragmatist view is that all our theories are instrumental, are mental modes of adaptation to reality, rather than revelations or gnostic answers to some divinely instituted world enigma. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 5) | |
A reaction: This treats instrumentalism as the pragmatic idea of theories as what works (and nothing more), with, presumably, no interest in grasping something called 'reality'. Presumably instrumentalism might have other motivations - such as fun. |
4732 | One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: It is possible to conceive of one understanding the meaning of a realm of ideas, but holding that one cannot judge as to the truth or rationality of the claims made in it. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: I think Davidson gives good grounds for challenging this, by doubt whether one 'conceptual scheme' can know another without grasping its rationality and truth-conditions. |
22654 | We can't know if the laws of nature are stable, but we must postulate it or assume it [James] |
Full Idea: That nature will follow tomorrow the same laws that she follows today is a truth which no man can know; but in the interests of cognition as well as of action we must postulate or assume it. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.39) | |
A reaction: The stability of nature is something to be assessed, not something taken for granted. If you arrive in a new city and it all seems quiet, you keep your fingers crossed and treat it as stable. But revolution or coup could be just round the corner. |
22656 | Trying to assess probabilities by mere calculation is absurd and impossible [James] |
Full Idea: The absurd abstraction of an intellect verbally formulating all its evidence and carefully estimating the probability thereof solely by the size of a vulgar fraction, is as ideally inept as it is practically impossible. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.40) | |
A reaction: James probably didn't know about Bayes, but this is directed at the Bayesian approach. My view is that full rational assessment of coherence is a much better bet than a Bayesian calculation. Factors must be weighted. |
22646 | We have a passion for knowing the parts of something, rather than the whole [James] |
Full Idea: Alongside the passion for simplification …is the passion for distinguishing; it is the passion to be acquainted with the parts rather than to comprehend the whole. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.22) | |
A reaction: As I child I dismantled almost every toy I was given. This seems to be the motivation for a lot of analytic philosophy, but Aristotle also tended to think that way. |
22652 | The mind has evolved entirely for practical interests, seen in our reflex actions [James] |
Full Idea: It is far too little recognised how entirely the intellect is built up of practical interests. The theory of evolution is beginning to do very good service by its reduction of all mentality to the type of reflex action. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.34) | |
A reaction: Hands evolved for manipulating tools end up playing the piano. Minds evolved for action can be afflicted with boredom. He's not wrong, but he is risking the etymological fallacy (origin = purpose). I take navigation to be the original purpose of mind. |
22651 | Dogs' curiosity only concerns what will happen next [James] |
Full Idea: A dog's curiosity about the movements of his master or a strange object only extends as far as the point of what is going to happen next. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.31) | |
A reaction: Good. A nice corrective to people like myself who are tempted to inflate animal rationality, in order to emphasise human evolutionary continuity with them. It is hard to disagree with his observation. But dogs do make judgements! True/false! |
9286 | Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James] |
Full Idea: Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and not a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, is best explained by their relations to one another, the relations being experiences. | |
From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], §3) | |
A reaction: This view has suddenly caught people's interest. It might be better than the higher/lower relationship, which seems to leave the basic problem untouched. Does a whole network of relations between experiences gradually 'add up' to consciousness? |
9285 | 'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James] |
Full Idea: 'Consciousness' is the name of a nonentity. ..Those who cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumour left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy. ..I deny that it stands for an entity, but it does stand for a function. | |
From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], Intro) | |
A reaction: This kind of view is often treated as being preposterous, but I think it is correct. No one is denying the phenomenology, but it is the ontology which is at stake. Either you are a substance dualist, or mind must be eliminated as an 'entity'. |
23981 | Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James] |
Full Idea: Can one fancy a state of rage and picture no flushing of the face, no dilation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action? …A purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity. | |
From: William James (What is an Emotion? [1884], p.194), quoted by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 3 'Bodily' | |
A reaction: Plausible for rage, but less so for irritation or admiration. Goldie thinks James is wrong. James says if intellectual feelings don't become bodily then they don't qualify as emotions. No True Scotsman! |
22650 | How can the ground of rationality be itself rational? [James] |
Full Idea: Can that which is the ground of rationality in all else be itself properly called rational? | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.25) | |
A reaction: This is the perennial problem in deciding grounds, and in deciding what to treat as primitive. The stoics see the whole of nature as rational. Cf how can the ground of what is physical be itself physical? |
22643 | It seems that we feel rational when we detect no irrationality [James] |
Full Idea: I think there are very good grounds for upholding the view that the feeling of rationality is constituted merely by the absence of any feelings of irrationality. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.20) | |
A reaction: A very interesting proposal. Nothing is more basic to logic (well, plausible versions of logic) than the principle of non-contradiction - perhaps because it is the foundation of our natural intellectual equipment. |
18975 | We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James] |
Full Idea: Concepts for the pragmatist are things to come back into experience with, things to make us look for differences. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: That's good. I like both halves of this. Experience gives us the concepts, but then we 'come back' into experience equipped with them. Presumably animals can look for differences, but concepts enhance that hugely. Know the names of the flowers. |
4710 | Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: Verificationism came under attack from empiricists who were friendly to the banishment of traditional metaphysics, but unfriendly to the analytic-synthetic distinction, on which the idea of a 'factual statement' depended. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I don't accept this move because I don't consider the 'facts' to be language-dependent. They are pre-linguistic, they outrun that capacity of our language, and they are available to animals. |
4717 | If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: There may be no way to avoid scepticism about meaning if you abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction in the way Quine does. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: My suspicion was always that Quine's proposal began the slippery road to hell. It appears to be pragmatists who are most drawn to Quine's idea. The proposal that all my analytic propositions could be treated as synthetic totally baffles me. |
4706 | Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: In his earlier work, Quine defended the view that no belief (including logic) is in principle unrevisable, but in his later work (1970) he took the conservative view that we would always impute mistranslation rather than deviancy. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I take it he was influenced by Davidson's 'principle of charity'. He says that if someone asserts 'p and not-p', we would assume a misunderstanding of 'and' or 'not'. |
4734 | Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: It makes sense to think that one could recognise that something is a language without necessarily being able to translate it; cryptographers do this all the time. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Maybe, but cryptographers usually have a lot of context to work with. If we met extraterrestrials if might not be so clear. One can only spot patterns, and crystals have those. |
22660 | Evolution suggests prevailing or survival as a new criterion of right and wrong [James] |
Full Idea: The philosophy of evolution offers us today a new criterion, which is objective and fixed, as an ethical test between right and wrong: That is to be called good which is destined to prevail or survive. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.44) | |
A reaction: Perceptive for its time. Herbert Spencer may have suggested the idea. James dismisses it, because it implies a sort of fatalism, whereas genuine moral choices are involved in what survives. |
6570 | Imagine millions made happy on condition that one person suffers endless lonely torture [James] |
Full Idea: Consider a case in which millions could be made permanently happy on the one simple condition that a certain lost soul on the far-off edge of things should lead a life of lonely torture. | |
From: William James (The Will to Believe [1896], p.188), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be one of the earliest pinpointings of a key problem with utilitiarianism, which is that other values than happiness (in this case, fairness) seem to be utterly overruled. If we ignore fairness, why shouldn't we ignore happiness? |
22645 | Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James] |
Full Idea: The knowledge of things by their causes, which is often given as a definition of rational knowledge, is useless unless the causes converge to a minimum number, while still producing the maximum number of effects. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.21) | |
A reaction: This is certainly the psychological motivation for trying to identify 'the' cause of something, but James always tries to sell such things as subjective. 'Useless' to one person is a subjective criterion; useless to anyone is much more objective. |
17968 | By digging deeper into the axioms we approach the essence of sciences, and unity of knowedge [Hilbert] |
Full Idea: By pushing ahead to ever deeper layers of axioms ...we also win ever-deeper insights into the essence of scientific thought itself, and become ever more conscious of the unity of our knowledge. | |
From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [56]) | |
A reaction: This is the less fashionable idea that scientific essentialism can also be applicable in the mathematic sciences, centring on the project of axiomatisation for logic, arithmetic, sets etc. |
18980 | If there is a 'greatest knower', it doesn't follow that they know absolutely everything [James] |
Full Idea: The greatest knower of them all may yet not know the whole of everything, or even know what he does know at one single stroke: - he may be liable to forget. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 4) | |
A reaction: And that's before you get to the problem of how the greatest knower could possibly know whether or not they knew absolutely everything, or whether there might be some fact which was irremediably hidden from them. |
18978 | It is hard to grasp a cosmic mind which produces such a mixture of goods and evils [James] |
Full Idea: We can with difficulty comprehend the character of a cosmic mind whose purposes are fully revealed by the strange mixture of good and evils that we find in this actual world's particulars. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: And, of course, what counts as 'goods' or 'evils' seems to have a highly relative aspect to it. To claim that really it is all good is massive hope based on flimsy evidence. |
18991 | If the God hypothesis works well, then it is true [James] |
Full Idea: On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 8) | |
A reaction: The truth of God's existence certainly is a challenging test case for the pragmatic theory of truth, and James really bites the bullet here. Pragmatism may ultimately founder on the impossibility of specifying what 'works satisfactorily' means. |
18977 | The wonderful design of a woodpecker looks diabolical to its victims [James] |
Full Idea: To the grub under the bark the exquisite fitness of the woodpecker's organism to extract him would certainly argue a diabolical designer. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: What an elegant sentence! The huge problem for religious people who accept (probably reluctantly) evolution by natural selection is the moral nature of the divine being who could use such a ruthless method of design. |
18979 | Things with parts always have some structure, so they always appear to be designed [James] |
Full Idea: The parts of things must always make some definite resultant, be it chaotic or harmonious. When we look at what has actually come, the conditions must always appear perfectly designed to ensure it. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: In so far as the design argument is an analogy with human affairs, we can't deny that high levels of order suggest an organising mind, and mere chaos suggests a coincidence of unco-ordinated forces. |
18976 | Private experience is the main evidence for God [James] |
Full Idea: I myself believe that the evidence for God lies primarily in inner personal experience. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: There is not much you can say to someone who claims incontrovertible evidence which is utterly private to themselves. Does total absence of private religious experience count as evidence on the subject? |
22653 | Early Christianity says God recognises the neglected weak and tender impulses [James] |
Full Idea: In what did the emancipating message of primitive Christianity consist but in the announcement that God recognizes those weak and tender impulses which paganism had so rudely overlooked. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.36) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche says these are the virtues of a good slave. Previous virtues were dominated by military needs, but the new virtues are those of large cities, where communal living with strangers is the challenge. |
18990 | Nirvana means safety from sense experience, and hindus and buddhists are just afraid of life [James] |
Full Idea: Nirvana means safety from the everlasting round of adventures of which the world of sense consists. The hindoo and the buddhist for this is essentially their attitude, are simply afraid, afraid of more experience, afraid of life. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 8) | |
A reaction: Wonderfully American! From what I have seen of eastern thought, including Taoism, I agree with James, in general. There is a rejection of knowledge and of human life which I find shocking. I suspect it is a defence mechanism for downtrodden people. |
4727 | The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas [O'Grady] |
Full Idea: The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas. | |
From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The other problem is trying to find grounds for sticking to the object of one's faith, rather than changing from time to time. |