132 ideas
22659 | It is wisdom to believe what you desire, because belief is needed to achieve it [James] |
Full Idea: Clearly it is often the part of wisdom to believe what one desires; for the belief is one of indispensable preliminary conditions of the realisation of its object. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.43) | |
A reaction: Roughly, action is impossible without optimism about possible success. This may count as instinct, rather than 'wisdom'. |
22657 | All good philosophers start from a dumb conviction about which truths can be revealed [James] |
Full Idea: Every philosopher whose initiative counts for anything in the evolution of thought has taken his stand on a sort of dumb conviction that the truth must lie in one direction rather than another, and a preliminary assurance that this can be made to work. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.40) | |
A reaction: I would refer to this as 'intuition', which I think of as reasons (probably good reasons) which cannot yet be articulated. Hence I like this idea very much, except for the word 'dumb'. It is more like a rational vision, yet to be filled in. |
22647 | A complete system is just a classification of the whole world's ingredients [James] |
Full Idea: A completed theoretic philosophy can never be anything more than a completed classification of the world's ingredients. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.23) | |
A reaction: I assume this is not just the physical ingredients, but must also include our conceptual scheme - but then we must first decide which is the best conceptual scheme to classify, and that's where the real action is. [He scorns such classifation later]. |
8558 | One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: There is a system of internally related concepts containing the notion of a property, the notion of a causal power, the concept of an event, the concept of similarity, and the concept of a persisting substance. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §07) | |
A reaction: A nice example of a modern metaphysical system, one which I find fairly congenial. His notion of events is Kim's, which involves his properties. The persisting substance is the one I am least clear about. |
8559 | Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: The goal of philosophical analysis should not be reductive analysis but rather the charting of internal relationships. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §07) | |
A reaction: See Idea 8558 for an attempt by Shoemaker himself. The idea that there has never been a successful analysis has become a truism among pessimistic analytic philosophers. But there are wonderful relationship maps (Quine, Davidson, Lewis, Lowe). |
22648 | A single explanation must have a single point of view [James] |
Full Idea: A single explanation of a fact only explains it from a single point of view. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.23) | |
A reaction: I take this to imply that multiple viewpoints lead us towards objectivity. The single viewpoint of an expert is of much greater value than that of a novice, on the whole. |
8594 | People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969], p.54) | |
A reaction: A lovely concise illustration of the limits of reason. We might distinguish 'rational to us' from 'rational in itself', with only what is true or real aspiring to the latter status. But the latter might be unknowable by us. |
22642 | Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James] |
Full Idea: After man's interest in breathing freely, the greatest of all his interests (because it never fluctuates or remits….) is his interest in consistency, in feeling that what he now thinks goes with what he thinks on other occasions. | |
From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Seventh') | |
A reaction: People notoriously contradict themselves all the time, but I suspect that it is when they get out of their depth in complexities such as politics. They probably achieve great consistency within their own expertise, and in common knowledge. |
22644 | Our greatest pleasure is the economy of reducing chaotic facts to one single fact [James] |
Full Idea: Our pleasure at finding that a chaos of facts is the expression of single underlying fact is like a musician's relief at discovering harmony. …The passion for economy of means in thought is the philosophic passion par excellence. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.21) | |
A reaction: We do, though, possess an inner klaxon warning against stupid simplistic reductions. Reducing all the miseries of life to the workings of the Devil is not satisfactory, even it it is economical. Simplicities are dangerously tempting. |
6710 | You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James] |
Full Idea: Pragmatism insists that statements and beliefs are inertly and statically true only by courtesy: they practically pass for true; but you cannot define what you mean by calling them true without referring to their functional possibilities. | |
From: William James (The Meaning of the Word "Truth" [1907], p.2) | |
A reaction: I think this clarifies an objection to pragmatism, because all functional definitions (e.g. of the mind, or of moral behaviour) are preceded by the question of WHY this thing is able to function in this way. What special quality makes this possible? |
18986 | Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James] |
Full Idea: Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification-processes, just as 'health' is a name for other processes in life. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: So the slogan is 'truth is success in belief'? Suicide and racist genocide can be 'successful'. I would have thought that truth was the end of a process, rather than the process itself. |
18983 | In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James] |
Full Idea: When you speak of the 'time-keeping function' of a clock, it is hard to see exactly what your ideas can copy. ...Where our ideas cannot copy definitely their object, what does agreement with that object mean? | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: This is a very good criticism of the correspondence theory of truth. It looks a lovely theory when you can map components of a sentence (like 'the pen is in the drawer') onto components of reality - but it has to cover the hard cases. |
18972 | Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James] |
Full Idea: Pragmatists say that ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: I'm struck by the close similarity (at least in James) of the pragmatic view of truth and the coherence theory of truth (associated later with Blanshard). Perhaps the coherence theory is one version of the pragmatic account |
18973 | New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James] |
Full Idea: A new opinion counts as 'true' just in proportion as it gratifies the individual's desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs in stock. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: Note the tell-tale locution 'counts as' true, rather than 'is' true. The obvious problem is that someone with a big stock of foolish beliefs will 'count as' true some bad interpretation which is gratifyingly assimilated to their current confusions. |
22305 | If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James] |
Full Idea: On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. | |
From: William James (The Meaning of the Word "Truth" [1907], p.299), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 35 'Prag' | |
A reaction: How you get from 'widely satisfactory' to 'true' is beyond my comprehension. This is dangerous nonsense. This view of truth seems to be a commonplace in American culture. Peirce hurray! James boo! James accepted verification, where possible. |
18984 | True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James] |
Full Idea: True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: The immediate question is why you should label something as 'false' simply on the grounds that you can't corroborate it. Proving the falsity is a stronger position than the ignorance James seems happy with. 'Assimilate' implies coherence. |
15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: I favour restricting the term 'logical truth' to what logicians would count as such, excluding both analytic truths like 'Bachelors are unmarried' and Kripkean necessities like 'Gold is an element'. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], I) | |
A reaction: I agree. There is a tendency to splash the phrases 'logical truth' and 'logical necessity around in vague ways. I take them to strictly arise out of the requirements of formal systems of logic. |
8596 | Inability to measure equality doesn't make all lengths unequal [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: It is not plausible to argue from the fact (if it is one) that it is impossible to verify that two things are exactly equal in length to the conclusion that any two things necessarily differ in length. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969], p.58) | |
A reaction: A beautifully simple point against anti-realist or verificationist views of the measurement of length. In any case where we can approach perfect precision, but not quite get there, the anti-realist view looks wildly implausible. |
8597 | We couldn't verify the earth's rotation if everyone simultaneously fell asleep [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: It would be impossible to verify directly that the rotation of the earth would continue if everyone in the universe were sound asleep, yet it is clearly possible that everyone in the universe should at some time be sound asleep. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969], p.59) | |
A reaction: Another beautifully simple argument from Shoemaker against anti-realism (cf. Ideas 8595, 8956). This one is nice because it is so obviously possible, given that everyone able to know of the earth's rotation also seems to need sleep. |
22641 | Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James] |
Full Idea: Realities are not true, they are; and beliefs are true of them. | |
From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth') | |
A reaction: At last, a remark by James about truth which I really like. For 'realities' I would use the word 'facts'. |
22649 | Classification can only ever be for a particular purpose [James] |
Full Idea: Every way of classifying a thing is but a way of handling it for some particular purpose. Conceptions, 'kinds', are teleological instruments. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.24) | |
A reaction: Could there not be ways of classifying which suit all of our purposes? If there were a naturally correct way to classifying things, then any pragmatist would probably welcome that. (I don't say there is such a way). |
15092 | Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: My 1980 paper said properties are individuated by causal features - the contribution they make to the causal powers of things, and also how their instantiation can be caused. Collectively, these causal features are the essence of a property. | |
From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], I) by Sydney Shoemaker - Causal and Metaphysical Necessity | |
A reaction: The later paper worries about uncertainty over individuation. The view I favour is that 'powers' is a much better term for what is basic, and this allows 'properties' to be the complex notion we use in real life, as innumberable power-combinations. |
15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: The view I now favour says that the causal features of a property, both forward-looking and backward-looking, are essential to it. And it says that properties having the same causal features are identical. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III) | |
A reaction: In this formulation we have essentialism about properties, as well as essentialism about the things which have the properties. |
15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: The controversial claim of my theory is that the causal features of properties are essential to them - are features that they have in all possible worlds. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III) | |
A reaction: One problem is that a property can come in degrees, so what degree of the property is necessary to it? It is better to assign this claim to the fundamental properties (which are best called 'powers'). |
8543 | Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Our intuitions as to what are, and what are not, genuine properties are closely related to our intuitions as to what are, and what are not, genuine changes. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §02) | |
A reaction: A simple but brilliant insight. Somehow we must hack through the plethora of bogus properties and get to the real ones, cutting nature at the joints. Here we have the principle needed for the task. |
8551 | Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Only if some causal theory of properties is true can it be explained how properties are capable of engaging our knowledge, and our language, in the way they do. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §05) | |
A reaction: Exactly. This also the reason why epiphenomenalism doesn't make sense about consciousness (Idea 7379). The fact that something has causal powers doesn't mean that it just IS a causal power. A bomb isn't an explosion. |
8557 | To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: There is a plausible way of distinguishing genuine and mere-Cambridge properties. To decide whether an emerald is green the thing to do is to examine it, but a mere-Cambridge property is settled by observations at a remote time and place. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §06) | |
A reaction: Scientific essentialism is beautifully simple! Schoemaker is good at connecting the epistemology to the ontology. If you examined a mirror, you might think it contained reflections. |
15761 | We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: I think we should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §04) | |
A reaction: Right. I have Shoemaker on my side, and he is a distinguished and senior member of the philosophical community. I don't just prefer not to use 'predicate' and 'property' indistinguishably - philosophers should really really give it up! |
15756 | Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Sometimes a predicate is true of a thing, not because (or only because) of any properties it has, but because something else, perhaps something related to it in certain ways, has certain properties. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §02) | |
A reaction: I'm on mission to prize predicates and properties apart, and the strategy is to focus on what is true of something, given that this may not ascribe a property to the thing. |
15758 | Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: There is a distinction between powers, and the properties in virtue of which things have they powers they have (n8: 'in virtue of' means that there is a lawlike truth, which turns out to be the properties entailing the powers). | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §03) | |
A reaction: To me this is an ontology which rests something very clear (a power) on something very indeterminate (a 'property'). |
8547 | One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: It is possible to have the same power (e.g. being poisonous) in virtue of having very different properties. ..So it is in virtue of a thing's properties that the thing has the powers that it has. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §03) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as an accurate and helpful picture. It means that true properties give rise to powers, and categorial or relational or whimsical properties must have their ontological status judged by that standard. |
8549 | Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Powers are functions from circumstances to causal effects, and properties (on which powers depend) can be thought of as functions from sets of properties to sets of powers. Maybe we should call properties 'second-order powers', as they produce powers. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §04) | |
A reaction: He presents property as both a function, and a component of the function. This is the core picture on which modern scientific essentialism is built. See under Natural Theory|Laws of Nature. |
15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: I now reject the formulation of the causal theory which says that a property is a cluster of conditional powers. That has a reductionist flavour, which is a cheat. We need properties to explain conditional powers, so properties won't reduce. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III) | |
A reaction: [compressed wording] I agree with Mumford and Anjum in preferring his earlier formulation. I think properties are broad messy things, whereas powers can be defined more precisely, and seem to have more stability in nature. |
12678 | Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis] |
Full Idea: I am against Shoemaker's strong dispositionalism, according to which all genuine properties are dispositional. | |
From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980]) by Brian Ellis - The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism 3 | |
A reaction: This is because Ellis argues that some properties are categorical, and are needed to underly the active dispositional ones. I think I side with Shoemaker, but this needs more thought. |
8545 | A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: My account of properties concerns those with respect to which change is possible; it is not intended to apply to such properties of numbers as being even and being prime. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §02) | |
A reaction: You could argue that while these properties may not cause change, they are abstract powers. Being even allows division by 2, and being prime blocks it. I say patterns are the basis, and dividing groups of physical objects is involved. |
15757 | 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Surely we make a distinction beween dispositional and nondispositional properties, and can mention paradigms of both sorts. ....It seems plain that predicates like 'square', 'round' and 'made of copper' are not dispositional. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §03) | |
A reaction: It might be possible to account for squareness and roundness in dispositional ways, and it is certainly plausible to say that 'made of copper' is not a property (even when it is a true predicate). |
15759 | The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: What makes a property the property it is, what determines its identity, is its potential for contributing to the causal powers of the things that have it. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §04) | |
A reaction: Does this mean that the 'potential' to act is the essence of the property, or is a property of the property, or is wholly identical with the property? Or is this just epistemological - whatever individuates the property for observers? |
15760 | Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: A thing has a 'conditional power' when it has a power conditionally upon the possession of certain properties. ...We can then express my view by saying that properties are clusters of conditional powers. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §04) | |
A reaction: His example is a knife-shaped thing, which conditionally cuts wood if it is made of steel. Shoemaker rejected this in 1998. Mumford/Anjum prefer the earlier view. Which is fundamental? Powers are simple and primitive. Properties are complex. |
15762 | Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Could a thing undergo radical change with respect to its properties without undergoing any change in its causal powers, or undergo radical change in its causal powers without undergoing any change in the properties that underlie these powers? | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §05) | |
A reaction: I don't accept properties underlying powers, but these two questions at least force us to see how closely the two are linked. |
8552 | If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: The disassociation of property identity from causal potentiality is an invitation to eliminate reference to properties from our explanatory hypotheses altogether. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §05) | |
A reaction: Just as epiphenomenalism about consciousness is a step towards eliminativism. This seems to describe Quine's reaction to Goodman, in moving from predicate nominalism to elimination of properties. I agree with Shoemaker. |
4040 | The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: The notion of a property and the notion of a causal power belong to a system of internally related concepts, no one of which can be explicated without the use of the other. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §07) | |
A reaction: Sounds good. It is hard to conceive of a property which has no causal powers, or a causal power that doesn't arise from a property. |
15765 | Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: I should probably modify my view, and say that properties are individuated by their possible causes as well as by their possible effects. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §11) | |
A reaction: (This is in an afterword responding to criticism by Richard Boyd) He doesn't use the word 'individuate' in the essay. That term always strikes me as smacking too much of epistemology, and not enough of ontology. Who cares how you individuate something? |
14534 | Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum] |
Full Idea: Shoemaker ventured the theory in 1980 that properties just are clusters of powers, but he has subsequently abandoned this, and now thinks properties bestow their bearers with causal powers. | |
From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Self, Body and Coincidence [1999], p.297) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 1.1 | |
A reaction: Like Mumford and Anjum, I prefer the earlier theory. I think taking powers as basic is the only story that really makes sense. A power is intrinsic and primitive, whereas properties are complex, messy, partly subjective, and higher level. |
8548 | Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: By and large, dispositional predicates ascribe powers while nondispositional monadic predicates ascribe properties that are not powers in the same sense. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §03) | |
A reaction: The powers are where the properties come into contact with the rest of the world, so you would expect dispositions to be found at that level, rather than at the deeper level of properties. Sounds good to me. |
9485 | Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird] |
Full Idea: Shoemaker contends that universals concern the way things could be, not merely the way any things actually are. | |
From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 3.2.2 | |
A reaction: If you want to retain universals within a scientific essentialist view (and I would rather not), then this seems like the only way to go. |
8550 | Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: It is natural to say that 'being triangular' and 'being trilateral', though necessarily coextensive, are different properties. But what are distinct are the concepts and meanings. If properties are not meanings of predicates, these are identical. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §04) | |
A reaction: A good test example. Being renate (kidney) and being cordate (heart) are different, because being cordate produces a thumping noise. Shoemaker's example is pretty much Phosphorus/Hesperus. |
18987 | A 'thing' is simply carved out of reality for human purposes [James] |
Full Idea: What shall we call a 'thing' anyhow? It seems quite arbitrary, for we carve out everything, just as we carve out constellations, to suit our human purposes. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 7) | |
A reaction: James wrote just before the discovery of galaxies, which are much more obviously 'things' than constellations like the Plough are! This idea suggests a connection between pragmatism and the nihilist view of objects of Van Inwagen and co. |
18981 | 'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James] |
Full Idea: 'Substance' appears now only as another name for the fact that phenomena as they come are actually grouped and given in coherent forms. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 4) | |
A reaction: This is the strongly empirical strain in James's empiricism. This sounds like a David Lewis comment on the Humean mosaic of experience. We Aristotelians at least believe that the groups run much deeper than the surface of experience. |
8555 | There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: There is, putting aside historical properties and 'identity properties', no subset of the properties of a thing which constitutes an individual essence, so that having those properties is necessary and sufficient for being that particular thing. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §05) | |
A reaction: He asserts this rather dogmatically. If he says a thing can lose its essence, I agree, but it seems to me that there must be a group of features which will guarantee that (if they are present) it has that identity. |
15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: If it is possible that there could be possible states of affairs that are not nomologically possible, don't we therefore need a notion of metaphysical possibility that outruns nomological possibility? | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI) | |
A reaction: Shoemaker rejects this possibility (p.425). I sympathise. So there is 'natural' possibility (my preferred term), which is anything which stuff, if it exists, could do, and 'logical' possibility, which is anything that doesn't lead to contradiction. |
8554 | Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: The ways in which a given thing can be different in different possible worlds depend on the ways in which such a thing can be different at different times in the actual world. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §05) | |
A reaction: Where change in a thing is possible across time in the actual world seems to require a combination of experiment and imagination. Unimaginability does not entail necessity, but it may be the best guide we have got. |
15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Once the obstacle of the deeply rooted conviction that necessary truths should be knowable a priori is removed, ...causal necessity is (pretheoretically) the very paradigm of necessity, in ordinary usage and in dictionaries. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VII) | |
A reaction: The a priori route seems to lead to logical necessity, just by doing a priori logic, and also to metaphysical necessity, by some sort of intuitive vision. This is a powerful idea of Shoemaker's (implied, of course, in Kripke). |
15764 | 'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: We could use 'conceivable' to say it is not provable that it is not the case, or we could use it to say that it is compatible with what we know. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §10) | |
A reaction: Rather significant, since the first one would seem to allow in a great deal that the second one would rule out. Any disproof of some natural possibility founders on the remark that 'you never know'. |
15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: We have abundant empirical evidence that when we can imagine some phenomenal situation, e.g., imagine things appearing certain ways, such a situation could actually exist. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI) | |
A reaction: There seem to be good reasons for holding the opposite view too. We can imagine gold appearing to be all sorts of colours, but that doesn't make it possible. What does empirical evidence really tell us here? |
15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Imaginability can give us access to conceptual possibility, when we come to believe situations to be conceptually possible by reflecting on their descriptions and seeing no contradiction or incoherence. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI) | |
A reaction: If take the absence of contradiction to indicate 'logical' possibility, but the absence of incoherence is more interesting, even if it is a bit vague. He is talking of 'situations', which I take to be features of reality. A priori synthetic? |
8562 | It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: It is possible to conceive what is not possible. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §10) | |
A reaction: The point here is that, while we cannot clearly conceive the impossible in a world like mathematics, we can conceive of impossible perceptions in the physical world, such as a bonfire burning under water. |
13065 | Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Understanding is an extremely vague concept. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.3) | |
A reaction: True, I suppose, but we usually recognise understanding when we encounter it, and everybody has a pretty clear notion of an 'increase' in understanding. I suspect that the concept is perfectly clear, but we lack any scale for measuring it. |
13047 | It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Knowledge 'that' is descriptive, and knowledge 'why' is explanatory, and it is the latter that provides scientific understanding of our world. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], Intro) | |
A reaction: I agree, but of course, knowing 'why' may require a lot of knowing 'that'. People with extensive knowledge 'that' things are so tend to understand why something happens more readily than the rest of us ignoramuses. |
18974 | Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James] |
Full Idea: Truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. The true is whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: The trouble is that false optimism can often often be what is 'good in the way of belief'. That said, I think quite a good way to specify 'truth' is 'success in belief', but I mean intrinsically successful, not pragmatically successful. |
5691 | The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Some who reject the act-object conception of sensation favour an 'adverbial' account, where (instead of the act of 'seeing a red image') it is better to speak of 'being appeared to redly'. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.398) | |
A reaction: The point is that you couldn't perceive without a colour (or travel without a speed), so the qualifying adverb is intrinsic to the process, not a separate object. The adverbial theory will imply a fairly minimal account of universals. |
18989 | Pragmatism accepts any hypothesis which has useful consequences [James] |
Full Idea: On pragmatic principles we cannot reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow from it. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 8) | |
A reaction: Most governments seem to find lies more useful than the truth. Maybe most children are better off not knowing the truth about their parents. It might be disastrous to know the truth about what other people are thinking. Is 'useful but false' meaningful? |
22640 | We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James] |
Full Idea: We find satisfaction in consistency between the present idea and the entire rest of our mental equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and that of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock previously acquired truths. | |
From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth') | |
A reaction: I like this, apart from the idea that the criterion of good coherence seems to be subjective 'satisfaction'. We should ask why some large set of beliefs is coherent. I assume nature is coherent, and truth is the best explanation of our coherence about it. |
8593 | Maybe billions of changeless years have elapsed since my last meal [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: If it is possible for there to be changeless intervals of time, then it may seem compatible with my total experience that any number of such intervals, each of them lasting billions of years, should have elapsed since I ate my last meal. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969], p.52) | |
A reaction: Compare Idea 2792. A nice new sceptical thought! Shoemaker's paper is devoted, successfully I think, to proving that there can indeed by changless intervals of time. |
22655 | Scientific genius extracts more than other people from the same evidence [James] |
Full Idea: What is the use of being a genius, unless with the same scientific evidence as other men, one can reach more truth than they? | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.40) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at Clifford's famous principle. He isn't actually contraverting the principle, but it is a nice point about evidence. Simple empiricists think detectives only have to stare at the evidence and the solution creates itself. |
13054 | Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Various kinds of correlations exist that provide excellent bases for prediction, but because no suitable causal relations exist (or are known), these correlations do not furnish explanation. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.3) | |
A reaction: There may be problem cases for the claim that all explanations are causal, but I certainly think that this idea is essentially right. Prediction can come from induction, but inductions may be true and yet baffling. |
22658 | Experimenters assume the theory is true, and stick to it as long as result don't disappoint [James] |
Full Idea: Each tester of the truth of a theory …acts as if it were true, and expects the result to disappoint him if his assumption is false. The longer disappointment is delayed, the stronger grows his faith in his theory. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.42) | |
A reaction: This is almost exactly Popper's falsificationist proposal for science, which interestingly shows the close relationship of his view to pragmatism. Believe it as long as it is still working. |
18971 | Theories are practical tools for progress, not answers to enigmas [James] |
Full Idea: Theories are instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest. We don't lie back upon them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid. Pragmatism unstiffens all our theories, limbers them up and sets each one to work. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 2) | |
A reaction: This follows his criticism of the quest for 'solving names' - big words that give bogus solutions to problems. James's view is not the same as 'instrumentalism', though he would probably sympathise with that view. The defines theories badly. |
18985 | True thoughts are just valuable instruments of action [James] |
Full Idea: The possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of action. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 6) | |
A reaction: It looks to me like we should distinguish 'active' and 'passive' instrumentalism. The passive version says there is no more to theories and truth than what instruments record. James's active version says truth is an instrument for doing things well. |
18982 | Pragmatism says all theories are instrumental - that is, mental modes of adaptation to reality [James] |
Full Idea: The pragmatist view is that all our theories are instrumental, are mental modes of adaptation to reality, rather than revelations or gnostic answers to some divinely instituted world enigma. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 5) | |
A reaction: This treats instrumentalism as the pragmatic idea of theories as what works (and nothing more), with, presumably, no interest in grasping something called 'reality'. Presumably instrumentalism might have other motivations - such as fun. |
13067 | For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon] |
Full Idea: There is a centuries-old philosophical tradition, sometimes referred to by the name of 'instrumentalism', that has denied the claim that science has explanatory power. For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.3) | |
A reaction: [He quotes Coffa] Presumably it is just a matter of matching the world to the readings on the instruments, aiming at van Fraassen's 'empirical adequacy'. If there are no scientific explanations, does that mean that there are no explanations at all? Daft! |
22654 | We can't know if the laws of nature are stable, but we must postulate it or assume it [James] |
Full Idea: That nature will follow tomorrow the same laws that she follows today is a truth which no man can know; but in the interests of cognition as well as of action we must postulate or assume it. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.39) | |
A reaction: The stability of nature is something to be assessed, not something taken for granted. If you arrive in a new city and it all seems quiet, you keep your fingers crossed and treat it as stable. But revolution or coup could be just round the corner. |
13055 | Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Inductive logicians have a 'requirement of total evidence': induction is strong if 1) it has true premises, 2) it has correct inductive form, and 3) no additional evidence that would change the degree of support is available at the time. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.4.2) | |
A reaction: The evidence might be very close at hand, but not quite 'available' to the person doing the induction. |
8556 | Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Grueness, as defined by Goodman, is not associated in the way greenness and blueness are with causal potentialities. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §06) | |
A reaction: Expressed rather more simply in Idea 7296. 'Grue' is a characteristic production of a predicate nominalist (i.e. Goodman), and that theory is just wrong. The account of properties must mesh with the account of induction. |
15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Perhaps 'grue' has causal features, but only derivatively, in virtue of its relation to green. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], III) | |
A reaction: I take grue to be a behaviour, and not a property at all. The problem only arises because the notion of a 'property' became too lax. Presumably Shoemaker should also mention blue in his account. |
22656 | Trying to assess probabilities by mere calculation is absurd and impossible [James] |
Full Idea: The absurd abstraction of an intellect verbally formulating all its evidence and carefully estimating the probability thereof solely by the size of a vulgar fraction, is as ideally inept as it is practically impossible. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.40) | |
A reaction: James probably didn't know about Bayes, but this is directed at the Bayesian approach. My view is that full rational assessment of coherence is a much better bet than a Bayesian calculation. Factors must be weighted. |
13046 | Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon] |
Full Idea: I reject the view that scientific explanation involves reduction of the unfamiliar to the familiar. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], Pref) | |
A reaction: Aristotle sometimes seems to imply this account of explanation, and I would have to agree with Salmon's view of it. Aristotle is also, though, aware of real explanations, definitions and essences. People are 'familiar' with some peculiar things. |
13058 | Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon] |
Full Idea: There are evidence-seeking why-questions, as well as explanation-seeking why-questions. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.2) | |
A reaction: Surely we would all prefer an explanation to mere evidence? It seems to me that they are all explanation-seeking, but that we are grateful for some evidence when no full explanation is available. Explanation renders evidence otiose. |
14366 | An explanation is a table of statistical information [Salmon, by Strevens] |
Full Idea: On Salmon's statistical relevance view, an explanation is a table of statistical information. | |
From: report of Wesley Salmon (Statistical Explanation [1970]) by Michael Strevens - No Understanding without Explanation 1 | |
A reaction: [He cites W.Salmon 1970] When put like that the view sounds incredibly implausible, but maybe a reading of Salmon would improve the case for it. |
13050 | The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon] |
Full Idea: The 'inferential' conception of scientific explanation is the thesis that all legitimate scientific explanations are arguments of one sort or another. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that someone has to be persuaded of something, and hence seems a rather too pragmatic view. I presume an explanation might be no more than dumbly pointing at conclusive evidence of a cause. Man with smoking gun. |
13059 | Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Proponents of the ontic conception of explanation can say that explanations exist in the world as facts, or that they are reports of such facts (as opposed to the view of explanations as arguments, or as speech acts). | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.2) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I am strongly drawn to the ontic approach, but not sure whether we want facts, or reports of them. The facts are the causal nexus, but which parts of the nexus provide the main aspect of explanation? I'll vote for reports, for now. |
13064 | The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon] |
Full Idea: There are three basic conceptions of scientific explanation - modal, epistemic, and ontic - which can be discerned in Aristotle, and that have persisted down the ages. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.1) |
13049 | We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon] |
Full Idea: The problem is to distinguish between laws and accidental generalizations, for laws have explanatory force while accidental generalizations, even if they are true, do not. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [He is discussing Hempel and Oppenheim 1948] This seems obviously right, but I can only make sense of the explanatory power if we have identified the mechanism which requires the generalisation to continue in future cases. |
13051 | Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon] |
Full Idea: The deductive-nomological view has an explanation/prediction symmetry thesis - that a correct explanation could be a scientific prediction, and that any deductive prediction could serve as a deductive-nomological explanation. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Of course, not all predictions will explain, or vice versa. Weird regularities become predictable but remain baffling. Good explanations may be of unrepeatable events. It is the 'law' in the account that ties the two ends together. |
13053 | A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon] |
Full Idea: To provide an adequate explanation of any given fact, we need to provide information that is relevant to the occurrence of that fact - information that makes a difference to its occurrence. It is not enough to subsume it under a general law. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Bromberger for this idea] Salmon is identifying this idea as the beginnings of trouble for the covering-law account of explanation, and it sounds exactly right. |
13061 | Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon] |
Full Idea: The height of the flagpole explains the length of the shadow because the interaction between the sunlight and the flagpole occurs before the interaction between the sunlight and the ground. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.6) | |
A reaction: [Bromberger produced the flagpole example] This seems to be correct, and would apply to all physical cases, but there may still be cases of explanation which are not causal (in mathematics, for example). |
17093 | Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Causal processes, causal interactions, and causal laws provide the mechanisms by which the world works; to understand why certain things happen, we need to see how they are produced by these mechanisms. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World [1984]), quoted by David-Hillel Ruben - Explaining Explanation Ch 7 | |
A reaction: I don't think I've ever found a better quotation on explanation. That strikes me as correct, and (basically) there is nothing more to be said. I'm not sure about the 'laws'. This is later Wesley Salmon. |
17492 | Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems [Glennan on Salmon] |
Full Idea: While Salmon's mechanisms are processes involving interactions, the interactions are not necessarily regular, and they do not involve the operation of systems. | |
From: comment on Wesley Salmon (Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World [1984]) by Stuart Glennan - Mechanisms 'hierarchical' | |
A reaction: This is why modern mechanistic philosophy only began in 2000, despite Wesley Salmon's championing of the roughly mechanistic approach. |
13045 | Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon] |
Full Idea: My basic feeling about explanation in the quantum realm is that it will involve mechanisms, but mechanisms that are quite different from those that seem to work in the macrocosm. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], Pref) | |
A reaction: Since I take most explanation to be by mechanisms (or some abstraction analogous to mechanisms), then I think this is probably right (rather than being by new 'laws'). |
13062 | Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon] |
Full Idea: In functional explanation, there is a disagreement over whether an item has a function the first time it occurs. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.8) | |
A reaction: This question arises particularly in evolutionary contexts, and would obviously not generally arise in the case of human artefacts. |
13063 | Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon] |
Full Idea: I favour an ontic conception of explanation, that explanations reveal the mechanisms, causal or other, that produce the facts we are trying to explain. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 4.1) | |
A reaction: [He also cites Coffa and Peter Railton] A structure may explain, and only be supported by causal powers, but it doesn't seem to be the causal powers that do the explaining. Is a peg fitting a hole explained causally? |
16557 | Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
Full Idea: For Salmon mechanisms are composed of processes and interactions. The interactions are identified in terms of transmitted marks and statistical relations, or (more recently) exchanges of conserved quantities. | |
From: report of Wesley Salmon (Causality and Explanation [1998], 3.1) by Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C - Thinking About Mechanisms 3.1 | |
A reaction: They say that Salmon has too little to say about the activities that constitute a mechanism. A 'mark' doesn't sound too promising, but I quite like the exchange of conserved quantities, which gets into the guts of what is going on. |
22646 | We have a passion for knowing the parts of something, rather than the whole [James] |
Full Idea: Alongside the passion for simplification …is the passion for distinguishing; it is the passion to be acquainted with the parts rather than to comprehend the whole. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.22) | |
A reaction: As I child I dismantled almost every toy I was given. This seems to be the motivation for a lot of analytic philosophy, but Aristotle also tended to think that way. |
13060 | Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.6) | |
A reaction: I take this to be one of the reasons why explanation must ultimately reside at the level of individual objects and events, rather than residing with generalisations and laws. |
13056 | Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Statistical relevance, not high probability, is the key desideratum in statistical explanation. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 2.5) | |
A reaction: I suspect that this is because the explanation will not ultimately be probabilistic at all, but mechanical and causal. Hence the link is what counts, which is the relevance. He notes that relevance needs two values instead of one high value. |
13057 | Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Perhaps we should think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Four Decades of Scientific Explanation [1989], 3.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Coffa 1974 for this] I find this suggestion very appealing, as it connects up with dispositions and powers, which I take to be the building blocks of all explanation. It is, of course, easier to render frequencies numerically. |
22652 | The mind has evolved entirely for practical interests, seen in our reflex actions [James] |
Full Idea: It is far too little recognised how entirely the intellect is built up of practical interests. The theory of evolution is beginning to do very good service by its reduction of all mentality to the type of reflex action. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.34) | |
A reaction: Hands evolved for manipulating tools end up playing the piano. Minds evolved for action can be afflicted with boredom. He's not wrong, but he is risking the etymological fallacy (origin = purpose). I take navigation to be the original purpose of mind. |
22651 | Dogs' curiosity only concerns what will happen next [James] |
Full Idea: A dog's curiosity about the movements of his master or a strange object only extends as far as the point of what is going to happen next. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.31) | |
A reaction: Good. A nice corrective to people like myself who are tempted to inflate animal rationality, in order to emphasise human evolutionary continuity with them. It is hard to disagree with his observation. But dogs do make judgements! True/false! |
9286 | Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James] |
Full Idea: Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and not a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, is best explained by their relations to one another, the relations being experiences. | |
From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], §3) | |
A reaction: This view has suddenly caught people's interest. It might be better than the higher/lower relationship, which seems to leave the basic problem untouched. Does a whole network of relations between experiences gradually 'add up' to consciousness? |
5687 | For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Some writers distinguish introspection from a pre-introspective awareness of mental phenomena, saying one is not properly introspecting unless one is not only aware of the phenomena, but aware that one is aware of them. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.395) | |
A reaction: The test question might be what we think animals do. I think I agree with the 'writers'. You are either just aware of the contents or qualia or images of thought, which is not introspection, or you become introspectively aware that you are having them. |
5688 | Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Foundationalist epistemology takes all empirical knowledge to be grounded in the introspective knowledge each mind has of its own states, …holding that introspective judgements are 'incorrigible' or 'infallible', and mental states are 'self-intimating'. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.396) | |
A reaction: Descartes' foundationalist Cogito also seems to be based on introspection, making introspection the essence of all foundationalism. The standard modern view is that introspective states are incorrigible, but not infallible. |
1389 | If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: If memory were the sole criterion of personal identity it would have to be the sole criterion that we use in making identity statements about persons other than ourselves. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §4) | |
A reaction: From Locke's point of view, he is much less certain about the continued identity of other people, because he allows the possibility of transference of minds. Even we might reject physical identity, if a person had suffered a severe trauma. |
1390 | Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG] |
Full Idea: Bodily identity must be one of the criteria for personal identity (to establish that a rememberer was present at a past event), but memory itself must also be accepted as one of the criteria. | |
From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Personal Identity and Memory [1959], §5) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This concerns the epistemology of personal identity, not the ontology. Someone with total amnesia would probably accept a driving licence as a criterion. Is personal identity a mental state, or a precondition which makes mental states possible? |
9285 | 'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James] |
Full Idea: 'Consciousness' is the name of a nonentity. ..Those who cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumour left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy. ..I deny that it stands for an entity, but it does stand for a function. | |
From: William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], Intro) | |
A reaction: This kind of view is often treated as being preposterous, but I think it is correct. No one is denying the phenomenology, but it is the ontology which is at stake. Either you are a substance dualist, or mind must be eliminated as an 'entity'. |
23981 | Rage is inconceivable without bodily responses; so there are no disembodied emotions [James] |
Full Idea: Can one fancy a state of rage and picture no flushing of the face, no dilation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action? …A purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity. | |
From: William James (What is an Emotion? [1884], p.194), quoted by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 3 'Bodily' | |
A reaction: Plausible for rage, but less so for irritation or admiration. Goldie thinks James is wrong. James says if intellectual feelings don't become bodily then they don't qualify as emotions. No True Scotsman! |
22650 | How can the ground of rationality be itself rational? [James] |
Full Idea: Can that which is the ground of rationality in all else be itself properly called rational? | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.25) | |
A reaction: This is the perennial problem in deciding grounds, and in deciding what to treat as primitive. The stoics see the whole of nature as rational. Cf how can the ground of what is physical be itself physical? |
22643 | It seems that we feel rational when we detect no irrationality [James] |
Full Idea: I think there are very good grounds for upholding the view that the feeling of rationality is constituted merely by the absence of any feelings of irrationality. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.20) | |
A reaction: A very interesting proposal. Nothing is more basic to logic (well, plausible versions of logic) than the principle of non-contradiction - perhaps because it is the foundation of our natural intellectual equipment. |
18975 | We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James] |
Full Idea: Concepts for the pragmatist are things to come back into experience with, things to make us look for differences. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: That's good. I like both halves of this. Experience gives us the concepts, but then we 'come back' into experience equipped with them. Presumably animals can look for differences, but concepts enhance that hugely. Know the names of the flowers. |
22660 | Evolution suggests prevailing or survival as a new criterion of right and wrong [James] |
Full Idea: The philosophy of evolution offers us today a new criterion, which is objective and fixed, as an ethical test between right and wrong: That is to be called good which is destined to prevail or survive. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.44) | |
A reaction: Perceptive for its time. Herbert Spencer may have suggested the idea. James dismisses it, because it implies a sort of fatalism, whereas genuine moral choices are involved in what survives. |
6570 | Imagine millions made happy on condition that one person suffers endless lonely torture [James] |
Full Idea: Consider a case in which millions could be made permanently happy on the one simple condition that a certain lost soul on the far-off edge of things should lead a life of lonely torture. | |
From: William James (The Will to Believe [1896], p.188), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be one of the earliest pinpointings of a key problem with utilitiarianism, which is that other values than happiness (in this case, fairness) seem to be utterly overruled. If we ignore fairness, why shouldn't we ignore happiness? |
8412 | A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon] |
Full Idea: When two processes intersect, and they undergo correlated modifications which persist after the intersection, I shall say that the intersection is a causal interaction. I take this as a fundamental causal concept. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §4) | |
A reaction: There may be a problem individuating processes, just as there is for events. I like this approach to causation, which is ontologically sparse, and fits in with the scientific worldview. Change of properties sounds precise, but isn't. Stick to processes. |
8413 | Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon] |
Full Idea: In a typical cause-effect situation (a 'propagation') cause must precede effect, for propagation over a finite time interval is an essential feature. In an 'interaction', an intersection of processes resulting in change, we have simultaneity. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §8) | |
A reaction: This takes the direction of time as axiomatic, and quite right too. Salmon isn't addressing the real difficulty, though, which is that the resultant laws are usually held to be time-reversible, which is a bit of a puzzle. |
8411 | Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon] |
Full Idea: I propose to approach causality by taking processes rather than events as basic entities. Events are relatively localised in space and time, while processes have much greater temporal duration, and, in many cases, much greater spatial extent. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Causality: Production and Propagation [1980], §2) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as an incredibly promising proposal, not just in our understanding of causation, but for our general metaphysics and understanding of nature. See Idea 4931, for example. Vague events and processes blend into one another. |
4784 | Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos] |
Full Idea: Salmon argues that processes rather than events should be the basic entities in a theory of physical causation. | |
From: report of Wesley Salmon (Causal Connections [1984]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.2 | |
A reaction: It increasingly strikes me that the concept of a 'process' ought to be ontologically basic. Edelman says the mind is a process. An 'event' is too loose, and a 'fact' too vague, and heaven knows what Hume meant by an 'object'. |
8542 | If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: Any account of causality as a relation between events should involve, in a central way, reference to the properties of the constituent objects of the events. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §01) | |
A reaction: This remark, with which I wholeheartedly agree, is aimed at Davidson, who seems to think you need know no more about an event than the way in which someone chooses to describe it. Metaphysics must dig deeper, even if science can't. |
22645 | Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James] |
Full Idea: The knowledge of things by their causes, which is often given as a definition of rational knowledge, is useless unless the causes converge to a minimum number, while still producing the maximum number of effects. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.21) | |
A reaction: This is certainly the psychological motivation for trying to identify 'the' cause of something, but James always tries to sell such things as subjective. 'Useless' to one person is a subjective criterion; useless to anyone is much more objective. |
8409 | Probabilistic causal concepts are widely used in everyday life and in science [Salmon] |
Full Idea: Probabilistic causal concepts are used in innumerable contexts of everyday life and science. ...In causes of cancer, road accidents, or food poisoning, for example. | |
From: Wesley Salmon (Probabilistic Causality [1980], p.137) | |
A reaction: [Second half compresses his examples] This strikes me as rather a weak point. No one ever thought that a particular road accident was actually caused by the high probability of it at a particular location. Causes are in the mechanisms. |
8598 | If things turn red for an hour and then explode, we wouldn't say the redness was the cause [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: If we found that things always explode after having been red for an hour, we would never suppose that what causes the explosion is simply a thing's having been red for an hour. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969], p.63) | |
A reaction: Shoemaker points out that even Hume says that cause and effect must be 'contiguous', but it clearly means that a simplistic regularity analysis of causation won't work. |
15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: One way to get the conclusion that laws are necessary is to combine my view of properties with the view of Armstrong, Dretske and Tooley, that laws are, or assert, relations between properties. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], I) | |
A reaction: This is interesting, because Armstrong in particular wants the necessity to arise from relations between properties as universals, but if we define properties causally, and make them necessary, we might get the same result without universals. |
8560 | If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: To the extent that causal laws can be viewed as propositions describing the causal potentialities of properties, it is impossible that the same properties should be governed by different causal laws in different possible worlds. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §08) | |
A reaction: [He has just asserted that causal potentialities are essential to properties] This is the dramatic basic claim of scientific essentialism, which grows out of Shoemaker's causal account of properties. Note that the laws are just descriptions. |
15763 | If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: My theory of properties as causal appears to have the consequence that causal laws are logically necessary, and that causal necessity is just a species of logical necessity. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §09) | |
A reaction: Where he writes 'logical' necessity I would claim that he really means 'metaphysical' necessity. The point, I take it, is that given the existence of those properties, certain causal efforts must always follow from them. I agree. |
8561 | If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: If there are worlds in which the causal laws are different from those that prevail in this world, ..then the properties will have to be different as well. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §09) | |
A reaction: The next question is whether the same stuff (e.g. gold or water) could have different properties, and I take the the scientific essentialism answer to be 'no'. So the actual stuff (substances?) would have to be different. |
8553 | It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: There is a prima facie case for saying that the immutability of the causal potentialities of a property implies their essentiality. ...If they cannot vary across time, they also cannot vary across possible worlds. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §05) | |
A reaction: This is only the beginning of scientific essentialism, but one of the targets is to save the phenomena. It is also involves unimaginability (of different powers from a given property) implying necessity. |
4226 | If three regions 'freeze' every three, four and five years, after sixty years everything stops for a year [Shoemaker, by Lowe] |
Full Idea: If region A has a year's 'freeze' every three years, region B does it every four years, and C every five years, every sixty years they would all freeze, and there would be no witnesses. The simplest hypothesis is that a year passes with no events. | |
From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969]) by E.J. Lowe - A Survey of Metaphysics p.247 | |
A reaction: Lovely argument. I definitely vote for there being a year of time with no events, even though it contradicats Einstein and the rest. As usual, we should be doing ontology, but get lured into epistemology. |
8595 | If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years [Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: If region A locally freezes (for one year, observed by the other two regions) every third year, and region B every fourth year, and region B every fifth year, ...then every sixtieth year there will be a total freeze lasting one year. | |
From: Sydney Shoemaker (Time Without Change [1969], p.56) | |
A reaction: One of the most brilliant thought experiments in modern philosophy!!! He demonstrates that there can be time without change, but also that we must rely on best explanation, and that there is more to ontology than epistemology (let alone semantics). |
18980 | If there is a 'greatest knower', it doesn't follow that they know absolutely everything [James] |
Full Idea: The greatest knower of them all may yet not know the whole of everything, or even know what he does know at one single stroke: - he may be liable to forget. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 4) | |
A reaction: And that's before you get to the problem of how the greatest knower could possibly know whether or not they knew absolutely everything, or whether there might be some fact which was irremediably hidden from them. |
18978 | It is hard to grasp a cosmic mind which produces such a mixture of goods and evils [James] |
Full Idea: We can with difficulty comprehend the character of a cosmic mind whose purposes are fully revealed by the strange mixture of good and evils that we find in this actual world's particulars. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: And, of course, what counts as 'goods' or 'evils' seems to have a highly relative aspect to it. To claim that really it is all good is massive hope based on flimsy evidence. |
18991 | If the God hypothesis works well, then it is true [James] |
Full Idea: On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 8) | |
A reaction: The truth of God's existence certainly is a challenging test case for the pragmatic theory of truth, and James really bites the bullet here. Pragmatism may ultimately founder on the impossibility of specifying what 'works satisfactorily' means. |
18977 | The wonderful design of a woodpecker looks diabolical to its victims [James] |
Full Idea: To the grub under the bark the exquisite fitness of the woodpecker's organism to extract him would certainly argue a diabolical designer. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: What an elegant sentence! The huge problem for religious people who accept (probably reluctantly) evolution by natural selection is the moral nature of the divine being who could use such a ruthless method of design. |
18979 | Things with parts always have some structure, so they always appear to be designed [James] |
Full Idea: The parts of things must always make some definite resultant, be it chaotic or harmonious. When we look at what has actually come, the conditions must always appear perfectly designed to ensure it. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: In so far as the design argument is an analogy with human affairs, we can't deny that high levels of order suggest an organising mind, and mere chaos suggests a coincidence of unco-ordinated forces. |
18976 | Private experience is the main evidence for God [James] |
Full Idea: I myself believe that the evidence for God lies primarily in inner personal experience. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 3) | |
A reaction: There is not much you can say to someone who claims incontrovertible evidence which is utterly private to themselves. Does total absence of private religious experience count as evidence on the subject? |
22653 | Early Christianity says God recognises the neglected weak and tender impulses [James] |
Full Idea: In what did the emancipating message of primitive Christianity consist but in the announcement that God recognizes those weak and tender impulses which paganism had so rudely overlooked. | |
From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.36) | |
A reaction: Nietzsche says these are the virtues of a good slave. Previous virtues were dominated by military needs, but the new virtues are those of large cities, where communal living with strangers is the challenge. |
18990 | Nirvana means safety from sense experience, and hindus and buddhists are just afraid of life [James] |
Full Idea: Nirvana means safety from the everlasting round of adventures of which the world of sense consists. The hindoo and the buddhist for this is essentially their attitude, are simply afraid, afraid of more experience, afraid of life. | |
From: William James (Pragmatism - eight lectures [1907], Lec 8) | |
A reaction: Wonderfully American! From what I have seen of eastern thought, including Taoism, I agree with James, in general. There is a rejection of knowledge and of human life which I find shocking. I suspect it is a defence mechanism for downtrodden people. |