27 ideas
8093 | Seek wisdom rather than truth; it is easier [Joubert] |
Full Idea: To seek wisdom rather than truth. It is more within our grasp. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1797) | |
A reaction: A nice challenge to the traditional goal of philosophy. The idea that we should 'seek truth' only seems to have emerged during the Reformation. The Greeks may well never have dreamed of such a thing. |
8095 | We must think with our entire body and soul [Joubert] |
Full Idea: Everything we think must be thought with our entire being, body and soul. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1798) | |
A reaction: Not just that thinking must be a whole-hearted activity, but that the very contents of our thinking will be better if it arises out of being a physical creature, and not just a disembodied reasoner. Maybe the bowels are not needed to analyse set theory. |
8107 | The love of certainty holds us back in metaphysics [Joubert] |
Full Idea: What stops or holds us back in metaphysics is a love of certainty. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1814) | |
A reaction: This is a prominent truth from the age of Descartes, but may have diminished in the twenty-first century. The very best metaphysicians (e.g. Aristotle and Lewis) always end in a trail of dots when things become unsure. |
9978 | Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait] |
Full Idea: The tendency to attack forms of expression rather than attempting to appreciate what is actually being said is one of the more unfortunate habits that analytic philosophy inherited from Frege. | |
From: William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], IV) | |
A reaction: The key to this, I say, is to acknowledge the existence of propositions (in brains). For example, this belief will make teachers more sympathetic to pupils who are struggling to express an idea, and verbal nit-picking becomes totally irrelevant. |
8099 | The truths of reason instruct, but they do not illuminate [Joubert] |
Full Idea: There are truths that instruct, perhaps, but they do not illuminate. In this class are all the truths of reasoning. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800) | |
A reaction: A rather romantic view, which strikes me as false. An inspiring truth can suddenly collapse when you see why it must be false. Equally a line of reasoning can lead to a truth which need becomes an illumination. |
8098 | Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has [Joubert] |
Full Idea: Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800) | |
A reaction: Presumably sceptics about the existence of objective truth must also be sceptical about the possibility of such a God. I think Joubert is close to the nature of truth here. It is a remote and barely imaginable ideal. |
9986 | The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait] |
Full Idea: The conception that what can be numbered is some object (including flocks of sheep) relative to a partition - a choice of unit - survived even in the late nineteenth century in the form of the rejection of the null set (and difficulties with unit sets). | |
From: William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], IX) | |
A reaction: This old view can't be entirely wrong! Frege makes the point that if asked to count a pack of cards, you must decide whether to count cards, or suits, or pips. You may not need a 'unit', but you need a concept. 'Units' name concept-extensions nicely! |
9984 | We can have a series with identical members [Tait] |
Full Idea: Why can't we have a series (as opposed to a linearly ordered set) all of whose members are identical, such as (a, a, a...,a)? | |
From: William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], VII) | |
A reaction: The question is whether the items order themselves, which presumably the natural numbers are supposed to do, or whether we impose the order (and length) of the series. What decides how many a's there are? Do we order, or does nature? |
13416 | Mathematics must be based on axioms, which are true because they are axioms, not vice versa [Tait, by Parsons,C] |
Full Idea: The axiomatic conception of mathematics is the only viable one. ...But they are true because they are axioms, in contrast to the view advanced by Frege (to Hilbert) that to be a candidate for axiomhood a statement must be true. | |
From: report of William W. Tait (Intro to 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2005], p.4) by Charles Parsons - Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' §2 | |
A reaction: This looks like the classic twentieth century shift in the attitude to axioms. The Greek idea is that they must be self-evident truths, but the Tait-style view is that they are just the first steps in establishing a logical structure. I prefer the Greeks. |
8510 | 'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC] |
Full Idea: 'Socrates is wise' means that the concurrence sum (Socrates) includes a trope which is a member of the similarity set (Wisdom). | |
From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.119) | |
A reaction: Resemblance has to be taken as a basic (and presumably unanalysable) concept, which invites Russell's objection (Idea 4441). |
8508 | A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC] |
Full Idea: I shall divert the word 'trope' to stand for the abstract particular which is, so to speak, the occurrence of an essence. | |
From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.115) | |
A reaction: Thus tropes entered philosophical discussion. Presumably the precedent for an 'abstract particular' would be a particular occurrence of the number 7. |
8509 | A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC] |
Full Idea: Any possible world, and hence, of course, this one, is completely constituted by its tropes and connections of location and similarity. | |
From: Donald C. Williams (On the Elements of Being: I [1953], p.116) | |
A reaction: Note that Williams regularly referred to possible worlds in 1953. This is a full-blooded trope theory, which asserts that objects are bundles of tropes, so that both particulars and universals are ontologically taken care of. |
8101 | To know is to see inside oneself [Joubert] |
Full Idea: To know: it is to see inside oneself. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800) | |
A reaction: Extreme internalism about justification! Personally I am becoming convinced that 'know' (unlike 'believe' and 'true') is an entirely social concept. Fools spend a lot of time instrospecting; wise people ask around, and check in books. |
8094 | The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye [Joubert] |
Full Idea: The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1797) | |
A reaction: As a fan of the imagination, I love this one. I suspect that imagination, which was marginalised by Descartes, is actually the single most important aspect of thought (in slugs as well as humans). Abstraction requires imagination. |
8103 | A thought is as real as a cannon ball [Joubert] |
Full Idea: A thought is a thing as real as a cannon ball. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1801) | |
A reaction: Nice. The realisation of a thought can strike someone as if they have been assaulted, and hearing some remarks can be as bad as being stabbed. That is quite apart from political consequences. Joubert is good on the physicality of thinking. |
8100 | Where does the bird's idea of a nest come from? [Joubert] |
Full Idea: The idea of the nest in the bird's mind, where does it come from? | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800) | |
A reaction: I think this is a very striking example in support of innate ideas. Most animal behaviour can be explained as responses to stimuli, but the bird seems to hold a model in its mind while it collects its materials. |
9981 | Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait] |
Full Idea: If the sense of a proposition about the abstract domain is given in terms of the corresponding proposition about the (relatively) concrete domain, ..and the truth of the former is founded upon the truth of the latter, then this is 'logical abstraction'. | |
From: William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], V) | |
A reaction: The 'relatively' in parentheses allows us to apply his idea to levels of abstraction, and not just to the simple jump up from the concrete. I think Tait's proposal is excellent, rather than purloining 'abstraction' for an internal concept within logic. |
9982 | Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait] |
Full Idea: Although (in Cantor and Dedekind) abstraction does not (as has often been observed) play any role in their proofs, but it does play a role, in that it fixes the grammar, the domain of meaningful propositions, and so determining the objects in the proofs. | |
From: William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], V) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is part of a defence of abstractionism in Cantor and Dedekind (see K.Fine also on the subject). To know the members of a set, or size of a domain, you need to know the process or function which created the set. |
9985 | Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait] |
Full Idea: A different reading of abstraction is that it concerns, not the individuating properties of the elements relative to one another, but rather the individuating properties of the set itself, for example the concept of what is its extension. | |
From: William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], VIII) | |
A reaction: If the set was 'objects in the room next door', we would not be able to abstract from the objects, but we might get to the idea of things being contain in things, or the concept of an object, or a room. Wrong. That's because they are objects... Hm. |
9972 | Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait] |
Full Idea: Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? | |
From: William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996]) | |
A reaction: [Tait is criticising Cantor] This expresses rather better than Frege or Dummett the central problem with the abstractionist view of how numbers are derived from matching groups of objects. |
9980 | If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait] |
Full Idea: If the power |A| is obtained by abstraction from set A, then if A is equipollent to set B, then |A| = |B|. But this does not imply that A = B. So |A| cannot just be A, taken in abstraction, unless that can identify distinct sets, ..or create new objects. | |
From: William W. Tait (Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind [1996], V) | |
A reaction: An elegant piece of argument, which shows rather crucial facts about abstraction. We are then obliged to ask how abstraction can create an object or a set, if the central activity of abstraction is just ignoring certain features. |
8096 | He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul [Joubert] |
Full Idea: He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1799) | |
A reaction: A rather crucial distinction in the world of hedonism. There seems something sincere about someone who pursues pleasure body and soul, and something fractured about the pursuit of pleasure without real commitment. The split seems possible. |
8104 | What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them? [Joubert] |
Full Idea: What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them? | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1802) | |
A reaction: A lovely test question for aspiring young hedonists! It doesn't follow at all that we will despise past pleasures. The judgement may be utilitarian - that we regret the pleasures that harmed others, but love the harmless ones. Shame is social. |
8097 | Virtue is hard if we are scorned; we need support [Joubert] |
Full Idea: It would be difficult to be scorned and to live virtuously. We have need of support. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800) | |
A reaction: He seems to have hit on what I take to be one of the keys to Aristotle: that virtue is a social matter, requiring both upbringing and a healthy culture. But we can help to create that culture, as well as benefiting from it. |
8106 | In raising a child we must think of his old age [Joubert] |
Full Idea: In raising a child we must think of his old age. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1809) | |
A reaction: Very nice, and Aristotle would approve. If educators think much about the future, it rarely extends before the child's first job. We should be preparing good grand-parents, as well as parents and employees. Educate for retirement! |
8105 | We can't exactly conceive virtue without the idea of God [Joubert] |
Full Idea: If we exclude the idea of God, it is impossible to have an exact idea of virtue. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1808) | |
A reaction: I suspect that an 'exact' idea is impossible even with an idea of God. This is an interesting defence of the importance of God in moral thinking, but it only requires the concept of a supreme being, and not belief. |
8102 | We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love [Joubert] |
Full Idea: We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love. | |
From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1801) | |
A reaction: This seems to be rather true at the present time, when a wave of anti-religious books is sweeping through our culture. Presumably this remark used to be true of ancient paganism, but it died away. Christianity, though, is very personal. |