37 ideas
15105 | F(x) walked into a bar. The barman said.. [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: F(x) walked into a bar. The barman said, 'Sorry, we don't cater for functions'. | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12408 | Sartre to Waitress: Coffee with no cream, please... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: Sartre to Waitress: Coffee with no cream, please. Waitress: Sorry, we're out of cream; would no milk do? | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12397 | Said Plato: 'The things that we feel... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: Said Plato: 'The things that we feel/ Are not ontologically real,/ But just the excrescence/ Of numinous essence/ Our senses can never reveal.' [Basil Ransome-Davis] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12407 | Barman to Descartes: Would you like another drink?... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: Barman to Descartes: Would you like another drink? Descartes: I think not (...and promptly vanishes) | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12399 | There was a young student called Fred... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: There was a young student called Fred,/ Who was questioned on Descartes and said:/ 'It's perfectly clear/ That I'm not really here,/ For I haven't a thought in my head.' [V.R. Ormerod] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
20963 | A philosopher and his wife are out for a drive... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: A philosopher and his wife are out for a drive in the country. 'Oh look!' she says, 'Those sheep have been shorn.' 'Yes', says the philosopher, 'on this side'. | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12404 | Dear Sir, Your astonishment's odd.... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: (reply to 12403) Dear Sir, Your astonishment's odd:/ I am always about in the Quad./ And that's why the tree/ Will continue to be,/ Since observed by Yours faithfully, God.' [anon] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12403 | There once was a man who said: 'God... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: There once was a man who said: 'God/ Must think it exceedingly odd/ If he finds that this tree/ Continues to be,/ When there's no-one about in the Quad.' [Ronald Knox] (reply in 12404) | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12402 | ..But if he's a student of Berkeley... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: (continued from 12401) ..But if he's a student of Berkeley,/ One thing will emerge, rather starkly,/ That he ought to believe/ What his senses perceive,/ No matter how dimly or darkly. [Leslie Johnson] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12409 | The philosopher Berkeley once said.. [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: The philosopher Berkeley once said/ In the dark to a maid in his bed:/ 'No perception, my dear,/ Means I'm not really here,/ But only a thought in your head.' [P.W.R. Foot] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
14694 | "My dog's got synaesthesia." How does he smell? ..... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: "My dog's got synaesthesia." How does he smell? "Purple." | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12401 | A toper who spies in the distance... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: A toper who spies in the distance,/ Striped tigers, will get some assistance/ From reading Descartes,/ Who holds that it's part/ Of his duty to doubt their existence. ... [Leslie Johnson] - (continued in 12402) | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12410 | There once was a man who said 'Damn!... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: There once was a man who said 'Damn!/ It is borne in upon me I am/ An engine that moves/ In predestinate grooves:/ I'm not even a bus, I'm a tram.' [M.E. Hare] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
9392 | How do behaviourists greet each other? [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: How do behaviourists greet each other? Hi - you're fine, how am I? | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: There are different levels of action, including at least: unconscious and/or involuntary behaviour, purposeful or goal-directed activity, intentional action, and the autonomous acts or actions of self-consciously active human agents. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: The fourth class is obviously designed to distinguish us from the other animals. It immediately strikes me as very optimistic to distinguish four (at least) clear categories, but you have to start somewhere. |
20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Some say that the movement's of agent's body are never actions. It is only the agent's direct moving of, say, his leg that constitutes a physical action; the leg movement is merely caused by and/or incorporated as part of the act of moving. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2) | |
A reaction: [they cite Jennifer Hornsby 1980] It seems normal to deny a twitch the accolade of an 'action', so I suppose that is right. Does the continual movement of my tongue count as action? Only if I bring it under control? Does it matter? Only in forensics. |
20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers have favored the overt arm movement the agent performs, some favor the extended causal process he initiates, and some prefer the relevant event of trying that precedes and 'generates' the rest. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2) | |
A reaction: [Davidson argues for the second, Hornsby for the third] There seems no way to settle this, and a compromise looks best. Mere movement won't do, and mere trying won't do, and whole processes get out of control. |
20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: If someone fires a bullet to kill someone, misses, and dislodges hornets that sting him to death, this implies that an intentional action must include succeeding in a manner according to the original plan. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: [their example, compressed] This resembles Gettier's problem cases for knowledge. If the shooter deliberately and maliciously brought down the hornet's nest, that would be intentional murder. Sounds right. |
20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: If someone enters the lottery with the bizarre belief that they can control who wins, and then wins it, that suggest that intentional actions must not depend on sheer luck, but needs competent exercise of the relevant skill. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: A nice companion to Idea 20022, which show that a mere intention is not sufficient to motivate and explain an action. |
20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: If an agent tries to do something by two different means, only one of which can succeed, then the behaviour is rational, even though one of them is an attempt to do an action which cannot succeed. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: [a concise account of a laborious account of an example from Bratman 1984, 1987] Bratman uses this to challenge the 'Simple View', that intention leads straightforwardly to action. |
20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: On the simple desire-belief model, an intention is a combination of desire-belief states, and an action is intentional in virtue of standing in the appropriate relation to these simpler terms. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 4) | |
A reaction: This is the traditional view found in Hume, and is probably endemic to folk psychology. They cite Bratman 1987 as the main opponent of the view. |
20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Rational group action may involve a 'collectivising of reasons', with participants acting in ways that are not rationally recommended from the individual viewpoint. This suggests that groups can be rational, intentional agents. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: [Pettit 2003] is the source for this. Gilbert says individuals can have joint commitment; Pettit says the group can be an independent agent. The matter of shared intentions is interesting, but there is no need for the ontology to go berserk. |
20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: An account of mutual obligation to do something may require that we give up reductive individualist accounts of shared activity and posit a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: [attributed to Margaret Gilbert 2000] If 'we' are trying to do something, that seems to give an externalist picture of intentions, rather like all the other externalisms floating around these days. I don't buy any of it, me. |
20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: A Strong Cognitivist is someone who identifies an intention with a certain pertinent belief about what she is doing or about to do. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1) | |
A reaction: (Sarah Paul 2009 makes this distinction) The belief, if so, seems to be as much counterfactual as factual. Hope seems to come into it, which isn't exactly a belief. |
20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: A Weak Cognitivist holds that intentions are partly constituted by, but are not identical with, relevant beliefs about the action. Grice (1971) said an intention is willing an action, combined with a belief that this will lead to the action. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] I didn't find Strong Cognitivism appealing, but it seems hard to argue with some form of the weak version. |
20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Strong Cognitivists say intentions/beliefs are not based on observation or evidence, and are causally reliable in leading to appropriate actions, so this is a mode of 'practical' knowledge that has not been derived from observation. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [compressed - Stanford unnecessarily verbose!] I see no mention in this discussion of 'hoping' that your action will turn out OK. We are usually right to hope, but it would be foolish to say that when we reach for the salt we know we won't knock it over. |
20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Some have maintained that we explain why an agent acted as he did when we explicate how the agent's normative reasons rendered the action intelligible in his eyes. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: Modern psychology is moving against this, by showing how hidden biases can predominate over conscious reasons (as in Kahnemann's work). I would say this mode of explanation works better for highly educated people (but you can chuckle at that). |
20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: Most causalists allow that reason explanations are teleological, but say that such purposive explanations are analysable causally, where the primary reasons for the act are the guiding causes of the act. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: The authors observe that it is hard to adjudicate on this matter, and that the concept of the 'cause' of an action is unclear. |
20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
Full Idea: The view that reason explanations are somehow causal explanations remains the dominant position. | |
From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: I suspect that this is only because no philosopher has a better idea, and the whole issue is being slowly outflanked by psychology. |
12405 | 'If you're aristocratic,' said Nietzsche... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: 'If you're aristocratic,' said Nietzsche,/ 'It's thumbs up, you're OK. Pleased to mietzsche./ If you're working-class bores,/ It's thumbs down and up yours!/ If you don't know your place, then I'll tietzsche.' [Gerry Hamill] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
9391 | Why do anarchists drink herbal tea? [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: Why do anarchists drink herbal tea? Because proper tea is theft. | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
12400 | Cries the maid: 'You must marry me Hume!'... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: Cries the maid: 'You must marry me Hume!'/ A statement that made David fume./ He said: 'In cause and effect,/ There is a defect;/ That it's mine you can only assume.' [P.W.R. Foot] | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
16527 | Causation - we all thought we knew it/ Till Hume came along and saw through it/…. [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: Causation - we all thought we knew it / Till Hume came along and saw through it / We notice that A / Follows B every day / And frankly that's all there is to it. | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
17592 | The barman called 'Time!', and Augustine said..... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: The barman called 'Time!'. Augustine: 'I don't know what you mean, though I did before you said that'. | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
15208 | The past, present and future walked into a bar.... [Sommers,W] |
Full Idea: The past, present and future walked into a bar. It was tense. | |
From: Will Sommers (talk [2019]) |
16713 | Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics. | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2 |
6610 | I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian] |
Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est'). | |
From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though. |