18 ideas
1813 | All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Twelfth mode: all reasoning leads on to further reasoning, and this process goes on forever. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
1811 | Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Fifteenth mode: proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
1815 | Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Fourteenth mode: reasoning requires arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
1812 | All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Eleventh mode: all topics of discussion are full of uncertainty and contradiction. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
16052 | 'Superdupervenience' is supervenience that has a robustly materialistic explanation [Horgan,T] |
Full Idea: The idea of a ontological supervenience that is robustly explainable in a materialistically explainable way I hereby dub 'superdupervenience'. | |
From: Terence Horgan (From Supervenience to Superdupervenience [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: [He credits William Lycan with the actual word] His assumption prior to this introduction is that mere supervenience just adds a new mystery. I take supervenience to be an observation of 'tracking', which presumably needs to be explained. |
16053 | 'Global' supervenience is facts tracking varying physical facts in every possible world [Horgan,T] |
Full Idea: The idea of 'global supervenience' is standardly expressed as 'there are no two physically possible worlds which are exactly alike in all physical respects but different in some other respect'. | |
From: Terence Horgan (From Supervenience to Superdupervenience [1993], §5) | |
A reaction: [Jaegwon Kim is the source of this concept] The 'local' view will be that they do indeed track, but they could, in principle, come apart. A zombie might be a case of them possibly coming apart. Zombies are silly. |
16056 | Don't just observe supervenience - explain it! [Horgan,T] |
Full Idea: Although the task of explaining supervenience has been little appreciated and little discussed in the philosophical literature, it is time for that to change. | |
From: Terence Horgan (From Supervenience to Superdupervenience [1993], §8) | |
A reaction: I would offer a strong addition to this: be absolutely sure that you are dealing with two distinct things in the supervenience relationship, before you waste time trying to explain how they relate to one another. |
16054 | Physicalism needs more than global supervenience on the physical [Horgan,T] |
Full Idea: Global supervenience seems too weak to capture the physical facts determining all the facts. …There could be two spatio-temporal regions alike in all physical respects, but different in some intrinsic non-physical respect. | |
From: Terence Horgan (From Supervenience to Superdupervenience [1993], §5) | |
A reaction: I.e. there might be two physically identical regions, but one contains angels and the other doesn't (so the extra fact isn't tracking the physical facts). Physicalism I take to be the simple denial of the angels. Supervenience is an explanandum. |
16055 | Materialism requires that physics be causally complete [Horgan,T] |
Full Idea: Any broadly materialistic metaphysical position needs to claim that physics is causally complete. | |
From: Terence Horgan (From Supervenience to Superdupervenience [1993], §6) | |
A reaction: Since 'physics' is a human creation, I presume he means that physical reality is causally complete. The interaction problem that faced Descartes seems crucial - how could something utterly non-physical effect a physical change? |
8850 | Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M] |
Full Idea: Agrippa's Trilemma offers three possible outcomes for a regress of justification: the chain goes on for ever (infinite); or the chain stops at an unjustified proposition (arbitrary); or the chain eventually includes the original proposition (circular). | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60], §2) by Michael Williams - Without Immediate Justification §2 | |
A reaction: This summarises Ideas 1911, 1913 and 1914. Agrippa's Trilemma is now a standard starting point for modern discussions of foundations. Personally I reject 2, and am torn between 1 (+ social consensus) and 3 (with a benign, coherent circle). |
411 | If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes] |
Full Idea: No man has seen certain truth, and no man will ever know about the gods and other things I mentioned; for if he succeeds in saying what is fully true, he himself is unaware of it; opinion is fixed by fate on all things. | |
From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B34), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.49.4 |
1814 | Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Thirteenth mode: everything is always perceived in relation to something else. | |
From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10 |
412 | If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes] |
Full Idea: If God had not created yellow honey, men would say that figs were sweeter. | |
From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B38), quoted by Herodian - On Peculiar Speech 41.5 |
16057 | Instrumentalism normally says some discourse is useful, but not genuinely true [Horgan,T] |
Full Idea: Instrumentalist views typically attribute utility to the given body of discourse, but deny that it expresses genuine truths. | |
From: Terence Horgan (From Supervenience to Superdupervenience [1993], §8) | |
A reaction: To me it is obvious to ask why anything could have a high level of utility (especially in accounts of the external physical world) without being true. Falsehoods may sometimes (though I doubt it) be handy in human life, but useful in chemistry…? |
1640 | The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato] |
Full Idea: The Eleatic tribe, which had its beginnings from Xenophanes and still earlier, proceed on the grounds that all things so-called are one. | |
From: report of Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE]) by Plato - The Sophist 242d |
3055 | Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Xenophanes taught that the essence of God was of a spherical form, in no respect resembling man. | |
From: report of Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.2.3 |
408 | Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes] |
Full Idea: Ethiopians have gods with snub noses and black hair, Thracians have gods with grey eyes and red hair. | |
From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B16), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 7.22.1 |
407 | Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes] |
Full Idea: Mortals believe the gods to be created by birth, and to have raiment, voice and body like mortals'. | |
From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B14), quoted by Clement - Miscellanies 5.109.2 |