23224
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That all matter thinks is absurd, and would make each part of our bodies a distinct self-consciousness [Bentley]
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Full Idea:
[Belief in thinking matter] leads to monstrous absurdities. …Every stock and stone would be a percipient and rational creature. …every single Atom of our bodies would be a distinct Animal, endued with self-consciousness and personal sensation of its own.
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From:
Richard Bentley (Matter and Motion Cannot Think [1692], p.14-15), quoted by Matthew Cobb - The Idea of the Brain 2
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A reaction:
Sounds correct, though presumably panpsychists don't think the flickers of consciousness in my toenails and hair constitute full-blown persons. I can't imagine what awareness is being claimed for my toenails.
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5845
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Niceratus learnt the whole of Homer by heart, as a guide to goodness [Xenophon]
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Full Idea:
Niceratus said that his father, because he was concerned to make him a good man, made him learn the whole works of Homer, and he could still repeat by heart the entire 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey'.
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From:
Xenophon (Symposium [c.391 BCE], 3.5)
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A reaction:
This clearly shows the status which Homer had in the teaching of morality in the time of Socrates, and it is precisely this acceptance of authority which he was challenging, in his attempts to analyse the true basis of virtue
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18089
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Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place]
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Full Idea:
Dispositions are the substantive laws, not, as for Armstrong, of nature in general, but of the nature of individual entities whose dispositional properties they are.
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From:
Ullin T. Place (Intentionality and the Physical: reply to Mumford [1999], 6)
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A reaction:
[He notes that Nancy Cartwright 1989 agrees with him] I like this a lot. I tend to denegrate 'laws', because of their dubious ontological status, but this restores laws to the picture, in the place where they belong, in the stuff of the world.
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