Combining Philosophers

Ideas for K Marx / F Engels, DH Mellor / T Crane and Paul M. Churchland

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4 ideas

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
     Full Idea: There are many psychophysical laws, linking sensations to non-mental features of those who have them; the industries of anaesthetics, scents, narcotics, sweeteners, coloured paints, loudspeakers and soft cushions depend on them.
     From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.198)
     A reaction: It may be expressing it a little strongly to call these 'laws', but they are certainly reliable regularities, and they are probably enough to undermine Davidson's claim that such laws don't exist.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false [Kirk,R on Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: It may well be that completed neuroscience will not include a reduction of folk psychology, but why should that be a reason to regard it as false? It would only be a reason if irreducibility entailed that they could not possibly both be true.
     From: comment on Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981]) by Robert Kirk - Mind and Body 3.9
     A reaction: If all our behaviour had been explained by a future neuro-science, this might not falsify folk psychology, but it would totally marginalise it. It is still possible that dewdrops are placed on leaves by fairies, but this is no longer a hot theory.
Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Eliminative materialism says our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena is a radically false theory, so defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced (rather than reduced).
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981], Intro)
     A reaction: It is hard to see what you could replace the idea of a 'belief' with in ordinary conversation. We may reduce beliefs to neuronal phenomena, but we can't drop the vocabulary of the macro-phenomena. The physics of weather doesn't eliminate 'storms'.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]
     Full Idea: Neither laws nor causation nor claims of supervenience (the last refuge of the physicalist) deprive psychology of the ontological authority of non-mental science.
     From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.203)
     A reaction: There is no need to defend the practice of psychologists (or garden designers) from the depradations of bandit physicalists. But what is the ontology of psychology if it isn't dualist or physicalist?