Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Sarah Bakewell, Roy Ellen and Jody Azzouni

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3 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni]
     Full Idea: 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' can be taken as true without have any truthmaker.
     From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.3)
     A reaction: There might be an equivocation over 'true' here. 'What, really really true that he IS a fictional mouse?'
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni]
     Full Idea: No truth predicate is ever indispensable, because Tarski biconditionals, the equivalences between sentences and explicit truth ascriptions to those sentences, allow us to replace explicit truth ascriptions with the sentences themselves.
     From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Ch.1)
     A reaction: Holding a sentence to be true isn't the same as saying that it is true, and it isn't the same as saying the sentence, because one might say it in an ironic tone of voice.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni]
     Full Idea: My take on truth is a fairly deflationary one: The role of the truth predicate is to enable us to assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit.
     From: Jody Azzouni (Deflating Existential Consequence [2004], Intro)
     A reaction: Clearly this is a role for truth, as in 'I forget what he said, but I know it was true', but it isn't remotely what most people understand by true. We use 'true' about totally explicit sentences all the time.