Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Michael Burke, E Conee / R Feldman and Trenton Merricks

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2 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks]
     Full Idea: The 'warrant' for a belief is that, whatever it is, that makes the difference between mere true belief and knowledge.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], 7.II)
     A reaction: Hence a false belief could be well justified, but it could never be warranted. This makes warrant something like the externalist view of justification, a good supporting situation for a belief, rather than an inner awareness of support for it.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman]
     Full Idea: Our limited cognitive capacities lead Goldman to deny a principle instructing people to believe all the logical consequences of their beliefs, since they are unable to have the infinite number of beliefs that following such a principle would require.
     From: E Conee / R Feldman (Evidentialism [1985], 'Doxastic')
     A reaction: This doesn't sound like much of an objection to epistemic closure, which I took to be the claim that you know the 'known' entailments of your knowledge.